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ABSTRACT
THREE FACES OF THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY:
IDENTITY, RATIONALITY AND UNIVERSALITY
Savaş Ş. Barkçin
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Supervisor: Associate Professor E. Fuat Keyman
June 2001
The thesis investigates the question of legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy as
manifested by the processes, debates, concepts, popular demands and emerging
new identities and forms of politics along the globalization phenomenon. It argues
that this crisis is situated in three principal sites of the liberal theoretical and
normative conceptualization: identity, rationality and universality.
Then a dialogical and thematic reading is carried out among various theoretical
positions in order to find out whether the current legitimacy crisis is an ephemeral
or conjunctural development or rather it is a crisis which is exacerbated by the
basic assumptions, modalities and configurations provided by the liberal
democratic discourse. These positions are classical liberalism, the Rawlsian
perspective and the communitarians, Habermas and the theory of deliberative
democracy, and finally radical democracy and agonistic democracy approach
within it. All these theoretical positions are critically presented and evaluated on
the basis of their capacity to offer alternatives for the legitimacy crisis and for the
reconstruction of the democratic legitimacy.
In the final chapter, general findings, problems and prospects are introduced and
certain strategies and modalities of theorization for political science are suggested
which would both strengthen democratic participation and reconstitute the
democratic legitimacy based on the intrinsic relationship between politics and
ethics which has been largely ignored in the liberal democratic thought.
Keywords: Political Science, Political Theory, Liberal Democracy, Globalization
iv
ÖZET
LİBERAL DEMOKRASİDEKİ MEŞRUİYET KRİZİNİN ÜÇ YÜZÜ:
KİMLİK, USSALLIK VE EVRENSELLİK
Savaş Ş. Barkçin
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç.Dr. E. Fuat Keyman
Haziran 2001
Bu tez, küreselleşme olgusu ile beraber ortaya çıkan süreçler, kavramlar,
tartışmalar, kavramlar, kamusal talepler, yeni kimlikler ve siyasa şekilleri ile
belirginleşen liberal demokrasideki meşruiyet krizi sorununu irdelemektedir. Bu
krizin liberal teorik ve normatif kavramsallaştırmadaki üç ana merkezde ortaya
çıktığı vurgulanmaktadır: kimlik, ussallık ve evrensellik.
Bunun ardından, mevcut meşruiyet krizinin geçici veya mevsimsel bir olgu olup
olmadığını, ya da bu krizin liberal demokrasi söyleminde mündemiç temel
varsayımlar, modaliteler ve kavramsal çerçevelere dayandığını belirlemek için,
çeşitli siyasi konumlar arasında bir diyalojik ve tematik okuma yapılmaktadır. Bu
siyasi konumlar klasik liberal, Rawls'un teorisi ve toplulukçular, Habermas ve
diyalogcu demokrasi teorisi ve son olarak da radikal demokrasi ve onun içinde yer
alan agonistik demokrasi yaklaşımlarıdır. Bütün bu teorik konumlar,  liberal
demokrasinin meşruiyet krizine ve demokratik meşruiyetin yeniden inşasına
alternatif olma kabiliyetlerini ortaya koyacak şekilde eleştirel bir şekilde
sunulmakta ve değerlendirilmektedir.
Son bölümde, tezin tesbit ettiği genel bulgular, problemler ve ileriye yönelik
açılımlar sıralanmakta, ayrıca siyaset düşüncesi çerçevesinde hem demokratik
katılımı güçlendirecek, hem de liberal demokrasi düşüncesinde genellikle gözardı
edilen siyasa ile etik arasındaki birbiriyle içiçe ilişkiye dayalı demokratik
meşruiyetin yeniden kurulmasına yardımcı olacak çeşitli teorileştirme stratejileri
ve modaliteleri sunulmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyaset Bilimi, Siyaset Teorisi, Liberal Demokrasi,
     Küreselleşme
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Globalization and the Ethical Concern
Ethics has always been a significant part of political philosophy. It is at the same
time the theoretical realm where legitimation and rationality arguments often
encounter and contest. Legitimacy of the liberal democratic politics, like all other
polities, transforms power into authority, habitual politics into an ethical/normative
practice.  Ethical question stands at the crossroads between the modern and
postmodern conceptions of politics because both conceptions differ in terms of the
problems they define, as well as the ways in which democracy is expected to
handle these problems.
The aim of my dissertation is to gain an insight into the legitimacy crisis of liberal
democracy and its implications for political theory, in general, and the democratic
theory, in particular. This crisis has been highlighted by the general change that is
conventionally called "globalization".
Major political consequences of globalization that contribute to the legitimacy
crisis are  collective claims made by new social movements and the demands for
redefinition of public sphere and democratic citizenship. The representative
regimes seem to be unable to meet demands by emerging identity/differences. As a
result, Balkanization of identities -- ethnic and religious fragmentation of identities
previously ignored leads to conflicts and threatens  democracy as a political
system, as an idea, and as an ideal. Hence a decline in the mass loyalty and
2confidence in party politics, institutional mechanisms of representation such as the
Parliament, and in the bureaucratic system as a whole, an eroding pattern of
participation in elections and other political activities, a sense of the demise of the
political ideologies in general, and an apparent convergence of political discourses.
The outcome is  a political indifference or apathy. These signs in liberal
democratic societies show us that the liberal democratic state is faced with a
legitimacy crisis together with a governability crisis which also has significant
ramifications for the liberal political thought, its conceptions, theoretical tools, and
modalities.
On the other hand, globalization paradoxically marks a euphoric revival of
democracy prima facie after the Cold War. The challenge before democracy and
democratic theory is now to revitalize the democratic ideals alongside the very
process of apparent democratic expansion in the world.
Concomitant to the legitimacy crisis of liberal nation state, we have the emerging
theoretical positions  which focus on the crisis of modernity and claims
announcing the end of the Enlightenment project.
Globalization is the basis for my study because it carries tremendous implications
for the liberal democratic construction of the nation state and for its ethical
configuration in terms of its conception of the self, the Other, the Reason as the
modus operandi and universalism as the axiological framework.
My goal in this thesis is to attempt a thematic and critical reading of various
positions with regard to the legitimacy crisis of liberalism in order to explore the
3plausibility of a new political-normative framework which would ensure the
viability of the democratic model in the face of globalization.
This thesis is written from the perspective of political theory which aims to provide
a systematic analysis of the discourses, theoretical attempts and explanations which
frame politics.  If political science is an empirical study of the institutions,
processes, interactions and ramifications centered around the realm of political
action and thought, political theory provides a framework which shapes them. In
this thesis I will systematically analyze theories, models and modalities of political
science as well as ethics.
My methodology is based on a careful, systematic, detailed and critical reading of
the theories related to the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy in a way to reveal
the fundamental differences and similarities between them. This critical reading I
have mentioned allows me to come up with prepositions related to the
reconstruction of the intrinsic relationship between ethics and politics in a way to
make it capable of answering some of the important questions of our globalizing
world. And at the same time this critical reading also permits for a better
understanding of democratic ethics as I will be proposing in the concluding
chapter.
Usually the literature is based on incompatibility of ethics and politics. In this
thesis I present a critical dialogical reading among the theories which underline
autonomy while those others which stress solidarity, as well as those which focus
on conflict, while some others which emphasize order. A dialogical reading
4between the various theories I will be discussing will provide a more plausible
synthesis for that task. And this is where the originality of my thesis lies in.
1.2 Liberal Democracy Revisited: A Theoretical Overview
Modern critics of liberal democracy have emphasized the significance of the moral
question as opposed to legal-rational basis of liberal democracy that is indeed a
product of the Enlightenment. Hence the debate  between communitarians and the
Rawlsian liberals, as well as the approaches such as deliberative and radical
democrats emerge not only as theoretical positions seeking an accommodation of
the liberal democracy’s problems, but those that take aim directly at the definition
of politics as a “conflict management” procedure per se. The critics of liberal
democracy advance substantial theoretical investigation of the human relations,
identity and agency, and definition of the nature of the political question.  The
common denominator for all the critics of the liberal credo is the need for
reintroducing ethics into politics.  Thus the conventional liberal understanding of
democracy as a procedural, legal and rational system is challenged by ethical and
normative claims that ask for a more participatory and moral democracy.
In my dissertation I am going to try to present arguments for reintroduction of
ethics into democracy. Subsequently I will compare and analyze them and come up
with the possibilities, and risks, highlight the inconsistencies and theoretical
promises of each approach. Generally, our study is designed to find out whether
liberal democracy is capable of regenerating and resurrecting itself in the face of its
legitimacy crisis.
5The positions of the critics of liberal democracy imply a larger theoretical quest for
a redefinition of the universe of political assumptions and tools developed along
the Enlightenment project, such as rationalism, foundationalism, constructionism,
universalism, individualism, constitutionalism and social evolutionism.
Therefore the debate on the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy and the debate
on the crisis of modernity seem to converge in their respective limitations and
prospects for political theorization in general, and an increasing appeal of ethics to
political science as well as other social disciplines.
The legitimacy crisis of the liberal nation state can be said to be manifest in three
peculiar developments: the shaking of the faith in the modern rational man, the
questions over the singularity and homogeneity of the liberal subject, and the
critique regarding the universal connotation of the liberal credo. These notions of
rationality, identity and universality also constitute the three important themes for
the debate between modernist and postmodernist camps.
This trinity of rationality, identity and universality constitutes the background of
both the positing the politico-ethical claims as well as the tensions, fractures and
failures to grasp, articulate and truly reflect the social reality for any liberal or
competing ideology.  In other words, these are sites for both construction as well as
crisis. They also highlight the crisis on modern conception of the ethical and the
political that at the same time furnishes the political morality of liberalism.  My
thesis, seen from this perspective, becomes a theoretical analysis which underlines
the intrinsic relationship between politics and ethics and introduces a junction
where the ontological (self), epistemological (rationality), and axiological
6(universality) elements meet. These three areas constitute the main intersection not
only between political and ethical conceptions, but also between major debates
within modern political theory.
In order to explore the significance of the legitimacy crisis of the liberal democracy
fully, we need to assess whether the groundwork of liberalism has had any
inconsistency from the start. In other words, it needs to be examined whether all its
assumptions regarding the human nature, rationality, identity and universality
contribute to the current politico-ethical crisis.
Therefore, we need to rely on an analysis of these three sites of the crisis in
considering the liberal construction of politics.  For this objective, we need to take
into consideration four prominent political-normative approaches within
liberalism: the natural rights approach of Locke, the Kantian contractarianism, the
utilitarianism of Mill, and the Rawlsian revision. These figures and strands best
exemplify the question to what extent the liberal credo deserves the critique that
the liberal conception of political ethics per se limits, distorts, displaces the
political.
Essentially, our thesis presents a theoretical inquiry and will require the assessment
of current debates on the vulnerability of the liberal nation state, an in-depth
exploration of the normative crisis inherent in that crisis, and examining whether
the liberal credo contributes to that crisis. Then we need to address the question
whether the liberal (like that of Rawls, or in some sense Habermas) or non-liberal
(e.g. radical democracy, republicanism and communitarianism) approaches to the
crisis can generate sound and theoretically justifiable remedies, and we will discuss
7the ramifications of the legitimacy crisis according to our understanding of the
relationship between ethics and politics in particular and, political morality in
general.
The thinkers and the lines of thought covered in the thesis are selected on the basis
of their significance in terms of the normative-political arguments in relation to the
liberal constitution of the self, reliance on rationalism and the idea of universalism.
My concern is not to refute or fully sponsor the liberal theory altogether, but to
explore the weaknesses and problems inherent in its theoretical constitution.
Therefore I exempted from my study those anti-liberal or libertarian thinkers and
movements which have agendas outside the framework of my study.  I also limited
the discussion on liberal nation state strictly to its locus in the globalization
processes otherwise the topic of nation state alone constitutes the focus of a vast
body of theoretical discusssion.
1.3 An Overview of the Thesis
In my thesis I will attempt to carry out a thematic inquiry, and a critical reading of
the models that emphasize a theoretical shift to a reformulation of politics on the
basis of legitimacy instead  of rationality. This will call for a scrutiny of all major
positions such as the Rawlsian contractarianism, deliberative democracy, radical
democracy and communitarianism with reference to their normative and ethical
perspectives by demonstrating theoretical limitations and prospects of each model.
Then I will pose a question whether these approaches could provide democracy
with a viable and consistent ethical framework that would prevent the anti-
8democratic impulses including fundamentalisms of all sorts and “negative
dialectics” of identity politics.
Consequently, such a thematic reading will lead to a discussion on the constitution
of the relationship between "the political" and "the ethical" in liberal democracy by
utilizing the symptoms that underline the misconfiguration, or misconception for
that matter—of liberal democracy as well as the competing political perspectives.
In order to deliver a critical reading of the positions with regards to the legitimacy
crisis of the liberal democracy,  I will first analyze the liberal approaches on the
legitimacy crisis, then major alternatives to this crisis.  I do so by exploring the
respective stances of these approaches with regards to three sites of the legitimacy
crisis: identity, rationality and universality. The concluding chapter attempts to
sketch the possibilities, opportunities and strategies for reconstitution of
democratic theory.
Chapter II deals with the pressures exerted upon the liberal nation state by the
globalization processes, and its political-normative implications because the
legitimacy crisis is based largely on the ability or inability of the liberal discourse
to respond this change. It identifies three sites of the normative crisis of liberalism
and their significance for the concept of "change" by considering the debate
between the modernist and the postmodernist approaches. These sites are: Identity,
rationality and universality. The postmodern critique of these sites are evaluated
for it highlights the crisis of modern ethics and the modern conception of man that
also shapes the political morality of liberalism. The debate between the
postmodernist and the modernist approaches has an impact on the definition of the
9"political". Therefore it takes us to the question of the definition of the "ethical"
and subsequently the relationship between change and ethics.
Chapter III presents an analysis of the ethical universe of liberalism in order to
consider the underlying theoretical causes for that crisis.  In this part of the
dissertation, I elaborate on the three distinct ethical approaches liberalism
possesses and which have tremendous significance for the constitution of the
liberal conceptions of identity, rationality and universality: the contractarian
approach of John Locke and Kant, and the utilitarian brand of John Stuart Mill. At
this point, I try to examine how the roots of the liberal normative framework
correspond with the three sites of the crisis of the liberal democratic framework as
mentioned above. Kant is given a special place both he is the thinker who may be
considered as the primary founder of the normative model of liberalism and also
because he still has a tremendous influence in shaping the liberal discourse.
Chapter IV turns to the question how the Rawlsian deontological liberalism tries to
respond the theoretical weaknesses of the liberal normative conception and the
response of the communitarians by looking again at how these three sites of the
normative crisis are considered, conceived and eventually shaped by that debate. I
focus on Rawls who has regenerated the political theory by developing a modern
interpretation of the liberal democracy and communitarians, because they both
characterize the contemporary debate on liberal order and moral universe.
Chapter V covers major non-liberal alternatives to this crisis while the first three
chapters of the thesis analyze the liberal conundrum on the subject which includes
the deliberative ethics model of Habermas and the radical democratic and
10
particularly the agonistic democratic discourse and the ramifications of these
approaches with regards to the same critical sites of identity, rationality and
universality. I analyzed the Habermasian theory in detail, because his attempt is
broadly a  synthesis between liberalism and the critical theory therefore stands as
an original contribution to the problem. It is also a theory which claims to offer a
response to the perennial tension between normativity and factity, by which the
political-normative questions brought by globalization may be answered. The
radical democratic approach on the other hand is considered because it emphasizes
participation and solidarity and tries to redefine the political with a tranformative
accent on the political theorization in general. Both approaches may be considered
as major theoretical stances which stress the democratic element in the liberal
democratic synthesis and offer strategies to combat the insulating, depoliticizing,
conformizing and silencing tendencies implied by the legitimacy crisis of liberal
nation state alongside globalization.
Chapter VI concludes my thesis. In this chapter I analyze the elements of a
theoretical framework for an ethical reconstruction of democratic legitimacy,
drawing upon the theoretical clues I derive from this thematic discussion of
perspectives on legitimacy crisis. I also present traps awaiting at any theoretical
attempt for such a reconstruction. Finally, based on this theoretical framework, I
discuss the plausibility and elaborate on possible constitutive elements of a new
democratic ethic that could respond to the liberal democracy’s legitimacy crisis.
The theoretical discussion and thematic reading of the approaches on ethical
construction of liberalism in my dissertation indicate that the constitution of the
political in liberalism suffers from a misreading and thus misconception of the
11
multiplicity, ambivalence, and multidimensionality of the human experience. This
leads to a political thought which indeed sees politics as a  negative practice since
it defines it by clash of interests. The three faces of the legitimacy crisis of
liberalism, namely, identity, rationality and universality all prove that the liberal
political morality often emerges as a formalist, and conformist model upon which
the diversity of aims, projects, conceptions of the good by the individuals is
uniformized. The social and affective elements for the political constitution such as
solidarity, care, other-regarding, compassion are by and large ignored.  In the final
chapter, I attempt to propose some avenues where further theoretical attempts may
engender especially those which take into account the diversity of the political and
social constructions, historicity, ambivalence and which stress the embedded
relationship between politics and ethics.
12
CHAPTER II
GLOBALIZATION AND LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY
2.1 Globalization and Change
In last decades "globalization" became almost a shibboleth, and a buzz-word.
Globalization has proved to be a theoretical field where economics, sociology,
political science, philosophy, international relations, anthropology and cultural
studies all crisscross and contest, converge and conflict. Globalization discourse
has also opened the new challenges and theoretical avenues for political scientists.
However, interpretations of globalization as well as its theoretical evaluation and
construction show significant variance with regards to the approaches of various
schools and scholars as to how to define it: as an anomaly, a question, a threat, or
an opportunity. Thus the globalization issue becomes problematic. Globalization is
important not only as change, but also as the theoretical realm where contesting
ideas about the nature of politics and ethics as well as liberal and democratic
stances, and modernist and postmodernist positions crisscross. For my concern in
this thesis, globalization constitutes the domain for the emergence of the questions
of identity, rationality and universal relevance which all contribute to the
legitimacy crisis of liberal nation state.
In this chapter I will try to explore the extent to which globalization has
contributed to the question of legitimacy crisis of the liberal nation state as well as
its political and ethical ramifications. This discussion will provide a thematic
grounding for the coming discussion on modern and liberal ethics and its
13
constituency for liberal legitimacy that I will present in Chapter III.  And I will
argue that the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy as manifested by globalization
process is not a temporary phenomenon, but linked to the normative configuration
of "the political" in the liberal thought.
2.1.1 The Concept of Change
The discussion of change in general entails the ancient Greek statement panta rhei,
meaning "everything is in flux". In a similar sense, Alain Touraine asserts that one
of the chief questions of the modern sociologists has been: "if modernity is change,
how can a stable modern society exist?"  (Touraine, 1988: 29) Thus the very
concept of change constitutes the central element of modernity: its promotion,
valorization and character as the ground for social and political action and
organization has remained rather intact until recently. It is because of this equation
of change with modernity that modern polity is motivated to demarcate, limit and
structure the state vis-à-vis civil society, as well as determine the conception of
society in order to guarantee a certain level of order.
Hence the conceptions of order and change are part and parcel of any political
view. Similarly, this modernist conception of change is directly linked to the
liberal conception of order. This is the reason how the postmodern objection to
universality and Eurocentrism in modern project will have lasting impact on the
way "order", and for our purposes, the liberal political order has been constructed.
In some sense, the postmodern resistance to the Enlightenment project can be seen
as a search for a new order, however this time amidst uncertainty, irrationality and
ambivalence.
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This sense of modern "order" is most visible in common distinction between state
and society. In this way, the parties are enumerated and limited, and further
refinements within these each agents of human life are made through a strict
loyalty to this binomy. Just as the economic activity is supposed to be conducted
through either state or civil society actors, the political order is imagined as
composed of agents that are either dependents or representatives of the same
duality.
When globalization process is seen as "the change" that both empowers and
weakens the liberal democratic governance, it will be more meaningful to situate it
in a broad historical and theoretical context. For it is the component of change that
has been characteristic of modernity in general: the sacralization of change, its
desirability, its normative status and the fact that social sciences in general, and
political theory in particular, have concentrated on explaining change. Assuming
that globalization is ontologically and epistemologically possible, the political
theory also focuses on that issue in its orientation, methodologies and
nomenclature.
One of the most important challenges globalization process poses is the inability
and indeed insufficiency of the social sciences whose analytical and conventional
tools, models, conceptions and methodologies seem to be falling short in face of
the expanding horizons and changing parameters of action and human
organization. The "crisis of social sciences" as I prefer to call it, is linked
intimately with the larger crisis of modernity and the crisis of liberal democratic
nation state that I am going to discuss later. 1
                                                
1 The important challenge of globalization for the social sciences is methodological: it relates to
how social science perceives "change" in general, its scale, scope and possibilities. This is a rather
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Thus it is argued that political theory should not proceed with the conventional
analytical tools to understand and produce explanations for the global change, but
needs to devise a new understanding transcending the old conceptions of state,
civil society, citizenship, rights and liberties, representation, identities and cultures.
Let me now analyze some perspectives on globalization in order to explore the
scope, dynamics and challenges of the social change that necessitates the inquiry
regarding the political question that once again appeared in the debate on
legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy and the significance of ethics for this crisis.
2.1.2 Globalization as Change: The Perspectives
One of the most profound perspectives on globalization comes from Roland
Robertson. His approach to the problem is "moral and critical".  (Robertson, 1992:
28) His understanding of the process attests to its complex nature. He tries to bring
a new perspective drawn from historical, social, cultural and political thought.
For Robertson, "globalization is, at least empirically, not in and of itself a nice
thing", in spite of certain indications of world progress."  (Robertson, 1992: 6)
Globalization is not a recent event, rather it is an analytically emphasized period of
history in which "compression of the world" and increasing "consciousness of the
world as a whole" take place.  (Robertson, 1992: 8) Robertson claims the
                                                                                                                                      
delicate question since it relates to the normative and value-laden analyses abound in the subject of
globalization. The second challenge is the loci of this change. Is it nation state, Gemeinschaft,
Gesellschaft, system, structure, agent, or globality? The responses to this epistemological
problematic largely determine the power, relevance and reliability of the corresponding theoretical
explanation. Susan Strange (1995: 292) thinks that "most Western social science has been rendered
obsolete by these globalizing changes." Peter Taylor (1998) calls globalization "the social change
that undermined orthodox social science." He also argues that social sciences tried to meet the
challenge of globalization by two types of reaction: The first are those trying to reform the
orthodoxy by "internationalizing" the scope of their framework, but still relying on state-centered
model. The second is the one that is willing to make a thorough critique of the methodology and the
way of knowing, thus reconstituting heterodoxy instead of old orthodoxy and "liberating" social
science from nation state.
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globalization process dates from the 15th century through stages that indicate the
relative intensification of "global" relations among states, societies and
civilizations. He thinks that this long process of globalization seems to be
dominating the world and there is no possible retreat from it. Robertson refuses
Anthony Giddens's view that globalization is "a consequence of modernity".
(Robertson, 1992: 27) He sees globalization as a product of both modernity and
postmodernity.
Robertson argues for a global-human condition which he defines on four tenets:
national societies, world system of societies, selves and humankind. Involved in
relations among these four actors are four links of relativization: relativization of
citizenship, self-identities, social reference, and societies. Relativization here
means how identities previously assumed to be "caged" start to interact across
boundaries, cultural, political and otherwise.  (Robertson, 1992: 27) Globalization
has involved and continues to involve the institutionalized construction of the
individual.  (Robertson, 1991: 80)
Robertson presents a cultural perspective on globalization but not without playing
down discontinuities and differences. He explains how insufficient the
modernization theories, world-system theory and postmodern approach seem in
explaining this phenomenon. He presents the inability of the social theory to cope
with this process and indicates the growing problems with universalism-
particularism, functionalism-idealism debates. His stress is on an interdisciplinary
approach that would combine various fields. Robertson also draws our attention to
the central position of the concept of "globality" as the new unit of analysis in
social theory, and its significance as the catalyst for modernization process that
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also brings along fragmentation of identities, structural differentiation, cognitive
and moral relativity, ephemerality, etc..
Robertson's effort is to introduce heterogeneity of globalization process without
reducing it to a new homogeneity.  (Robertson, 1992: 141) His emphasis is that the
process puts greater impact within the societies.  (Robertson, 1992: 104) It has its
own logic, and can be reduced neither to intra-societal processes nor the
development of the inter-state system. Globalization is primarily the form in which
the world moves towards unicity.  (Robertson, 1992: 175) In other words,
Robertson does not think that the type of globalization that has been at work
recently is necessarily the only theoretically possible trajectory, and he professes
that there could have been other directions in which the world could be globalized.
He argues that the four reference points of globalization, namely nationally
constituted societies, the international system of societies, individuals in general
and humankind have recently become relatively independent foci of social practice.
(Robertson, 1992: 176) As a result, relativization of identity occurred; the
prevalence of "being human" and interpretations of world history multiplied,
resulting in emerging fundamentalisms and anti-fundamentalisms. What emerges
as the prominent feature of globalization is its contradictory or contested aspect;
both enabling and constraining the social entities and processes.  (Robertson, 1992:
61)
Robertson argues that globalization is "a form of universalization of particularism
and the particularization of universalism."  (Robertson, 1992: 102) Hence
resistance to contemporary globalization includes both anti-modernity (since there
18
is the will to oppose homogenization), and anti-postmodernity (since that
resistance needs to distinguish itself by giving lesser status to other cultural
entities). Even the anti-global movements (such as fundamentalisms) are contained
within the larger process of globalization. In this sense, globalization serves as a
field where identity claims can carry elements signifying both Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft tendencies at the same time.
In addition, globalization produces new actors and "third cultures" such as
transnational movements and international organizations. Cultural pluralism, for
example, is the constituent feature of globalization. However, Robertson perceives
the "global culture" ill-defined just like national or local culture, since the ways we
imagine for organizing of the world blind us to the "shifting definitions of global
circumstance".  (Robertson, 1992: 114) He tries to contain both types of analyses
regarding representation of identity in globalization. In his view, "relativism"
stresses discontinuities and is postmodern, anti-foundational and anti-totalistic,
against any "universalizing" act. On the other hand, what he calls  "worldism", or
world-system approach as foundationalist because it claims that it is possible to
grasp the world as a whole.  (Robertson, 1991: 73)
On the contrary, Anthony Giddens defines globalization as "the intensification of
worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local
happenings are shaped by events miles away and vice versa".  (Giddens, 1990: 64)
He delineates four dimensions of globalization: the nation-state system, the world
capitalist economy, the world military order and the international division of labor.
In this sense, globalization means enlargement of modernity, expanding from
western society to the world.  (Robertson, 1992: 142)
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To exemplify the depth of change as globalization, Giddens distinguishes three
sources of social change that occurred in recent decades: globalization for him is a
complex process and both invades and liberates the local contexts of action;
detraditionalization that can be considered as synonymous with "reflexive
modernization"; and social reflexivity that means self-decision making without
relying on "expert systems".  (Giddens, 1996: 153-155)
Giddens has developed the "reflexive modernity" thesis by situating globalization
in the wider framework of "modernity turning towards itself". For Giddens too, the
question of globalization is problematic. He perceives a "radicalized modernity"
instead of postmodernity that is characterized by discontinuity as a result of
"rapidity and pace of change in modern life; the global scope of change; the
uniqueness of modern institutions, such as the nation state; the commodification of
products and labor, and the great reliance on inanimate sources of physical power."
(Giddens, 1996: 139) He, similar to Robertson, argues that the globalization
process has double-edge: both constraining and enabling. From this ambivalence,
he extrapolates the themes of security versus danger and trust versus risk.
A significant aspect of Giddens's view of modern society is that it is not defined
entirely by its economic base, but by the fact that it is a nation state. Thus he
implies that capitalist nation state is the modern society par excellence.  (Waters,
1995: 48) This perspective has ramifications for our discussion since it is necessary
to situate the nation state within modernity in order to analyze and understand its
legitimacy crisis. Another significant aspect of Giddens' thought is the concept of
time-space distanciation which means "the lifting out of social relations from local
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contexts and their restructuring across time and space."  (Giddens, 1990: 83)
Included in this "disembedding" process are symbolic tokens, i.e. universal media
of exchange like money, and the expert systems which involves technical
knowledge that in return provides guarantees regarding a wide array of
expectations. Modern people rely on these two mechanisms in a reflexive manner:
they exhibit a constant reception, revision, reconstitution and reproduction of
information.  (Waters, 1995: 48)
Bringing the dimension of cultural change of globalizing processes to the scene,
Arjun Appadurai argues that the central problem of globalization lies in the tension
between cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization. He sees
globalization as a "complex, overlapping and disjunctive" process.  (Appadurai,
1990: 296) Appadurai suggests the emergence of five dimensions of global culture:
"ethnoscapes"-- meaning the flow of people like tourists, immigrants and refugees;
"technoscapes"-- indicating the rapid movement of technologies across the national
borders; "mediascapes"-- referring to the flow of image- and narrative-based strips
of reality such as electronic media; "finanscapes"-- that refer to mobility of global
financial resources and investments; and "ideoscapes"  -- indicating the spread of
political buzzwords like "freedom" and "democracy".  (Appadurai, 1990: 296-300)
For Appadurai the central concept is the deterritorialization process whereby labor,
images and finance transcend the borders of country of origin.  (Appadurai, 1990:
301) His important conclusion in the discussion, however, is a negative one: He
encapsulates globalization as "the politics of the mutual effort of sameness and
difference to cannibalize one another"  (Appadurai, 1990: 307-308) Appadurai
warns that both heterogenization of the cultures and their cannibalization are two
sides of the same coin. In this way, Appadurai presents globalization as a complex
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and multifarious cultural phenomenon that has serious political and ethical
consequences.
Malcolm Waters defines globalization as "a social process in which the constraints
of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people
become increasingly aware that they are receding"  (Waters, 1995: 3) His main
thesis is that in a globalizing world, material exchanges localize, political
exchanges internationalize, and symbolic exchanges globalize. Therefore, he
distinguishes between three spheres of globalization in the fields of economy,
polity, and culture  (Waters: 1995: 9) Of these, Waters thinks that culture tends to
be more globalized.
The crisis of the welfare state after 1970s proved, as Waters argues, that the state
was unable to meet the growing popular demands that sometimes clogged the
political processes, that the location of real state power shifted towards bureaucrats
and technicians, consequently the welfare system got into a deep crisis due to
creation of a culture of state dependency, unemployment and failing industries
galloped, the class-interest groups on which the welfare state was established
started to decompose in favor of new status groups, organized crime got stronger
and internationalized beyond state's intervention. (Waters, 1995: 99-100) 2
Waters points that the response to this crisis of nation state is disétatization, alias --
weakening the sovereignty of state. On the other hand, "the crisis of state
contributes to the reflexivity of globalization"  (Waters, 1995: 101) because
                                                
2 Strange (1995: 305-309) seems to be in a similar line in showing that globalization both stems
from the weakness of governments and facilitates functioning of the globalized crime hence further
exacerbating the failure of nation states. For her, the meaning of "the political institution" has also
changed in favor of TNCs relying on Arendt's definition of such institutions as "manifestations and
materializations of power".
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national governments tend to attribute their inability or failures to exterritorial
developments or crises, most recently, for example, to the Asian crisis. This
negative link with global scene may become even more harmful for the
sovereignty of nation state since the attempts to provide solutions may increasingly
rely on exterritorial agents and processes. In addition, Waters analyzes the
"planetary problems", due to which the liberal nation state is losing from its
sovereignty: human rights, environmental problems, development and inequality,
peace and order (Waters, 1995: 101-111).  He sees further erosion in nation state
sovereignty as the social problems are re-defined as global problems (Waters,
1995: 111)
After reviewing the common theses on globalization, Waters reaches some
conclusions: First, globalization is related to modernity; second, it involves the
increasing relationships among individuals and thus facilitating the unification of
human society; third, globalization involves elimination of space and
generalization of time; fourth, it is reflexive; fifth, it destroys universalism and
particularism; and lastly, it involves a Janus-faced mix of risk and trust (Waters,
1995: 62-64).
David Held, however, holds the view that a cosmopolitan global governance is
emerging at the expense of nation states, but this does not mean that nation states
will become redundant. He argues that sovereignties of regional, national and local
political entities must be subordinated to the cosmopolitan democracy. He links the
cosmopolitan democratic order to the democracies in particular societies. Thus he
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foresees strengthening of democracy from outside through a network of
international agencies and assemblies (Held, 1995: 237). 3
He argues that with globalization nation states become unable to control the flow
of ideas as well as economic transactions and cultural connections and thus
become ineffective. Furthermore, the expansion of TNCs into foreign countries
weakens nation state's sovereignty since in most cases they are more powerful than
the national governments. At the same time, many conventional public activities
such as defense, communications and economic management must be coordinated
together with transnational bodies. Also, states have thus been obliged to surrender
sovereignty within larger political units such as EU, ASEAN, or international
organizations like UN, WTO, etc.. Held's conclusion is that a global governance is
emerging with its own policy development and administrative system (Waters,
1995: 97).   
Negating Waters' theme of cultural globalization, Mike Featherstone, in his work
Global Culture argues that many "global cultures" that are based on heterogeneity
and diversity rather than homogenization are emerging.  For him, this plurality is a
direct outcome of the perceived multiplicity of the paths of globalization processes
(Featherstone, 1990: 10).
Stuart Hall takes "global culture" as being necessarily western in origin and
homogenizing. Using the Gramscian term of hegemony, he claims that
globalization is a hegemonic project (Hall, 1991a: 68).4 For him, ethnicity is still
                                                
3 Similarly, Martin Shaw (1994: 3-4) argues for emergence of a global society in his book Global
Society and International Relations. However he too indicates the contradictory nature of this
process which emerges through global crises of political, environmental and social nature.
4 Against Hall, Janet Abu-Lughod (1991: 131) argues that multiple cores in the sense of world-
system theory are proliferating and some cultural power differences are decreasing. Her conclusion
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the primary locus where people define themselves. The emerging ethnic
nationalisms are "defensive enclaves" against the hegemony of "global forces of
postmodernity" (Hall, 1991b: 36).  He also thinks that globalization is a
contradictory process. It is not a pacific nor a pacified one, and its contradictions
stem from the "old dialectic" between the global and the local (Hall, 1991a: 62).   
Hall discusses the process of the Eurocentric formation of collective identities of
class, race, nation, gender and the West itself. These identities were supported and
stabilized by industrialization and capitalism, as well as the nation state. However
with the advent of globalization, these identities can no longer remain
homogenous. The partial reason is that "identities are never completed", in other
words, identities are culturally, historically and politically constructed (Hall,
1991a: 47).   
Zygmunt Bauman is also critical of the prevalent globalization theories. He
believes that globalization follows the same modern pattern of "unequal
development", meaning those remaining local in a globalizing world constitute the
deprived class. This inequality reveals itself along the process in economic
opportunities, mobility, time and space; nation state, and law and order. Bauman
describes globalization as a new structuring process by which those on the top of
globalization receive benefits, while those at the bottom -- those remaining local
cannot. Therefore, he thinks that globalization process tends to be temporally
polarizing rather than converging the human condition (Bauman, 1998: 18).   
                                                                                                                                      
is that global culture is not a one-way street, it also includes creolization of the western culture.
While Ian Douglas sees globalization as a new form of capitalistic power, Falk (1997a and 1998)
asks for resistance against the the state-driven globalization process through cosmopolitan or what
he calls the "normative" democracy. Louise Amoore and Richard Dodgson (1997) too make similar
plea to resist globalization as "teleology".
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According to Bauman, globalization also restructures the time so that there is a
sharp division between those who live in a constant present and those who cannot
pass their time. The "top" of globalized world live in time, space does not matter
for them, while the "bottom" globalizers live in space and they cannot control the
time (Bauman, 1998: 88).   The same inequality is observed in those who are
tourists, i.e. highly mobile, and those who are vagabonds meaning the relatively
less mobile lower class of globalization. Bauman criticizes postmodernism for its
understanding of globalization from the point of view of one-sided, and high-class
interests (Bauman, 1998: 101).  Similarly, he sees increasing incarceration and
"spectacular promotion of issues classified under 'the law and order' rubric" as a
sign of yet another global stratification: the state trying to reinforce its status as the
security provider for the "top" globalizer while the "bottom" one falls usually a
victim to this process (Bauman, 1998: 116).  Order is "local" while the laws are
translocal. He points to the ethical ramification of globalization by asserting that
global elite with their mobility can escape from local order, while poverty is
criminalized (Bauman, 1998: 125).
2.1.3 Globalization: An Assessment
All the major perspectives I have summarized indicate the fact that we are going
through a time of transformation which carries tremendous implications for the
way we usually understand nation state, power, politics, sovereignty, democracy,
culture, social constructs and political geography. Therefore globalization is a
central question of political theory whether it is presented in a euphoric way by
some as "the end of the history",  or "third wave of democratization", or accused of
being a conspiracy of the dominant world powers to once again exploit the
remainder of the world.
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While some of the analyses of globalization characterize it as a historically
unprecedented process, or another stage yet in the purportedly unilinear
development of the human society, it is clear that globalization has historical
ramifications for the understanding of the history, not only of the human
civilizations, but also political institutions and polities, as well as political ideas
such as democracy and liberal democracy.
Therefore it is not a coincidence that the debate on globalization is indeed the
crossroads for the debates of modernism vs. postmodernism, liberalism vs.
communitarianism, individualism vs. Republicanism, epicureanism vs. stoicism,
particularism vs. universalism, etc.. which all attest to the impressively reflexive
and thought-provoking nature of change.
Based on these perspectives, my conclusion is that globalization is
multidimensional, contingent and revealing as well as mystifying. The conception
of change that is inherent in all globalization theories indicates a decline in nation
state's primacy and legitimacy, a wearing out of the liberal notions of the identity,
rationality and universality, a rising demand for more democratic forms of politics,
liberated from the boundaries of the liberal state, and finally, a challenge for the
social sciences in general and political science in particular, to include the ever-
changing and multiplying agents and processes in their analysis of the complex
world of man.
Indeed globalization, like any other crisis of action and thought, provides us some
opportunities as well: the fading of sovereignty understood as the political rule on a
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limited piece of territory with limitations on the cultural, social and political
formation, expression and articulation of various identities, life styles and positions
is absolutely a window of opportunity for the democratic moment to capture. In
Falk's terms, "globalization from below" is indeed the current along which the
discussion of democratizing the liberal democracy. As Giddens refers to,
reflexivity, an awareness as well as a global responsibility are needed in order to
effectively understand and transform the crisis. One of the most important ways to
do that is to rethink, revisit and regenerate the ideas and ideals that might have
been at the root of this crisis. In this thesis, I aim to contribute to achieving this
task by focusing on the faultlines of the current crisis of the notions of liberal self,
liberal politics and liberal normative principles.
This conclusion paves the way for my analysis of the legitimacy crisis of liberal
nation state and provides us the background upon which I can continue to discuss
its politico-ethical ramifications on the liberal legitimacy, as well as the liberal
conceptions of identity, rationality and universality.
Let me now try to explore the scale and scope of globalization which I have
discussed as the change which has a profound impact not only on liberal nation
states, but also on the ways, strategies and constructs of the political theory with
regards to the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy and its ramifications for the
normative-political understanding of democracy in general.
2.2 Legitimacy Crisis of Liberal Nation State
2.2.1 Globalization and the Legitimacy Crisis of Liberal Nation State
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In the preceding section I have tried to underline the significance of globalization
as a process that has a direct bearing upon the notions of liberal democracy, nation
state, and other social, cultural and political processes by exhibiting various
perspectives on globalization in order to understand its multidimensional and
contrasting implications. Now I would like to discuss how globalization as the
change is related to the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy in general.
The complex of expanding and intertwining relations among places and peoples, as
well as ideas and genres makes it difficult to characterize the local and the global
as comfortably as before. As Saskia Sassen (1998) indicates, one of the most
important features of globalization is that whatever happens within the territory of
a sovereign state does not necessarily mean that that process is a national one.   
This brings enormous mobility to the routine lives of people and institutions which
have been previously conceived as "entities bounded" by the territorial nation state.
In recent decades, forming of new nation states and dissolution of the modern-day
empires such as Soviet Union have changed the political maps considerably.
Liberal thinkers such as Samuel Huntington attribute this apparent spread of
independent nation states possessing nominal democracies and market economies
to the winning out of liberal democracy, i.e. "the third wave of democratization".
What is perceived by some students such as Samuel Huntington and Francis
Fukuyama is the emergence of a global liberal political culture alongside the
globalization process and the weakening of nation state. The nominal proliferation
of nation states as a result of political globalization is seen as a formidable
indicator for the strengthening of democracy on the globe as a whole. This rhetoric
is also exacerbated by liberal democracy becoming a global cliché, a hegemonic
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discourse that has almost no alternative or rival. Some analysts including Giddens
see the crisis of liberal democracy in the fact that there remains no rival to it thanks
to the globalization discourse. Therefore it is assumed that liberal democracy has
no need to repair its ailing legitimacy (Giddens, 1998: 3).  For those students,
globalization seems to have destroyed the Other, the rivalry of communism and is
now left alone with its own identity that seeks no differences to posit itself.5
However, all these celebrations of the triumph of liberal democracy cannot conceal
the deep legitimacy crisis of nation states including the new ones. As Claude Ake
asserts, "it is by no means clear whether we should be celebrating the triumph of
democracy or lamenting its demise" (Ake, 1997: 284).  This is exactly the
problematic face of the current globalization discourse. It also forces us to rethink
many convenient and conventional assumptions we tend to make about the nation
state and democracy. What globalization induces us to do is to question the
essential link between territoriality of the nation state with its role as a
representative totality, as well as the link between the nation state as "the container
of social processes" (Sassen, 1998)  and its role as the maker of nation. Therefore,
globalization once again poses important theoretical questions regarding the
viability, continuity, essentiality and relevance of nation state as the main political
unit of international as well as domestic politics.
Legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy is a subject that precedes globalization
discourse, but it is at the same time exacerbated by it. In this sense, the legitimacy
                                                
5 There are also those like Hyug Baeg Im (1996) who think that globalization does not promote
democracy but, on the contrary, by wekaening the state that is the repository of liberal democratic
experience may even hinder it. For Ake (1997: 291), the social movements are especially negatively
affected by globalization processes, because there is no rival before "the triumph of democracy" to
contest.
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crisis of the nation state and the ensuing crisis in liberal ethics can be situated in
the larger crisis of modernity.
Globalization encourages arguments for the crisis of liberal democracy in various
ways. First, it contributes to the legitimacy crisis by weakening of the nation state
and its sovereignty and territoriality arguments. Second, and in relation to the first,
the conventional liberal stress on individualism comes to a new juncture as new
collective identities start to make political claims. The new ethnic and religious
identities create a new dimension of "politics" as it is usually understood, in that
these claims and movements supersede the national boundaries and defy the liberal
definition of citizenship bound by a national state. Third, the representative
democracies are further weakened by the "global intrusion", the exterritorial
influences on the political sphere which are beyond the scrutiny of the national
populations and thus the phenomenon of non-governability.
Some of the outcomes of this legitimacy crisis which is accelerated and expanded
beyond the western locus by the globalization process are; first, the weakening of
the governability of the state as a result of the engrossment of the bureaucracies
managing the outflow and inflow of the economic, cultural, political and ideational
elements and their further distancing away from the public; second, declining
popular trust in institutional representation and in public agencies in general, and
politicians, in particular, because of the money/power relations and the opaque
character of the managing class; third, the increasing lack of confidence in the
electoral process and the apparent convergence of the left and the right; fourth, the
rise of new social movements that endanger the conventional norms of citizenship
on the basis of gender, race, religion, etc. which at the same time threaten not only
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the "unitary" vision of the national society, but also its ethical construction by
reinvigorating the ideal of "good society" against the notion of "welfare society".
Therefore, the scale and nature of "change" as exemplified and amplified by
globalization process that I have discussed above are significant elements in
rethinking "the political". What is at stake is not only the students' inability to
perceive, evaluate and analyze the social and political events within nation states,
but also the viability, continuity, and relevance of the democratic ideal that is
historically wedded to liberal ideology and the concept of nation state. Just as the
sovereignty element of liberal nation state is tied to its territoriality, so is the
institutional framework of nation state equally entwined with the democratic
project. The control established over the subjects by the modern nation state is
realized through, as Bauman calls it, "transparency of setting" (Bauman, 1998: 30).
It means that the state is eager to demarcate boundaries, hence turning the nation
state into a "cartographic state".
What happens along the globalization process is, when "the black box" of nation
state is opened up and the national citizen is enabled to transcend the
claustrophobic borders of the state, there emerge certain signs that signal the
loosening of state's legitimacy: the loss of authoritative control of the state over its
constituency, and the inability of its codes, symbols, values, procedures and
modalities that have provided before a secure one-to-one relationship between the
nation state and the society to meet the expanding, "globalizing" consciousness of
the populace. This adds to the legitimacy crisis of the nation state. As Ake says:
"As the relevance of the nation-state diminishes, so does that of democracy,
especially liberal democracy". (Ake, 1997: 286).
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Giddens attributes the legitimacy crisis to the immense social changes in result of
globalization, detraditionalization and social reflexivity, and also to the fact that
the voters are now using in the same discursive arena as their political leaders,
hence political activities which were taken granted before and now being
questioned. He suggests that it is the welfare state with its risk management system
that faces the same legitimacy crisis (Giddens, 1996: 156).  He proposes a shift
from "emancipation politics" that focuses on freedoms and social justice to "life
politics" that stresses taking life decisions  reflexively and with ethical and value
considerations (Giddens, 1996: 158). As Lash and Urry argue, the contemporary
nation state is undermined by globalization in many ways: development of
transnational practices, development of localized sites, decreasing effectiveness of
state policy instruments, an increasing number of inter-state connections, the
embryonic development of global bureaucracies, the emergence of new socio-
spatial entities, and an overall decline in the sovereignty of nation state (Waters,
1995: 53).   
Eric Hobsbawm lists some of the indicators for this legitimacy crisis: the
attenuation of links between citizens and public affairs in liberal democratic states
as demonstrated by "the decline in ideological mass parties, politically mobilizing
electoral 'machines' or other organizations for mass civic activity (such as labor
unions), and the spread of the values of consumer individualism" (Hobsbawm,
1996: 61).  This has a direct impact on the link between democracy and ethics,
since "the state is weakened when it is not identified with a common good"
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(Hobsbawm, 1996: 61).6 Similarly, for Falk, globalization has won out against the
image of state-centric world. He thinks that globalization is linked to both the crisis
of the nation state and to the crisis of modernity. He contends that three pillars of
the modern project, namely,  territorial state, secularization of political inter-state
relations and Western global dominance have been eroded (Falk, 1997b: 128).
Levent Köker lists five elements of the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy: first,
the notion of political participation of the individual is reduced to electoral process
and the "private" freedoms of the individual and thus needs to be turned back
towards participation; second, the institutional structure of representative
democracies and the inherent inequality and hierarchy within those institutions as
well as civil society agencies prevent a broader political participation; third,
recognition of new collective identities constitutes a problematic that liberal state
seems to be unable to respond; fourth, the assumption that the state is neutral
towards "cultural" identity and its association with "private" life seems to restrict
the public sphere and the "political" domain and debates; fifth, the major objective
of liberal state becomes its own institutional survival rather than serving the ideal
of "a good political community" (Köker, 1996: 113-114).
Based on this discussion, I may delineate three broad crises of the global scale:
crisis of liberal nation state and the liberal subject, crisis of modernity and modern
rationality, and the crisis of political morality. I will be analyzing these crises in
the following sections. Let me first focus on the legitimacy crisis of liberal
democracy.
                                                
6 Hobsbawm (1996) however thinks that what are presented as alternatives to nation state like
anarchism, or free-market liberalism and smaller state machinery are not effective and viable. On
the contrary, he presumes that states are too small to cope with globalization.
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Liberal democracy functions in two separate realms. At the procedural level liberal
democracy aims at protecting political, economic and civil rights and their
realization through political decision-making, hence saving individual rights and
freedoms from the societal pressures. On another level liberal democracy presumes
the democratic control by the citizens through a pluralist public sphere (see
Keyman, 1996: 98).7 As Touraine suggests, political traditions inherited from the
19th century have defined democracy as representative. However one century later
this type of democracy is in deep crisis almost everywhere (Touraine, 1992: 131).
Because the representative mechanism of liberal democracy ultimately blocks
participation that must be the core of the democratic ideal.
The legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy emerges because it colonizes or
"étatizes" the public sphere at the same time it functions at the procedural level. As
a result, the liberal polity behaves according to an abstract definition of citizenship
that is based on the "rights." In consequence, other constitutive elements of identity
such as gender, religion, ethnicity, culture and class are left out. Therefore the
public sphere becomes the battleground for interest groups rather than being a
territory for the diverse identities to interact and communicate.
The legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy is most apparent in the general feeling
of "lack of trust and certainty" (Keyman, 1999a: 62; also Pieterse, 1997: 79; Ake,
1997: 292).8 Douglas refers to the same global psychology as "global paranoic
politics" (see Sammy, 1996).9 This feeling is perceived largely as a consequence of
                                                
7 The existence of civil society is especially significant when one remembers what Leo Strauss
says: "liberalism stands and falls by the distinction between state and society or by the recognition
of a private sphere" (quoted in Gilden, 1987: 93).
8 A similar characterization can be found in Pieterse, 1997; and in Ake, 1997: 292.
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the crisis of state-centric citizenship, the extension of identity claims across the
territorial borders of nation state, lack of confidence in civil society institutions
including political parties, and the inability of the representative state to turn to
itself and reinstitute the democratic ideal for larger participation of the civil
society.
When we talk about the legitimacy of a certain governance we mean the legality of
the governing institutions, but more importantly we also imply "a general
interpretation which supports the system of authority as a whole" as Habermas
suggests (Habermas, 1988: 97).  Legitimacy may be said to be a concept that has
gained new significance alongside the modernity (Mardin, 1994: 10).
Hence, in the current crisis of legitimacy, the legality argument relies on the
modern rationality argument, whereas the argument of authority relies upon merely
the electoral process and the pressure groups that are in fact hardly representative
of the popular trust and moral support for the democratic polity. In other words, the
current crisis of liberal democracy is a crisis of legitimacy because the
"legitimizing system", i.e. the liberal notions of citizenship, representation and civil
rights, "does not succeed in maintaining the requisite level of mass loyalty"
(Habermas, 1988: 46). 10
2.2.2 The Postmodern Stance and The Crisis of Liberal Ethics
                                                                                                                                      
9 For the discussion on the subject, see Sammy (1996). The difficulty of thinking about the state is,
as Bourdieu (1990: 40) puts it, "because we are the state's thinkers, and because the state is in the
head of the thinkers."
10 However, as Barker (1990: 99) and Beetham (1991: 165) indicate, the notion of legitimacy in
Habermas and his followers such as Offe and O'Connor seem rather limited to the material
satisfaction of the masses by the state.
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Once the exclusionary face of the instrumental rationality is exposed, then the need
for an "ethical" reading of politics instead of a new rationality becomes clear. It
also forces us to consider the strategies to resist the antagonisms created as a result
of the modern Reason in political sphere such as othering, universality and
homogeneity claims and the subsequent creation of difference through identity.
The outcome is acknowledgment of uncertainty, historicity and relativity of the
political subject. So, the ethical question is thus situated not in a rationally
organized project where it is expected to function as a marginal element of the
"iron cage" of political representation, but in a reflexive and ambivalent course of
human action that is inclined towards responsibility for the Other, dialogue,
deliberation and therefore peaceful coexistence. By underlining the significance of
the replacement of instrumental rationality, this "ethical" approach also moves
towards inclusion of rather diverse theoretical approaches that can be associated
with postmodernity and its poststructuralist variant.
One of the useful concepts for our discussion developed by Foucault is
"genealogy". He uses this term to connote that "being" is an historical and
discursive process of "becoming", identity of the subject constantly being reshaped
by discourses of knowledge and power. Hence, the individual is made a moral
agent in the specific ethical discourses (Keyman, 1997: 127).   
One critique of modernity by the postmodern discourse is creation of binary
oppositions. Modern discourse operates by situating the Eurocentric self as the
center and creating the Other as its mirror image (Keyman, 1997: 132).  The
creation and constant reproduction of binary oppositions is seminal for our
discussion since the major crisis facing the nation state is the emerging ethnic,
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gender, life-style, religious and other types of identities. The modern identities
formed through binary oppositions are the causes for antagonistic othering. They
are also the cause for perpetuation of the instrumental rationality that both provides
the ground for othering and justifies it in the name of "moral neutrality".
Postmodern perspective relates the theory to the practice by urging radical action
to reverse the discursive or textual hegemony of the modern narratives (Keyman,
1997: 140).  The ethical question is once again accentuated here since it is
necessary to approach the legitimacy crisis of democracy not only form a topical
point of view, or as an academic pastime, but also with the view that stresses
responsibility and response to the challenge by producing modalities, frameworks
and ways for action. Therefore the ethics of responsibility intertwines with the
ethics of action. This is an important reference in order to achieve the task of
preventing the annihilation of the Other as a result of modern identity formation
and subsequent othering process.
Keyman suggests that the postmodern thought provides us the elements involved in
making of the modern identity, reality and rationality. All these theoretical
warnings imply the need for exploration of the very structures of the liberal polity
and attempt to examine its hierarchical, unequal and exclusionary character. They,
therefore, attest to the "poverty of the Reason", and the need for an ethical
reconstruction of the political question if democratic ideal is to survive this ordeal.
In other words, the ethical question emerges as a response to the bankruptcy of the
modernist notion of rationality along the globalization process, and the nation state
as the container of the power in modernity suffers from this larger crisis. Then the
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task is to salvage the democratic ideal without running the same risk of
foundationalism and a new type of rationalism (Keyman, 1997: 140).
In short, the postmodern perspective contributes to our discussion of the legitimacy
crisis of liberal nation state by first, providing the epistemological tools for
deconstructing the identity formation and the discursive nature of the national
ideology, and second, by demonstrating the need to emphasize the ethical question
as the integral and central question of the same crisis. Contrary to some arguments,
postmodernity may even be considered as an "era of morality" in that it could be
possible to "face the moral issues point-blank" in the ambivalence that is an
outcome of the postmodern dispersal of "ethical clouds" around the moral subject
and moral responsibility. (see Bauman, 1997: 43)  I shall discuss the significance
of liberal ethics in Chapter III.
However, the incredulity of postmodern position vis-à-vis the metanarratives may
make it more difficult for the task of understanding and situating the legitimacy
problem although the intention seems justified. First of all, what is common
between the approaches of "discursivity" of Foucault and "textuality" of Derrida
within poststructuralism is the stress on discontinuity and historicity, and through
these arguments, a sense of non-knowability of the phenomena emerges, and thus
virtual impossibility of theorizing (Keyman, 1997: 142).  The question is an
ontological one, since if the reality cannot be defined theoretically, then no
political or philosophical position and statement can be made subject to an
examination, and as a result, the consistency of meaning could shatter
immediately. The second danger is the narrow basis this perspective offers for
action.
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Postmodern style of life subjected people to stay away from each other, hence
giving rise to indifference.  The postmodern ethics becomes the consumer ethics in
which the satisfaction comes before needs (Keyman, 1997: 81).11 Therefore, the
modern nation state's legitimacy crisis receives no ready and full answer from
postmodern position, but there is no doubt that the postmodern critique may
provide us useful hints to further explore the ethical repercussions of the crisis.
In this section, I have reviewed the positions with regards to the legitimacy crisis
of liberal nation state in relation to globalization and suggested that the crisis
consists of a weakening claim of sovereignty, an inability under its rubric of
citizenship to meet the demands of new and emerging collective identities based on
ethnic, religious, gender, ecological and similar factors, a doubtful reliance on the
modern instrumental rationality best exemplified by expert systems and
bureaucracy, ambiguity of positions of mass political parties, declining popular
participation and confidence in representational politics. Now let me attempt to
ground main elements of my perspective on the legitimacy crisis of liberalism as
revealed, perpetuated and problematized by the globalization processes.
2.3 Three Sites of the Legitimacy Crisis of Liberalism: Identity, Rationality
      and Universality
I have tried to emphasize the setting and the elements of the legitimacy crisis of
liberalism in the previous section. Now I would like to turn to the discussion of
                                                
11 For Bauman (1998), even in being a consumer globalization restratifies men: not all can become
even if they wish to be. This is called "global apartheid" by some others (in similar lines, see Lynch,
1998).
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three major sites or faces of this crisis, namely, the inherent crises in identity,
rationality and universality.
2.3.1 The Crisis of Identity
The legitimacy crisis of nation state is determined not only by the actual events,
but also by the crisis in imagining, projecting and constituting of the universal and
liberal conceptions and institutions of state, bureaucracy, civil society, citizenship,
electoral process and representation, rule of law, constitution, national identity,
national economy, culture, sovereignty and territoriality within the modern
paradigm.
Roland Axtmann (1997: 115) argues that globalization challenges our conception
of democracy associated with the representative, liberal and territorial nation state.
Despite the liberal principle of non-discriminatory equality of citizens, women and
ethnic identities are asking for recognition on the basis of their "group identity".
This is something that liberal state that is based on "individual rights" is not
prepared to.  He sees that globalization does not do away with the nation state, but
poses very important challenges before it and democratic ideal. Legitimacy crisis
of nation state emerges because it cannot properly meet the citizens demand for
"political representation, physical protection, economic security and cultural
certainty." (Axtmann, 1997: 134)  The danger of this crisis is the emergence of
"extreme nationalisms and right-wing extremism" that seek to balance the identity
crisis by globalization through othering (Axtmann, 1997: 135).   
As we have already mentioned, one of the main challenges before liberal
democracy is the emergence and fragmentation of ethnic identities and
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nationalisms, mostly resulting in the weakening of confidence in liberal polity, but
also the confidence in the democratic ideal. "Balkanization" of identities as it is
conventionally called, calls the legitimacy of the liberal state as the representative
of a "national identity" into question. Ironically, as Wendell Bell argues, modern
nationalism is an aspect of democratic revolution (Bell, 1996: 15).  Therefore,
global changes create yet another havoc in this assumed unity of the subject with
the official definition of the national citizen. Some of the recent examples for this
fragmentation of identity are, Mexican Zapatista movement, the native Indians of
Canada and United States, the segregation wars in the Balkans. The importance
these movements possess results from their exclusionary discourse and the
methods they utilize, often a combination of the use of global culture as their
enemy, and at the same time depending on the global networks to make their
voices heard. On the other hand, Axtmann (1997: 137) points to the emergence of
a "global elite" that enjoys a shared global culture, but which lacks "global civic
sense of responsibility".  This is one of the most frequent arguments regarding the
external causes of the legitimacy crisis of nation states. This means, while
nationally elected politicians can be scrutinized by the public through electoral
process and other checks and balances, the "global elite" identified by the business
can escape the democratic monitoring and responsibility.
In a similar vein, Touraine argues that the "State" in modern polity could become
legitimate through becoming less repressive, but only at the cost of distancing itself
from the society in an increasing fashion (Touraine, 1988: 32).  Following this
then, and consequently, it is visible how the State is no longer the unifying force in
the society, so it is no longer the agent for modernity. There is a further phase to
modernity that also involves the crisis of nation state. Hence the "unifying"
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function of  the state is jeopardized by nation state that is moving away from
"political" sphere to dominantly "economic" sphere (Touraine, 1988: 32-36).12
This, however, does not mean that state is no longer relevant. It means that the
society is no longer the source of the unity of social life. On the contrary, the social
has become a ground for contesting and resisting identity claims (Touraine, 1988:
39).  For Touraine, the dissolution of the idea of society thus gives rise to two
developments: First, by releasing the "social" from the modern cage, it creates a
sense of permanent change, thus regenerating the "political" by politicization of the
social life, and secondly, it leads to "the birth of the idea of subject", meaning that
the subject becomes problematic with than the notion of "national subject"
(Touraine, 1988: 40).
The post-materialist values such as community, self-expression and the quality of
life as Inglehart elaborates, are yet other important factors that contribute to the
legitimacy crisis of the nation state by blurring and delegitimizing the old division
between the left and the right on the basis of distribution and redistribution of
goods and services. The state becomes problematic in this phase since the new
right sees it as an obstacle to individual freedoms and free markets, and the new
left perceives it as the agency of rampant materialism and an oppressive arm
against minorities and marginal populations (Waters, 1995: 121).  As Waters
asserts "the state might  therefore be the final bastion of resistance to globalizing
trends" (Waters, 1995: 122)   
                                                
12 As Wallerstein argues (1990: 166), nation states are not dying out, just to the contrary, they have
"never been less legitimate" as a result of the globalization process.
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For Bauman, globalization represents the loss of control, thus disorder in the
modern mind, and what it is about is "what is happening to us all" (in italics,
Bauman, 1998: 60). He professes that the modern equivalence of "state equal
order" and consequently association of the state with regularity is faced with
overwhelming uncertainty, risk and non-knowability as a result of which, the
globalization process is seen as "things going out of control", or as what Leach
calls "a runaway world" (quoted in Giddens, 1996: 152) . A direct result of this
panic is that the distinction between the "inside and outside" of the state gets blurry
and, subsequently, weakens the nation state (Bauman, 1998: 61, 65).  However, he
explains that this weakening is taking place by the initiative of the global trade,
finance and information that "depend on political fragmentation" in order to pursue
their ends, and again for their interest, they would not let the nation states to die
out (Bauman, 1998: 68).  As a result of disembedding politics from economics and
letting the former dominate the latter, globalization actually has weakened the
politics and the power became anonymous and "its locus empty" (cited from Claus
Offe by Bauman, 1998: 68)   by porous borders. Bauman argues that it is for this
reason that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to channel social issues to
collective action.
Stuart Hall remarks that there are two simultaneous responses to the weakening
effect of globalization on nation state as going in two ways simultaneously:
"above", meaning transcending territoriality and sovereignty of the nation state, i.e.
going global; and "below", which implies that it subverts the authority of the nation
state at home by new identities and claims, thus "going local" (Hall, 1991b: 27).
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An empty political realm invites the possibility of the non-public, non-transparent
and non-responsive administrative practices and behavior which in turn leaves no
room for the ethical question. This is often stated as one of the reasons for the
extensive lobbying by private interest groups at the expense of environmental
concerns, civil and political rights of especially the minority groups, and the
surfacing of the large global crime schemes that penetrate the "democratic"
process. I think this picture also relates to the profoundness of the legitimacy crisis
of liberal democracy exacerbated by the globalization process.
The ethical significance of the political question arises once again with the
challenges and threats of the globalization processes for the identities formed in
public sphere by the liberal ethos. These individual identities are perceived as
homogenous, separable and distinct social labels on the basis of which the
constitutional guarantees and freedoms, as well as rights and entitlements are
established. The global culture and the mass political upheaval associated with the
nation state also weaken these readily-accepted identity referents, making liberal
democracies vulnerable to additional or fragmented identities such as gender,
ethnicity, region, and religion. The concept of unitary and individual citizenship
isolated from the identity/difference dimension thus becomes a mechanism for
othering and exclusion of other identities. The consequent antagonisms and
annihilations are observable in the human tragedies of Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti,
Mexico and most recently in Kosovo. It is at the juncture of the global that the
governability crisis of liberal democracy meets the legitimacy crisis.
As we have seen, globalization pressurizes the modern liberal nation state to lose
control over its "identity engineering",  and results in multiplying identities, both
45
individual and collective. The modern politics of identity is based on what I call a
"transvestite existence" to express the point made by Jonathan Friedman, namely
that alterity becomes a permanent situation in modernity (Friedman, 1993).
However, the social representation of the particular identity is not directly linked to
the political definition of that identity, hence creating all other cultural and
subjective categories as sub-altern. Globalization poses a challenge to this
transvestite subjecthood from the modern political point of view. This is the
junction where the representational crisis turns into legitimacy crisis.
What is involved in this crisis are not only the "functional" elements of
governance, i.e. the public institutions and their services, and their changing roles
and perception by the public. Also involved in the crisis are the
"ideational/ideological" elements such as "unity", "nation", "culture", "citizen", as
well as "morality" that binds the nation and the state together, as well. The
distinction is significant since any project with the objective of upholding the
democratic ideal and flourishing a democratic governance needs to work out both
tracks of the legitimacy crisis, thus not sufficing with the institutional reforms but
also supporting the reshaping of democratic polity with a new perspective of the
ideal and ethical constitution of democracy. This is also necessary in order to
convert the sense of democracy from a "problem-solving strategy" that is by and
large the product of the core of rationality within the modern project to a model
that is based on legitimacy.
These two concerns also shape the way we read the globalization discourse. While
conceiving the benign side of globalization as a social process whereby the
repressed and underrepresented identities and collectivities are empowered, we
46
have also to acknowledge the emerging collective identities that call for totalizing
projects that at the same time threaten the very basic idea of democracy. Therefore,
the "democracy-as-problem solving" approach would only strengthen those
Balkanizing and fragmenting tendencies by shattering the unitary concept of
citizen, national culture, national society and what is meant by governance in
general that would also pave the way for weakening of the democracy's attachment
to nation state. What is at stake is then looking for ways and frameworks that
would both challenge the dark side of globalization and at the same time provide
proactive measures to consolidate the "democratic vision" as independent from its
representative brand.
2.3.2 The Crisis of Rationality
The current claims for "end-isms" such as "end of history", "end of the nation
state", "end of the social", "end of the metanarratives", etc. that are related to the
globalization discourse, eventually center around the "end of modernity". Both the
enabling as well as constraining features of globalization signal the need for
rethinking the modern actors that are involved in the process such as the nation
state, society, culture, civil society, but also the general paradigm of modernity.
Indeed much of the postmodern discourse has pointed to the issue of globalization
as the ultimate theoretical ground where supporting evidence and arguments for the
crisis of modernity are derived from.
The "ambiguous" position of postmodernism, alternatively called "late modernism"
by Giddens, "second-modern" by Beck, and "surmodern" by Balandier, stands in
opposition to the project of Enlightenment, in its invalidity and oppression in
symbolic as well as historical planes. Postmodernity or "dissident thought"  is
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centered around "ambiguity, uncertainty, and difference as an effective political
resource to impede, disrupt, and delay any attempt to transcend diversity into
unity" (Keyman, 1997: 124).  As Keyman notes, the significance of postmodern
thought comes from its incredulity towards metanarratives that are products of
social and political theory, and also from their resistance to imposed boundaries
and  the truth. Henceforth, modernity is seen as totalizing in its claim of
universalism, and oppressive since the unity is realized by dissolving differences
(Keyman, 1997: 124-125).    
At the center of the postmodern refusal and its radical search for an alternative lies
the critique of the Enlightenment, and thus the liberal Reason.  "Postmodernism is
primarily an intellectual identity that defines itself in opposition to the rational-
scientific core of modernity" (Friedman, 1993: 211).13 For postmodernists it is the
Reason itself that should be regarded as the source for the oppression of modern
totalizing unity (Gilden, 1987: 91). Because the Reason is responsible for the
practice of inclusion/exclusion by privileging one identity through the process of
othering (Keyman, 1997: 126).   
The modern liberal nation state relied on constructing a bureaucracy that stood in
opposition to the "transparency" of the state's geography with its opaque and
impenetrable structure "while keeping [it] clear to [itself]" (Bauman, 1998: 33).
What happens with globalization is the demand by populace to see inside this
opaque space and try to seize the control erected by demarcations not only around
                                                
13 As Strauss argues (as quoted in Gilden,1987: 91), "the critique of modern rationalism or of the
modern belief in reason by Nietzsche cannot be dismissed or forgotten. This is the deepest reason
for the crisis of  liberal democracy." Inglehart (1997), on the other hand, sees postmodernity as the
shift from instrumental rationality to "postmodern values", what he calls "the post-materialist
values".
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the "nation" but also the "individual", "group", "gender", and "ethnicity". Bauman
argues that the modern state bureaucracies manipulated uncertainty in order to
preserve and maximize their power much like Foucault's panopticon (Bauman,
1998: 34).  Once the panopticon where the insider could not be seen from outside,
but could monitor and control all social processes started to have holes all around
the place thanks to the globalized transactions and interactions, the rationality that
has so far been represented by bureaucracy and its neutrality started to crumble. As
a result, in most of the liberal states the trust for the civil servants took a sharp
decline in recent decades. This gave another blow to the legitimation potential of
the nation state versus what is called the civil society.
It means that the rational construction of the nation state model starts to attenuate
as a result of the weakening of its basis in modern conceptions such as national
society and the individual subject that lose their meanings, and its representational
power diminishes as a result of the massive fluctuations in loyalty, trust and self-
affiliation of the populace vis-à-vis the state as the "guardian of freedoms". In other
words, the liberal freedom discourse gives itself away to a global freedom that
discourages consolidating of bonds between the political subject and the "local",
nation-wide, representative and territorial state.
One of the most important contributions of Jürgen Habermas on the subject is his
suggestion that the legitimation crisis of liberal democracy is a product of the
instrumental rationality of the Enlightenment. In order to accomplish the
unfinished project of modernity, Habermas proposes the alternative of relying on
legitimacy and thus the moral element, rather than on rationality in democratic
governance. Therefore one direct conclusion that can be drawn from Habermas is
49
his claim that at the root of the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy lies the crisis
of politics based on rationality. Although Habermas does not directly link this
claim to the globalization discourse, it is possible to draw the same conclusion with
regards to the challenge of globalized phenomena before the nation state and its
rational organization. It is also possible to relate it to the challenge for the
mechanism of representation that assumes a certain typology of citizenship and
national identity, within a given boundary, thus making democratic state "a
political machine" that works according to the precepts of the Reason. However,
once this rational structure starts to malfunction, it appears that there is still the
need to enhance democracy than what the rational approach would permit.
The emergence of "global risks" is yet another area where the instrumental
rationality of modernity is taken as the culprit. The awareness of and the responses
to these common planetary problems such as environmental pollution, nuclear
threat, migration and overpopulation also add to the decline of the authority of
nation state. Moreover, migration, human rights and increasing xenophobia are
other important political questions that call for an extension and revision of the
liberal democratic citizenship concept (see Jacobson, 1998).
Ulrich Beck approaches the problem of the crisis of nation state from his
conception of the "risk society", the society in which dangers to human life emerge
not in result of natural harms, but due to the decisions made in the political realm.
The question Beck asks is how democratic polity can be preserved in the face of
global risks that endanger its credibility (Beck, 1990: 106).  These risks are
produced by humans and are universal in their effect. The risk society becomes a
global phenomenon, so it also poses challenge to the sovereignty of nation state
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(Beck, 1990: 113).  Beck touches upon the fact that in industrial democracies, the
decisions are made on behalf of the populace by some technocrats whom the
people cannot control within the representative system, hence resulting in a
legitimacy problem. His proposal is the "ecological extension to democracy"
which basically refers to remedy this crisis by creating a new public sphere where
free deliberations regarding decisions on risks can be made and be subjected to
some "discursive checking" by experts, and making a division of powers (Beck,
1990: 119).
Therefore, the larger crisis involving the nation state and -on its mirror- the
political question necessitates a critical evaluation of the centrality of the argument
of rationality of the modern project, in order to come up with a new definition so
that othering cannot harm the democratic ideal. According to Keyman, three
theoretical attempts must be made for such a task: first, decentering of subject from
its modern definition as the epistemologically autonomous, and rational actor.
Second, abandoning its claim of universality, unity, totality and foundations, and
thirdly defeating its regime of universal truth (Keyman, 1997: 126).   
2.3.3 The Crisis of Universality
In previous sections I have discussed about the role of the crises in the liberal
conceptions of identity and rationality as contributing to the general crisis of liberal
democratic legitimacy. Now let me dwell upon the last site of the crisis, namely,
the crisis of the universalist conception of liberal democracy as revealed by the
globalization process.
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The loss of a unicentered world is one of the most prominent arguments underlying
the postmodern discourse and the process of globalization. The modernist
inclination to extrapolate the European and the western historical experience,
universally valid terms of social and political organization, and the assumptions of
linear development is rejected on the basis of difference, alterity and the primacy
of the local. Unilinearity and uniformity are seen as the tools for hegemonizing of
the non-western societies, and the West's colonialist past  is related to its use of
knowledge/power strategies.
Therefore, those theories or approaches which emphasize all-binding, all-
encompassing and universalizing explanations are finding less room for a
welcome, an acceptance on the basis of scientific certitude and even relevance. The
outcome is a suspicion of the theoretical approaches that try to explain the reality
on the basis of the terms, symbols, historical schema and moral priority by relying
on a Eurocentric perspective.
The loss of the faith in universally relevant processes, explanations, and models
also draws on the emerging emphasis on the significance of the local identity, life
and localized politico-ethical relations. The post-colonialist thinking ushers by the
introduction of new philosophical ventures such as deconstruction and stands
against modernist portrayal of the social phenomena as basically uniform and
unilinear. It also tries to uncover the vestiges of the colonial influence on the
patterns of thinking, action and conception. Universalism together with its twin,
positivism, are seen as dangers to the diversity and difference that are believed to
constitute the essential mode of human existence.
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Global discourse strengthens this tendency by making available to it the self-
reflection of the Other and the alterity ignored in the Eurocentric thinking. The
"glocalization" as it is conveniently referred to, both works to empower the local
and the unaccounted for, as well as to link the local with the global without risking
to become homogenized or colonized. The resistance against homogeneity and the
conception of the world as the home to one kind of reality and life brings about an
intensifying theoretical search for a moral-political vision that could accommodate
the plurality, alterity and contingency without the risks of colonization,
assimilation and homogenization.
2.4 The Search for A Solution
There are various approaches responding to the challenge posed by the
implications of the legitimacy crisis of liberalism. For Axtmann, for instance, the
global condition necessitates a conceptual approach that comes closer to the
Kantian cosmopolitanism than the Lockean individualism (Axtmann, 1997: 139).
This point links the legitimacy crisis to its inherent and inevitable ethical
repercussions which I will discuss in the next chapter. However, for Axtmann, like
William Connolly, the state and democracy still share an "elective affinity" despite
the rise of "global consciousness". Thus a tension arises between the concept of
democratic citizenship based on liberal nation state and democratic humanity based
on global cosmopolitan democracy (Axtmann, 1997: 142).
Therefore, just as the globalization process contains multiple and contradictory
elements within a whole complex of increasing relations and thus tensions, the
democratic governance also faces multiple threats and opportunities at once.
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All these concerns on legitimacy stress the need for seeing politics as necessarily
an ethically significant realm. It also encourages us to perceive the challenges
before the nation state as manifested by globalization, i.e. Balkanization of
identities, irrelevance of modern rationality, and the clash between local and
universal claims, as elements that necessitate a thorough questioning of the
definition of politics as a rational activity in favor of a perceptive which considers
politics necessarily intertwined with ethics and thus legitimacy.
As Geertz says, the liberal democracy's crisis may be overcome if it stops seeing
difference as the negation of similarity, but rather if it can transcend this binary
opposition that underlies its logic and rather sees that the difference is the element
that comprises it, locates it, concretizes it, and gives it the form (Geertz, 1996). The
abstract individualism of liberalism  imposes a unitary conception of human needs,
which thereby marginalizes groups who differ from the norm (Stevenson, 1997:
56).   
I think that in order to understand the legitimacy crisis, we have to discuss the
effects of the general division of particular versus universal that is the denominator
not only for the liberal conception of democracy and its notion of citizenship, but
also the significant divide of the Kantian liberal ethics and the color of the
postmodern tendency. Because it is from this binary opposition that the liberal
constituent claims of totality vs. difference, abstraction vs. actualization, global vs.
local, systemic vs. chaotic, Geist vs. individual, homogeneity vs. heterogeneity and
hegemony vs. fragmentation emerge.
54
As we have seen in this chapter, globalization reveals us the weaknesses and the
legitimacy crisis of liberal nation state. The crisis has three faces: the crisis of the
liberal conceptions of identity, rationality and universality. These faces force us to
rethink the normative tenets of liberal democracy and hence to assess whether
liberal democracy as it is can handle such extensive changes and whether it can
provide consistent and comprehensive theoretical answers to its legitimacy crisis.
I shall now proceed to Chapter III in order to explore the nature of liberal political
ethics, and whether the groundwork of liberalism has had any inconsistency from
the start. In other words, it needs to be examined whether and how all the liberal
democratic assumptions regarding the human nature, rationality, identity and
universality contribute to the current politico-ethical crisis.
55
CHAPTER III
THE NORMATIVE UNIVERSE OF LIBERALISM:
BETWEEN PROMISE AND DISILLUSIONMENT
In the previous chapter I have dealt with the process of globalization and how it
contributes to the conditions for the crisis of liberal democratic legitimacy and
underlined three distinct crises within that crisis, namely the crises of the liberal
conceptions of identity, rationality and universality. In this chapter I will try to
elaborate on the question whether these crises are ephemeral phenomena or can be
connected to the faultlines in the theoretical conception of the liberal democratic
political-normative condition. Hence the aim of this chapter is to gain an insight
into the liberal conceptions of identity, rationality and universality with a view to
determine how intrinsic and perpetuated are these crises which contribute to the
legitimacy crisis that are manifested along the globalization process.
Liberalism, as Ronald Terchek (1986: 15) contends, is a political language of
rights that aims at expanding the range of choices for individuals in such a way as
not to interfere with the legitimate choices of the others. Liberalism may be said to
be rooted in the belief in the individual and his ability to take decisions and,
consequently, be responsible for them. As such, liberalism represents the post-
Reformation mood of secular self-salvation and  subscribes to the Enlightenment
ideals by attributing individual will to rationality, universality and abstract rights.
The recent renewed interest in liberalism and its normative foundations may be
attributed to John Rawls's epoch-making study, A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971).
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However, the course of intellectual engagement with liberalism and its ethical
constitution has gained new dimensions with successive debates focusing more
radically on the meaning of liberalism despite its increasing popularity in the
world. Consequently, there has also been a revival of discussion on ethical
ramifications of political liberalism. This is apparent in works that refocus on
Hobbes, Locke and Kant.
In order to substantiate my analysis of this subject, I will first elaborate on the
contractarian strand of liberalism that is best represented by John Locke and
especially Immanuel Kant for he provided the most sophisticated account of
ethical-normative foundations of political liberalism. Then I will proceed to the
utilitarian theory of liberalism and thus the contributions and ideas of Jeremy
Bentham and J.S.Mill for that matter. Consequently I will try to formulate what
liberal ethics entails and its ramifications for the current legitimacy crisis and three
sites of this crisis, and liberal conception of "the political", in its claims as well as
achievements and failures by discussing the theoretical consistency of its moral
premises.
3.1 Liberalism and Its Normative Universe
The origins of liberalism can be described as relying on a messianic message that
aims at eradicating religious clashes and destructive antagonisms, intolerance and
traditional forms of obedience. The liberal order is the one that aims to provide the
full prospect of human dignity, self-determination, self-development and
autonomy. There are three versions of the liberal order: The "vulgar" or the
Hobbesian version sees the relations between citizens in terms of conflict of
interest who share only a common interest, that of security and prevention of
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violence. The "political" liberalism like that of Rawls treats liberalism as "neutral"
towards diverse and competing claims of the good and stresses equality. The
"ideal-based" liberalism like that of Dworkin and Galston, on the other hand,
argues that liberalism has its own theory of the good life (Lund, 1996: 480).
Essentially, political liberalism has two ultimate values: equality and individuality.
Whereas the former is put into question by many thinkers especially those who
argue for the non-democratic nature of liberalism, the latter is certainly the unique
characteristic of liberalism. Understandably, liberals have the discourse of value
neutrality which rejects any a priori political good, and instead uphold a claim of
equality that means the possession of rights regardless of the performance of any
given good (Terchek, 1986: 17).
Terchek (1986: 17) calls liberalism a theory of rights that tries to justify the moral
autonomy of men and women. However, the justification of a political theory of
morality is never an easy task. It has a direct impact on the procedures, concepts
and significance a theory attributes to the legitimacy of the state. Morality is not to
be taken for granted either. In other words, "morality is not a Procrustean bed into
which willy-nilly, social existence can be trimmed to fit" (Lomasky, 1990: 100).
So, one common critique about the aggregative, representative arrangements is that
they lack moral resources required to generate and sustain democratic legitimacy
for decisions made on issues that are politically contentious (Knight and Johnson,
1994: 277).
The legitimacy crisis of the liberal state that I have discussed in the previous
chapter is thus related to the larger problem of the relevance, plausibility and
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desirability of a liberal ethic. It is true that many liberals are reluctant to profess a
comprehensive ethical conviction. However, there is no doubt that liberalism too
possesses a morality of its own as I will discuss in the coming paragraphs.
Let me first focus on the contractarian liberal tradition and within it two prominent
figures: Locke and Kant, in order to determine whether their politico-ethical ideas
may have contributed to the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy.
3.1.1 Contractarianism: Locke and Kant
Both Locke and Kant defend a contractarian approach to political morality by
which political rights and entitlements ensue from a contract between the civil
society and the government that was designed in a hypothetical time through a
hypothetical procedure. The actual contracts such as laws and constitutions are
justified in the light of such an abstract  historical convent. Contractarian "moral
theories see morality as the product of, or constituted by, a mutually advantageous
agreement." (Phillips, 1998: 184) Such theories, however, often run the risk of
ignoring interests and moral status of certain groups within the society on the basis
of ethnicity, gender, property ownership, etc.. (Phillips, 1998: 183) Yet, it is this
contractarian lineage that interests us most since it is also the same school that has
created our existing imagination of a unity between Enlightenment liberalism and
democracy.
3.1.1.1 Locke and the Glorification of the Individual
John Locke establishes the basis of the political and ethical life on the notion of
natural rights that are prior to the political life. He is a defender of the
constitutional government whose raison d'être is protecting individuals' rights that
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are namely rights of life, liberty and property, "as laid down by God's will and as
enshrined in law." (Held, 1996: 79) In the state of nature humans are free because
they are rational. Locke says, "being all equal and independent, no one might do
harm to another in his life, health, liberty or possessions." (Bobbio, 1990: 6) His
stress, unlike Hobbes, is on society not the state. The government can be legitimate
as long as it obtains the consent of the individuals that means the majority of the
people's representatives. It is through the notion of consent that natural rights and
the theory of the social contract are connected. (Bobbio, 1990: 8)
Locke rejects the Aristotelian idea of virtue as the basis of moral behavior,
however he also uses this notion to substantiate his claim for toleration. Virtue for
him as well as other early liberal thinkers is "an instrumental good" for the end of
nonmoral goods that the liberal politics try to attain. For Locke some of the liberal
virtues are "self-denial, civility, justice, courage, humanity, industry, and
truthfulness."  (Galston, 1986: 130-131) All these virtues refer to self-preservation
that can be said the utmost motif of the liberal thinking. According to Locke,
political activity is instrumental, and not substantial because it secures the
condition of freedom so that other human activities can be carried out. The whole
purpose of his imaginary reconstruction of the original state of man is to assert that
the state power must be limited. (Held, 1996: 79-82; Bobbio, 1990: 6) The law is
presumed to preserve individuals' liberty essentially by coercing other people. It
helps individuals to draw around themselves a circle within which the others may
not trespass.  (Axtmann, 1996: 17)
There are various aspects of Locke's thought which negate his intent for total
salvation of the individual. By conceptualizing natural rights and civil society as
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synonymous with legal authority, Locke in fact legitimizes the state in the sense of
power politics. (Axtmann, 1996: 16) His concept of rights-based state follows the
medieval saying lex facit regem (the law makes the king) (Bobbio, 1990: 12),  but
the limits on the power of the state is left to the initiative of the state itself. In this
context, it is not surprising to find Locke, the champion of liberalism as an investor
in the Royal Africa Company which was involved in slave trading (see
Macpherson, 1980: x). Similarly, his understanding of the right to vote in elections
is confined only to the propertied-classes. The nonpropertied, on the other hand, do
not have any voice in making the laws, but conversely "were to fully bound by the
laws" (Macpherson, 1980: xix). Property thus constitutes the backbone of the
Lockean liberal moral universe. Locke says: "the great and chief end, therefore, of
men's uniting into common-wealths, and putting themselves under government, is
the preservation of their property." (Locke, 1980: 66, italics original) Although
Locke introduces the element of property in order to secure a larger political
participation before the aristocratic rule, the accent on property ultimately bears the
question of inequality which liberalism often faces.
The theme of inequality as justified in God's bestowing is reflected in Locke's
description of reason in relation to the state of nature. The men in the state of
nature possess reason and thus become equal moral persons. However, only those
having property come to possess the reason after the introduction of money and
thus property. (Macpherson, 1980: xix) It becomes a calculative reason, in fact, the
rationality that could be called the historical and normative conditioner of
liberalism. In other words, rationality loses its traditional moral character through
the introduction of the constitutive element of the liberal polity: inequality. Locke
highlights this tendency for moral justification of inequality in his suggestion for a
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civil government that is under the ultimate control of the propertied class.1
(Macpherson, 1980: xx) It is interesting to see how such a glorified humanitarian
notion of reason is used to justify such an anti-humanitarian evil. However, as I am
going to discuss, the inconsistencies of this sort are frequent in the western
political thought in general, and in liberal thinking, in particular. Toleration for
Locke means that the state must be neutral towards the religious differences. He
rejects the rational justification of beliefs and religions. Therefore efforts to impose
truth through coercion lack rational warrant and no faith can be imposed by
coercion.
Locke is an important thinker for he grounds the individual in a society and polity,
a construct that provides the basis of government for the liberals to come. This is
not so much because he differs from Hobbes who underlines the necessity of
political legitimacy to be rooted in a certain high principle involving the
intervention of the human reason and the consequent social contract. Locke is truly
"liberal" in the modern sense for he elevates the place of individual as the main
actor in the whole process of creation of government, and thus in the purportedly
self-asserting "the political". This is indeed so, because Locke turns the natural law
approach around and replaces the center of the natural political law from divine
laws to the laws of the human beings. Therefore, his understanding of the rights,
liberty, choice and the individual endowments work towards replacing the
Christian-Judaic notion of the transcendental and holistic political raison d'état in
favor of a man who is essentially determined by autonomy. The new man, in other
words, can decide for his own good and is responsible for the actions he performs.
                                                
1 Macpherson goes on explaining that the weight of property as the basic moral right in the Lockean
liberalism may be attributed to the historical developments in England where Locke's ideas
eventually led to the Whig state which was controlled by the propertied class.
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This is a critical twist in the post-Reformation political thought and is followed by
Kant in yet another intellectual endeavor, aimed to reconcile the rights approach
with an ethics, both centered around man.
Locke seems to situate a liberal self that merits existence through recognition by
the state even though he defines the individual as prior to the state. Therefore, the
chain of justification of the liberal political ontology starts not from individual to
the state but the other way round. So, he constructs "the political" as a necessary
evil out of which the individual autonomy must be preserved against the perils of
the collective life. In other words, "the ethical" is the sanctified as an autonomous
sphere of the atomized individual which in return shapes the liberal state as
something like a neutral referee who can actually manipulate the rules of the game
aided by this "asocial politics". Because of this fact and due to the extreme
identification of the individual with separateness and isolation, and the
identification of the political life with the government, Locke actually contributes
to the impoverishment of the political in its very source. The political becomes the
domain of the government that is assumed to represent the atomized individuals
who naturally possess some rights that stand as the wall between them. Therefore,
even though liberalism has the claim of a liberating ideology par excellence, its
political resources seem rather limited to achieve that end. The political needs to be
the social as well as the individual, yet the Lockean liberalism misses this point
and creates an image of the political man as something that needs to be afraid of,
taken precautions against and full of greed, hatred and distrust.
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3.1.1.2 Kant and the Categorical Imperative
I have tried to analyze the first major line in the contractarian thinking of the
liberal school by focusing broadly on the Lockean perspective on politics and
legitimacy. Now, I will deal with the Kantian perspective within the same tradition
to explore whether and how the liberal assumptions lead to an estrangement of the
individual to his own social universe, and thus his depoliticization under a liberal
government.
Immanuel Kant is the thinker who provided much of the philosophical foundations
of political liberalism. Deontological liberalism that Kant advocated contains the
notions of justice, fairness, individual rights and conceives "the priority of the right
over the good". (Sandel, 1987:1) According to Michael Sandel, this type of
liberalism assumes that justice must be the primary moral element because of the
plurality of the conceptions of the good in the society. This necessity of justice
relies on the concept of right, "a moral category given prior to the good and
independent of it." (Sandel, 1987: 1) The motive behind this primacy is that "both
morality and law perform the social function ... of overcoming certain basic
difficulties of human life in society." (Nino, 1993: 66)
Kant is a thinker who may be called the most unique bridge-builder in the western
thought. He tries to resolve so many and diverse tensions and contradictions and
therefore has an influence on almost all strands of the western thought from
liberalism to progressivism, from Hegelianism to radical democracy. He represents
the unique juncture where the transcendentalist and naturalist traditions converge
and then through him diverge into the schools of romanticism, rationalism,
humanism and universalism of the latter epochs. Kant has been deeply influenced
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by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who believed in the power of the masses, and by John
Locke who believed in the power of individuals for governance.
Kant's adoption of volonté général from Rousseau is clear. However he thinks that
the general will as the political self-legislation cannot be manifested without
representation. He considers representation as moral because it relies on laws that
are founded over the moral consent of the people. (Bielefeldt, 1997: 542) Kant, in
contrast to Rousseau, upholds legality so strongly that he claims that there existed
legality even in state of nature, in contrast to Hobbes. (Bielefeldt, 1997: 543) This
also marks his difference from those who advocate "possessive individualism"
because he thinks that citizenship is relevant even in the state of nature.
Kant is primarily an Enlightenment thinker and thus depicts the portrait of an
ethical universe that is by and large in conformity with the laws of the Newtonian
physical universe. (see Findler, 1997: 167-199) He is a firm believer in natural law.
His greatest effect in political thought was the introduction of the idea of
Rechtstaat, the state governed according to the rule of law. (Reiss, 1989: 10-11)
Kant revolutionized the notion of ethics since "he identified basic formal features
that any moral judgment in order to be valid must display: its autonomy, its
universality, and its unconditionality with regard to desires and interests of the
agent." (Nino, 1993: 69) He sought to derive the "supreme moral principle" (or
categorical imperative) from pure practical reason, in other words, he claimed the
ethical to be associated with rationality for the first time. (Baynes, 1992: 3) The
same endeavor has been carried further by Rawls whose theory I will be analyzing
in the next chapter.
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Deontological or Kantian liberal ethics depends on a non-consequentialist
conception since it regards only certain categorical duties and prohibitions that
precede other moral or practical concerns, and it is at the same time non-
teleological because it does not regard any final human end or purpose nor any
determinate conception of the human good. (Sandel, 1987: 3) Kant gives a
radically new content to the notion of equality by building liberty into it.2
(Shusterman, 1997: 197) This approach is secured through the arguments of
rationality and universality of the moral self. The catalyst in this process is
rationality since equality that has an impact on social and political norms and
institutions is confined to the rational quality of individuals. This is best
exemplified in the Enlightenment motto Kant urged: Aude sapere, i.e., dare to
know. (Shusterman, 1997: 198) The individual is given the power to think for
himself, for his own fate without the interference of transcendental injunctions.
Therefore the Kantian morality centers around the individual, his interactions with
the society and his will to follow the rules that are at the same time universal moral
consensus.
This passage from the individual to the society and to the humanity is provided by
principle of categorical imperative which states in its first formulation, that we
have to "act according to that maxim which we can at the same time will should
become a universal law." This is at the same time the objective principle of
morality. (Reiss, 1985: 18) Baynes thinks that the Kantian notion of categorical
imperative promises a more egalitarian political morality than Locke's, because it
underlines the primacy of practical reason and the consent in moral laws. (Baynes,
                                                
2 "The problem of human freedom was at the very core of his thought." Hans Reiss says this in
reference to Kant. (See Reiss, 1985:3).
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1992: 46) Kant's discussion of universal moral law also has the power of natural
law in forcing individuals to follow it even in the absence of positive law. (Findler,
1987: 181)
Kant's effort is to reconcile the liberal and the republican traditions, hence bridging
the political idealism of Locke and the normative egalitarianism of Rousseau.
Kant's contribution is meaningful because he demonstrates us that a moral
governance can be feasible over the practical political constitution of the society
and that morality has a role to play for politics. Thus he opens the way for the
normative value of democratic participation. For Kant, individual autonomy can
only be obtained through collective interaction. The rights of individual moral
agent are determined by the collective self-legislation. And such a collective and
individual moral position can only be sustained within civil society. Therefore civil
society is the only element that can provide autonomy, i.e. freedom. The social
contract for Kant, then, becomes the manifestation of this collective will and
therefore the moral significance of individual moral agency. (Dodson, 1997: 93-
111) In this way Kant tries to establish a bridge between moral action and the
political authority, i.e. the state. He borrows from Rousseau the idea that civil
society produces a moral transformation in the nature of individuals. The medium
in this process is social contract that would come into being with self-legislation of
the autonomous individuals through which the universal laws will be enforceable.
(Dodson, 1997: 94-97) Consent appears to be the main element in this process.3
                                                
3 For Kant, the notion of moral personality entails that the legitimacy of laws depend upon the
participation and consent of the individual. (Baynes, 1992:15). Axtmann (1996: 17) remarks that
governments gain legitimacy as well as their limits in the performance of popular consent.
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Baynes summarizes the Kantian theory of justice in four ways: the rights in the
theory are understood as related to rationality away from self-interest, and thus the
notion of autonomy, the theory has a constructivist and non-teleological approach
to ethics, the theory delineates laws of justice having the same source of
justification, i.e., Moral Law (or categorical imperative)  as do the laws of ethics,
and that Kant's theory of justice is about the legitimate use of force or coercion.
(Baynes, 1992: 29)
Kant wants justice to be applied to all external acts of moral individual agents.
Therefore justice contains both the element of coercion as well as freedom. The
underlying belief is that law would not be sufficient by itself without the support of
morality. (Nino, 1993: 68) For this reason, Kant formulates the third version of
categorical imperative: "Act always in such a way as if you were, through your
maxims, a law-making member of a universal kingdom of ends." (Reiss: 1985: 19)
Moral autonomy and the duty of one's moral conduct precedes rights for Kant and
hence is constitutive of freedoms. Right is not teleological, thus independent of the
moral or practical ends the men may pursue and "is derived entirely from the
concept of freedom." (Sandel, 1987: 5) Struggle for morality is a moral duty
because it is not possible to live morally without being free. In this way, duty
precedes freedom and normative rights. (Bielefeldt, 1997: 527) Kant tries to save
the  individual from becoming dependent upon a higher authority for his freedom
and self-responsibility. This conception of ethics that is man-centered is truly a
Copernican revolution in the field of ethics. Because the new ethics provides no
ranking of moral behavior as "higher" or "lower" and thus contributes to the
secularization of the moral grounds of liberalism. The moral will initiates and at
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the same time carries out the moral obligations. In other words, as Bielefeldt calls
it, the moral will is both the "executive" and the "legislative" organ. (Bielefeldt,
1997: 527)
The moral disposition as a duty for the sake of acting morally must be balanced
with consideration of the individual interests. Here the Kantian bridge-building
tendency reappears and provides us with the maxim. In other words, the abstract
moral disposition is bridged with the practical individual action, subjective as well
as objective moral obligation, and the particular and the universal. However,
whether these elements are "bridged" or rather "wedded" is another question.
The duty for Kant is the door through which we can obtain moral consciousness.
As Findler says, "an act is moral if I do the act simply because I ought to do it."
(Findler, 1997: 177) In other words, moral action is tied to duty as it is tied to
freedom in an intertwined fashion just as human dignity and moral autonomy are.
There are two types of duties: duties of virtue (ethics) and duties of justice (rights).
The difference between these two duties is that while the latter can be enforced the
former cannot. The awareness of freedom goes hand-in-hand with awareness of
duty. This deontological approach is situated on the radical notion of individual
moral autonomy and from it emanates all the liberal arguments for inalienability of
rights of individual, and the transcendental conception of individual away from any
shadow of difference and collective identity. Non-conformism has no place in this
duty-oriented liberalism.
Kant differs from Locke in his consideration of the right to freedom as the basic
right while Locke includes it within his trio of natural rights of "life, liberty and
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property".  Because freedom constitutes all rights and the whole legal order. The
innate right of freedom is synonymous with the innate right of equality. For Kant,
the moral freedom of the individual is thus demarcated by the laws of the civil
society, or more realistically, the state  that is presumably consented by the
individual and hence are moral to follow. Laws, just like maxims, bridge a
particular society's political and social affairs with the universal principle of right
that basically means freedom. (see Findler, 1997)
3.1.1.2.1 Unintended Consequences of the Kantian Ethics
The universalizability test for the moral maxims can only be done by "practical
way of reasoning" hence the Kantian argument prescribes an individual good that
is defined by autonomous will. (Kant, 1969: 34) However, as there are as many
ways to "moral reasoning" as the number of human beings, it seems rather dubious
whether the universalizability argument can still provide a common point in the
way rationality is assumed in the Kantian ethics, that unite all human conceptions
and actions morally designed in so many diverse ways. Thus the effort to bridge
the particular conception of the human good with the general moral convention
may fail as it may produce the unexpected outcome of the latter dominating the
former.
The Kantian definition of two worlds, that of the noumenal and of the phenomenal
is used to distinguish between the right and the good. (Baynes, 1992: 47) However
it also creates the problem of "being grounded in this world", in other words, the
applicability of the ideals, or the common theme of the relationship between facts
and norms. This is indeed the case with the liberal ethics in general. Most of the
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time, morally contentious issues are debated from the point of the universal
relevance which is historically, epistemologically and cognitively structured.
This search for a way out becomes a deadlock especially when one takes into
consideration the fact that the only universal values that can raise no question
within the liberal moral universe are those rights, liberties and entitlements that
citizens are assumed to possess. Therefore the perils of the abstractness of the
liberal moral position emerges: The winner of such debates often become those
who can better control, manipulate or substantiate powerful positions in reality. In
this way, the ambiguous rights argument or universal applicability serves only to
strengthening the legitimacy claim of the most powerful. The universalizability test
in this regard becomes the tool at the hand of the politically more powerful rather
than as an equalizer of power and status by which fair and equal contest of ideas
and positions can be made.
Kant's categorical imperative as the basis of his version of liberal ethics is founded
over the cardinal concept of individual moral autonomy. His project of human
freedom on the basis of human autonomy and political republicanism leads to the
liberal ethical assertion that the individual rights are inalienable, meaning they are
not subject to bargaining nor manipulation. The supremacy of the individual choice
hence becomes the central issue over which the liberals defend their minimalist
morality. In this picture, the individual is endowed with reason that is the only
legitimate source of morality, and the only medium for justification of beliefs and
convictions.
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Besides, as Benhabib says, Kant has "a reductionist treatment of the emotional and
affective bases of moral judgment and conduct." (Benhabib, 1992: 23-67) In this
way, individual actions are justified as long as they are reasonable and do not
breach universal maxims, the apparent transcendental moral system that is
sustained through the rational consensus of all humanity. The claim that this is an
egalitarian extension of the Lockean natural rights approach, as Baynes does, may
be right. (Baynes, 1992: 46) However let us not forget that this ideal becomes a
hard task to accomplish given the abstractness of the "universal moral maxim"
coupled with the notion of a rationality that is conceived as uniform, instrumental
and as being devoid of a social and versatile quality that indeed manifests a
plurality of reasonableness both in persons and groups, as well as within persons in
terms of their emotive, cognitive, strategic and supra-rational dimensions.
The second formulation of the categorical imperative reads: "Act always so that
you treat humanity whether in your person or in that of another always as an end,
but never as a means only." (Reiss, 1985, 18) So, individuals can only be taken as
ends in themselves in the Kantian morality. This principle of human dignity or
respect may be related with the liberal glorification of the individual, however, as
we are going to see, liberalism ultimately lacks the means by which this ideal can
be achieved. Historically, it stands over a morality as an extension of its
Realpolitik that imposes different moral standards for different territories,
societies, identities, and cultures. For this reason, it is important to note that the
history of liberalism in western societies is cotemporaneous with the history of
imperialism at the same time. These are clear signs of lack of tolerance and respect
that liberal ideology promises so ambitiously on a universal scale.
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Kantian consideration of the other starts with this principle of the self as an end,
i.e. having the absolute worth. Findler characterizes the Kantian self as "a
legislating being who legislates for him/herself also legislates for everyone who is
similar to him/herself." (Findler, 1997: 177) Therefore in the Kantian ethics, in
conformity with the general liberal notion, the other is a replica, or an analogue of
the self. As Benhabib calls it, it is the "generalized other". The emphasis on
similarity of the individual and his inner motives, instincts and goals thus
determines strongly the place and nature of the alterity. The generalization of the
self onto Others is achieved through the definition of the individual as a rational,
universally homogenous and unitary being. There is no question that such a
disembodied and mass-produced self would result in the ultimate crisis of common
political action, i.e. consensus, and thus representation and together with it all
arguments that support it, such as rationality, distinct individual identity, moral
autonomy and the universal moral laws. This weakness in construction of the self
is, therefore, facilitated by the instability in the Kantian bridge-making across the
shores of particularity and universality by making use of ethical dignity and
responsibility. Therefore this weakness leads us to the same conclusion: too
abstract promises on the part of political empowerment of the individual leads to
disempowering of his ethical stature which consequently weakens the individual's
political primacy presumed by the liberal theory.
Kant has two strategies with regards to the individual moral disposition towards
the other that is not naturally defined in his vocabulary. The first strategy is the
uniformization of the individual as a whole through the ontological reduction of
human existence to one type of standard individual. In this way, the question of the
other is absorbed at best, and ignored at worst. The second strategy relates to his
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conception of duties. "Kant does not deny that promoting the well-being of others
is a duty. But, on the other hand,  by proclaiming it an imperfect duty [those duties
that only the virtuous would carry out], a duty left ultimately to the discretion of
the agent." (Tan, 1997: 54) In other words, he categorizes and ranks the moral
benevolence in such a way that care, trust, solidarity and "the face of the other" as
Levinas calls, become only extraneous. Virtue defined in this way can no longer be
the essential part of the moral behavior that is already made hostage to the
formalistic and ethically minimalist legalistic order. This fact reinforces our
observation that the Kantian deontological liberalism ultimately results in a
disempowered, disembodied, hence depoliticized self.
The Kantian notion of respect is for the morally worthy persons, as Honig explains,
"not for persons tout court; and it is certainly never for those who are other." In
any case, the respect for person as ends in themselves require a picture of the self
who adapts himself and his behavior in conformity with certain moral ends. It also
requires a certain distance, "as equals, and as bearers of rights". (Honig, 1993: 18,
32) Therefore the Kantian notion of the self can be called "moral sameness" that is
derived from the natural law which is influenced by the Newtonian physics in turn.
In fact, contrary to what Findler concludes in his discussion of the Kantian
understanding of the other (see Findler, 1997), this brand of liberal ethics relies on
the notions of equality, selfhood and sameness rather than of inequality, otherness
and difference.
The Kantian self is a self-conscious reproducer and container of the other as much
as it leans on duty as moral action and respects the other as long as he/she
demonstrates the same qualities of obedience, rationality and sameness. The liberal
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political argument that situates the self in this narrow and powerless stature thus
promises the dominance of the system over the individual more than his
prominence in empowering the system. The liberal self is a creation of the
dimensional, rational and universal understanding and thus has been constantly
shaped and reshaped as there emerged changes and contingencies that affected that
understanding over the ages. However, as Thomas Spragens explains, the moral
assumptions that Locke, Kant and other liberal thinkers considered as "common
sense" and over which built their theories, have changed over time. (Spragens,
1986: 35) In this sense, liberalism experiences a rigidity in terms of its
epistemological as well as moral resources.
To quote William Galston, the Kantian approach is the one that tries to "combine
an ethics of positive freedom with a politics of negative freedom." (Galston, 1991:
83) However, as he concludes, this attempt fails. Indeed, the Kantian moral
argument eventually becomes a suffocating vicious circle: it starts with "the duty to
be free" and conversely "being free with a duty" and from there it travels to
emulate the universal in our inner moral reasoning utilizing the categorical
imperative that is an utterly hard task to envision and implement for any
individual. Kant himself admits this fact: "To be sure, common human reason does
not think of [the categorical imperative] abstractly in such a universal form, but it
always has it in view and uses it as the standard of its judgments." (Kant, 1969: 23)
The failure comes from the fact that Kant vigorously seeks a morality that is "freed
from propositions about the nature of man or ... the circumstances in which he is
placed" (Galston, 1991: 167),  even though he clearly presumes such a nature
(rational, autonomous, homogenous and duty-oriented) and such circumstances
(consent, respect and the Rechtstaat).
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The most destabilizing arguments against liberalism and its moral universe
generally come on three fronts: its highly abstract stature, its ahistorical and asocial
nature and its universal and rationalist claims. Indeed, on the subject of categorical
imperative as moral law, as Bielefeldt notes, Kant completely ignores the fact that
the subjective moral maxims are historical and social constructs and thus cannot be
universalized directly. (Bielefeldt, 1997: 535) Moreover, he tries to bridge the
phenomenal morality, i.e. the maxims with the noumenal morality that is respect
aiming "to consolidate selves into moral and political subjects." (Honig, 1993: 7)
This objective, however, runs contrary to the conception of a rights-based social
life where moral maxims are represented by laws enforced by the state, and that the
individual morality is isolated in the notion of rational autonomy.
Therefore, the circle closes on itself on the point where the universal moral
envisioning and the ensuing moral obligation almost completely displaces and then
bypasses the individual action because the universal moral condition supersedes
the individual factity through its dominant abstractness.  This conflict is also
reflected on the tension between "individual perfection" and "state neutrality."
(Galston, 1991: 89)
A similar dilemma can be detected in the case of rationality argument of the liberal
subject. The Kantian theory implies that the reason must be free in its public use,
and must be submissive in its private use. Here, as Foucault adds, the private use of
reason entails an image of the individual who has a role to play in the society, in
more interesting terms, "a cog in a machine". Therefore the promising expanding
horizon of the Kantian individual initiative, in one way or other, is submitted to a
76
political ethic of rational submission that consequently presents the largest obstacle
to it. In another sense, the Kantian political morality propounds a participatory and
egalitarian process of politics while the "logistics", i.e., the mechanisms Kant
provides for this objective lead the individual to the opposite direction. Moreover,
the liberal notion of rationality often carries the sense of economic rationality that
construes reason as a technical functionary enslaved to individual self-interest. It
also is for this reason that liberalism has become a "philosophy of will rather than
of reason."  (Spragens, 1986: 45) This is because the initial liberal contention,
namely "reason creates morality" has been replaced by a "Humean skepticism."
(Spragens, 1986: 46)
In the light of the foregoing explanation, the criticism regarding the neutrality of
the liberal state and its current legitimacy crisis becomes meaningful as mirrored in
its inability to reflect the political and moral claims of various new actors in the
society. The liberal freedom is the freedom of the liberal state to impose its own
values yet doing this in the name of neutrality. And this fallacy, as we can see,
goes back to the Kantian definition of moral will and autonomy. This false
fondness of liberty can be found in Kant's division of labor between the public who
can debate and engage in political criticism, and the despots who subjectively need
to govern in "a republican manner, even although they may rule autocratically."
(Bielefeldt, 1997: 30) There is this sense of "rational despotism" as Foucault calls
in the Kantian project of reasonable contract: a contract that is proposed to the
monarch to conform to "universal reason" in return for the unhindered obedience
of the individual. (Rabinow, 1984: 37) The Kantian tendency for legalism
disregards democracy as "a despotism" and excludes women and poor from its
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"universal" and "egalitarian" conception of active citizenship. (Bielefeldt, 1997:
30)
What is the problem here? Is it that the secular definition of the man's freedom
inevitably results in a reduced importance of the singular will of an individual
versus the others? Or is it the claim of rational and uniform individual that cuts
across all these problematic areas of freedom and universality? I think that the
Kantian categorical imperative and the definition of the morally disembodied and
culturally "disembedded" self (see Axtmann, 1996: 83) underlies all the attempts to
justify moral neutrality of the liberal state in such a way that the individual and the
civil society in his definition fail to counteract against the moral imposition of the
liberal state. In other words, the Kantian project results in justifying the state which
it aims to turn around. Then, in the face of the failing and weaker individual moral
will, the only sources of moral behavior and the definers of the moral political
order become either state or community. And as the liberal state has no affinity
with the idea of community in general, the outcome of this "liberating" effort
remains "suffocating" the individual before a state that has all means of moral
justification wrapped around the transcendentalized concepts of freedom, reason
and rights. Michel Foucault indicates that Kant has taken the meaning of
Aufklärung, the Enlightenment negatively as a "way out". (cited in Rabinow, 1984:
34) I think that Kant with his theory proceeds from this liberating sense of "the
way out" and arrives eventually at the suffocating sense of "one way", completely
reshaping and manifesting the Enlightenment mind.
By denying difference and subscribing to a transcendental individual who is
defined in uniformity and natural tendency towards moral consensus, the Kantian
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moral schema in reality gives way to the enclosurement of the individual will by
the systematic will, i.e. the liberal state. As Foucault explains, "the Enlightenment
must be considered both as a process in which men participate collectively and as
an act of courage to be accomplished personally." (cited in Rabinow, 1984: 35) As
the collective process involves definition and implementation of abstract, asocial
and ahistorical principles by which the state is situated at the center of the political
act of submission and the individual is endowed (or alternatively burdened) with
the duty to act under this moral precursor, the personal moral act eventually
becomes a singular and politically less emphatic act of submission. Therefore we
see that the motto of Rousseau whom Kant admires so much stands at the point
where this apparently empowering argumentation turns out to be disempowering
and hegemonizing: "on les forcera d'être libre"!
When seen from the reverse angle, this dilemma reveals the basic paradox of the
liberal state: the liberal state is relatively freer not to impose on itself any moral
guidance as many classical liberals would argue. This is so even when we assume
that the legitimation of the liberal state would also involve a moral correspondence
between the civil society and the state. For this reason, liberal legitimacy from the
outset has built-in destabilizing relationships in the sense of the different moral
obligations for the public and the government. This, in turn, endangers its
legitimate position as the neutral and somewhat indifferent arbiter over diverse
interests and moral positions.
For Kant, the state and law come first in any case. Honig (1993: 7) is right when
she remarks that Kant reduces politics to law and treated politics as an instrument
of his moral project. Therefore, the political in the face of this formalism and
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reductionism becomes weaker through which the individual, the center of the
liberal universe actually loses the ability to politics although the claim of the theory
is just the opposite. The Kantian reduction of politics to law stems from his fear
that once politics is unharnessed, it could disrupt the moral life of individuals. Here
the basic element of fear within liberalism becomes manifest.
In this light, Terchek’s claim, namely that "unlike some other political theories that
were suspicious or even hostile to change, liberalism always expected change and
welcomed it", becomes doubtful.4 (Terchek, 1986: 19) As we have mentioned
before, change for the liberals is a contained fact, a phenomenon that can take
place only within the limits of a rational, disembodied, unidimensional and asocial
self and his political practice. This is the reality which Terchek later comes close to
discover when explaining the liberal dilemma that the liberals " ... wanted to
remove obstacles to rights", but "their theory of the practice of rights usually
required the continued vitality of some settled institutions." (Terchek, 1986: 20)
Kant asserts: "A system of politics cannot take a single step without first paying
tribute to morality." (quoted in Baynes, 1992: 11) So, in the Kantian thought,
ethics and politics overlap, although he differentiates between political and moral
duties. (Reiss, 1985: 20) The political is defined exclusively in terms of, and
subordinate to, the principle of justice, that is, of right (Recht). There is therefore a
strong correlation between legality and politics, thus the Kantian system turns out
to be formalist and proceduralist. And the Kantian ethics depoliticizes morality by
                                                
4 Similarly, John Dewey wrote: "If radicalism be defined as perception of the need for radical
change, then today any liberalism which is not also radicalism is irrelevant and doomed" (quoted in
Bernstein, 1992: 232).
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its definition of a phenomenal self and therefore results in the glorification of
discipline as disguised under the rubric of law.
3.1.2 Utilitarianism: Individual Good as Anti-Political
My analysis of the contractarian brand of the liberal democratic tradition
concluded that the current symptoms of the disruption in the liberal concepts of
agency, rationality and universality indeed may be traced back to the fundamentals
of this tradition. In this section, I am going to inquire whether the second major
normative perspective within the liberal tradition, i.e. the utilitarian brand may be
exempted from this conclusion or remain vulnerable before it.
Utilitarianism is a dynamic theory of political morality that has been evolving
since Jeremy Bentham who argued for a "felicific calculus" by which any political
rule would be judged whether it contributed to a diminishing or increasing in the
sum total of human happiness. (Birch, 1993: 98) The simple definition of this
principle was elaborated by John Stuart Mill who differentiated between the levels
and contents of happiness or pleasure and perfected the theory as we know it today.
Utilitarianism is important for our discussion, because it provides "one of the
clearest justifications for the liberal democratic state." (Held, 1996: 95) It is yet
another attempt against paternalism as "each individual is the proper guardian of
his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual." (quoted from Mill;
Bobbio, 1990: 61) Its basic claim is that the morally proper act or policy is the one
that produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number of members of the
society. (Kymlicka, 1990: 9) The good that it promotes does not depend on any
transcendental being, and it is consequentialist. Utilitarianism presumes that
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"principles of justice like all other moral principles take their character and color
from the end of happiness." (Sandel, 1987: 4) This demonstrates the teleological
character of this type of liberal strand.
As Neal (1997: 35) explains, there are two types of utilitarianism: Psychological
utilitarianism like that of Bentham and Mill "aimed at maximizing satisfactions
which were conceptualized as ... empirically verifiable, quantifiable and capable of
comparative measurement". Preference utilitarianism like that of Dworkin, on the
other hand "takes the aim of social policy to be that of maximizing the satisfaction
of individual preferences, leaving aside the attempt to quantify levels of individual
satisfaction in terms of happiness or pleasure." On the other hand, Kymlicka argues
that there are four sub-divisions within utilitarianism: "welfare hedonism" of
Bentham which argues that the experience of pleasure is the ultimate good, "non-
hedonistic mental-state utility" that defends that the experience of pleasure is not
the only good because we have other mental states that are valuable beside it,
Dworkin's "preference satisfaction" thesis that argues something is valuable for the
reason that many people desire it, and the argument of "informed preferences" that
defines welfare as the satisfaction of "rational" or "informed" preferences.
(Kymlicka, 1990: 12-18)
Mill speculates that the state could curtail the freedom of individuals only in cases
where they would harm others, i.e. the principle of neminem laedere. (Bobbio,
1987: 101) In this account, a harmful action may be prevented by the government
but cannot be abolished altogether. It is up to the individuals to decide whether
such an action would decrease their own utility. The limit for the state action, then,
is when there is a threat to the others. Utilitarianism, especially that of Mill
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attempts to define limits for the state action. Utilitarians have a negative concept of
liberty, and therefore they believe that individuals will be free as long as they are
not constrained by laws and regulations. Mill argues that the best polity is the
representative democracy that could provide a counter-balance to an overgrown
bureaucracy. But while he supported universal suffrage, he did not conceal his
distrust in ordinary people and their elected representatives.  (Held, 1996: 107-108)
Utilitarians reject "the whole idea of rights prior to and against the state." (Birch,
1993: 119-120) Gray calls utilitarianism "perfectionist liberalism" as opposed to
the Kantian "rights-based liberalism". (Mehta, 1997: 508) Because Millian
liberalism takes individual autonomy as the central value that leads to the argument
for human flourishing that unites all human aspirations within it. (Damico, 1986:
171)
Utilitarianism develops a completely different strategy with regards to the agency,
rationality and universality arguments of classical liberalism. Instead of referring to
some natural or abstract rights, utilitarianism seeks individual-based calculations of
inner motivations, interests and desires in configuring the role of individual vis-à-
vis the society and the state. Utilitarians take "facts of individual welfare as the
basic subject matter of ethical thought." (Williams, 1985: 75) From this
perspective, we can claim that this brand of liberalism seems weaker on its
systemic, i.e. state-oriented claims and stronger in terms of its description and
utilization of the individual ethical behavior in comparison to the contractarian
strand of Locke and Kant that we have already discussed.
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For some liberals like Neal, utilitarianism itself may be said to constitute a
distinctive ethics in its own right. For him, utilitarianism is both devoid of a theory
of the good, yet on the other hand, it is the liberal theory of the good. It is the
teleological version of liberal ethics as opposed to the deontological liberal ethics,
of which the contractarian branch relies on Locke and Kant, and the libertarian
branch that is represented by several thinkers including Hayek, Nozick and Rand.
However both schools are similar "in maintaining that the state must be neutral" in
regard to the question of the good life. (Neal, 1997: 36)
The major criticisms against utilitarianism generally focus on three fronts: that it
does not secure individual rights since it values only pleasures and pains; it does
not take into account the distinctiveness of persons; and, finally, it does not respect
the dignity and autonomy of the moral individual. (Neal, 1997: 36) It is also
accused of establishing an administrative system that provides the government
control, best symbolized by Bentham's panopticon which is an icon of glorification
of the manipulative power of the expert systems under the guise of liberal rhetoric.
It leads to exclusion of differences and increased government control on the people
in the name of upholding the principle of utility. The utilitarian legacy had a strong
influence on the welfare state policies starting with Bentham's proposals for a free
education, minimum wage and sickness benefits. Therefore it is proper to call it a
"founding model of democracy for a modern industrial society" as Macpherson
prefers. However it also contributed to inequality by seeing politics, public sphere
and public affairs as synonymous with the realm of men, especially men of
property. (Held, 1996: 97) Utilitarianism justifies sacrificing the weak and
unpopular members of the community for the benefit of the majority. (Kymlicka,
1990: 45) Therefore, it tends to be inegalitarian and indifferent with regard to the
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arguments for justice. Utilitarians are also "surprisingly conformist" since they
want to leave everything unchanged. (Kymlicka, 1990: 45) Thus they evade the
need for change and tend to disfavor the political as we understand it. Politics for
them is confined to the state and its activities, and is a distinct and separate realm
than other social activities. (Held, 1996: 98)
Utilitarianism has a deep dislike of democracy and its egalitarian project although
it also talks about a direct relationship between the interests of populace and the
principles of governance. Gordon Graham summarizes this position: "appeal to
desires and preferences as the basis of political choice does not sustain the
principle that everyone should have an equal say, or even that everyone should
have a say." (Graham, 1994: 25; italics original) It shows a semblance to the
democratic theory with its agenda of individual's self-development as a
consequence and at the same time ideal of the political morality. However, as Held
suggests, "Mill tried to weave arguments for democracy together with arguments to
protect the modern political world from the democracy." (Held, 1996: 117)
Clearly, there was a fear of democracy on the part of utilitarians just like the
libertarians such as Hayek, for it could result in arbitrary or oppressive rule of
majority, their representatives and bureaucracy. (Held, 1996: 256) Mill, for
example, exempts from the universal suffrage those bankrupts, fraudulent debtors,
the illiterate and those who receive charity and suggests plural votes by which the
best educated must have more than one vote, (Bobbio, 1990: 64-66) as if the
educational level is something that is equally and justly obtained by each and every
person in the society. Therefore, his seemingly egalitarian utilitarian ethics
consequently turns out to perpetuate the inequalities already in place.
85
Moreover, we can detect the familiar theme of Eurocentricism underlying the very
claims of universalism of the Millian utilitarianism. For in his view, all societies
could be placed "on a single scale according to the degree to which they afforded
its members the opportunities to realize the highest human form", i.e. what he calls
the "noble character." (Mehta, 1997: 509) Liberty is only for those individuals
whose faculties are fully developed. The imperialist connotation in this thinking is
manifest as Mill claims that for the "barbarians", despotism may be "a legitimate
mode of government, provided the end be their improvement, and the means
justified by actually effecting that end." (quoted in Bobbio, 1990: 61) He thinks, in
accordance with the Enlightenment ideal of progress, that non-western civilizations
are frozen in a state of arrested development. This claim necessarily leads to his
famous antipathy towards plurality of cultures and civilizations and his advocating
of a hierarchy of cultures. (Mehta, 1997:  509)
3.2 Liberal Ethics: Its Constitution and Problems
So far I have concentrated on the pretext, the theoretical milieu and the
implications of the globalization process for the legitimacy of the liberal
democratic state.  I have presented various perspectives on the legitimacy crisis of
the liberal nation state and then proceeded to analyze the contractarianism of
Locke and Kant and the utilitarianism of Mill as two major normative traditions
within political liberalism with a view to find out whether the current crisis is a
temporary and "conjuntural" one, or whether it is imminent in the very conceptions
of the three major constituents of the liberal political idea, namely the notions of
agency, rationality and universality. In this section I will try to present a general
critical overview of the liberal democratic normative framework in order to
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broadly delineate the trajectories by which the liberal nation state is assumed to be
associated with democracy.
3.2.1. Liberalism and Democracy: A Perfect Match?
Before discussing the elements and problems of the liberal ethics, first of all, we
need to delineate the relationship between liberalism and democracy. When the
secular individualistic transcendentalism that is a part of the negativism by which
the liberal theory is characterized is exempted, the liberal normative argument
relies on a single element: democracy seems to be the savior of liberalism in dire
times. Norberto Bobbio (1987) contends that liberalism and democracy although
historically and conceptually different, do and have to depend on each other for the
success of democracy. Nevertheless, it is clear that the immediate link between
these two models is not easy to establish, especially in terms of their historical,
ethical and political ramifications. For well into the twentieth century universal
suffrage was left non-accomplished in many liberal societies. Lower classes that
lacked ownership of property, education and income were kept outside the
democratic participation in many of the major liberal societies. Women were
excluded in quite many cases.  Besides the inequality in universal suffrage, the
equality of votes was also a late comer. All these show that liberalism could do
well without the democratic principles and processes such as equal participation in
the public decision-making.
Liberalism seems to be benefited most from the democratic input that has appeared
with expanded universal suffrage and egalitarian welfare state policies. Shklar
claims that, at present "liberalism is monogamously, faithfully, and permanently
married to democracy" but this is a rather "marriage of convenience" (Shklar,
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1989: 37). The democratic element of liberal democracy was galvanized only after
extensive conflicts, and as Held suggests, it still remains a rather fragile
achievement. Benjamin Barber accepts this fact of marriage between liberalism
and democracy but rightly adds that "although liberalism has benefited from
democracy, it has rarely acknowledged the benefits and has generally treated
democratic practices (if not also democratic ideas) as perilous" (Barber, 1989: 55).
While the liberal notion of negative rights push the individual introvert, the
democratic resistance emphasized the positive rights to cement solidarity,
collectivity, community and an ethic of care.
At present, the liberal and the democratic elements are subjects of vibrant
theoretical debate as radical democrats and deliberative democrats stress the
democratic element in liberal democracy, while Rawls and libertarians underline
the element of liberalism. I will dwell upon these thoughts and their positions with
regards to the democratic element in the coming chapters.
3.2.2 The Groundwork of the Liberal Normative Order
The crisis of liberalism, as we have discussed earlier, is not a simple nor a passing
phenomenon.  It requires a profound critique and analysis of how liberalism is
understood and practiced today, as well as how its basic statement and principles
such as rights, freedom, consent, reasonable self contribute to this crisis. Moreover,
it asks for a thorough rethinking on how its formulation and formation of the
liberal nation state on these very bases could and still can respond to change.
Basically liberal ethics can be basically situated within modern ethics which is an
"ethic of progress" and "ethic of success". This modern ethic is based on some
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particular assumptions: that man is rational and self-interested, that human beings
have human rights regardless of origin and culture, that capitalistic economic
development is good because it leads to progress, that this development is
universal, and that the human knowledge and ethics are capable of transformation
based on a universal and impartial standpoint (Ferguson, 1998: 96). In addition,
Galston argues for these elements of the good to be constitutive of a liberal ethic:
the life, normal development of basic capacities, fulfillment of interests and
purposes, freedom, rationality, society, subjective satisfaction.5
On the subject of self-development, Kant, just like Mill, argues that liberalism with
its stress on  unhindered action of the individual moral agent can reveal the best
hidden in the human beings. Kant articulates this view: "The history of human race
as a whole can be regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring
about an internally perfect political constitution as the only possible state within
which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely" (Reiss,
1985: 50) We can also see the evolutionist element in Kant's belief in a "constantly
progressing human race" in cultural as well as moral matters, a process that "may
at times be interrupted but never broken off" (Reiss, 1985, italics original).
An ethical liberalism is the one that individual is the prime agent for morality from
where negative and positive notions of liberty, as well as economic and political
freedoms, legal and institutional arrangements issue (Bobbio, 1987: 105-106). The
problem of political liberalism, then, is to provide a framework on which various
freedoms can coexist through introduction of practical rules of conduct. Many
                                                
5 For Galston (1991: 173-177), the liberal notion of the good is rather "thin" and stands in defiance
against the dangers of secular nihilism, theological withdrawalism, moral monism, Nietzschean
irrationalism, and barbarism. Axtmann (1996: 107-108) reflects a similar view: "liberalism itself is
thoroughly "moral" in its appreciative endorsement of the autonomy and self-determination of the
individual."
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critiques relating to liberalism argue that political liberalism lacks ethical substance
therefore it relies almost solely on procedures to keep the society together. Because
all the social and moral relation need to pass through the state, so it becomes
stronger than the individual. This proceduralism in return gives rise to a formalistic
and minimalistic morality, and an institutionalism that risks encouraging
individuals to be moral in their political behavior (Bielefeldt, 1997: 524; Hardin,
1994: 32).
As I have suggested before, the liberal notion of the individual is assumed to be in
a priori disposition towards the ethics of "the jungle", or in later models, "the
modern system". The relationship between the individual of the liberal discourse
who is characterized as being singular, autonomous, homogenous, identifiable and
rational; and the political process, on the other hand, is established on an ethical
marginality. Therefore the liberal ethics may be broadly assumed to be the rational
disposition of individuals towards rational uncertainty and thus ethics does not
constitute the core of liberal legitimacy. It rather becomes a contingency, instead of
the determining framework of liberal democracy. We can only speak about an
ethical remedy for the rational political model.
On the other hand, liberalism also possesses an a posteriori element because the
ethical question is reduced to its immediate identification by the outcome of the
rational process of identity constitution, in other words, a particular identity is
granted prompt moral recognition as long as it serves the ethical position of the
liberal state. Therefore the individual is defined as a political subject without a
history, hence a predictable and homogenous being, not heterogeneous since that is
already consumed under the rubric of liberal pluralism. The moral constitution of
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the liberal subject takes place through a process of self-centered reflexivity that
shapes and reshapes the elements, and thus the whole complexion of the political
subject.
It is important to see the role of  the liberal state in the othering process between
the national subject and other subjects in the world, but also among the national
subjects themselves that would mean the negation of interpersonal concerns for
solidarity and responsibility. Thanks to this monopolizing role, the liberal public
sphere tends to be claustrophobic, morally relativistic, indifferent and finally
exclusionary for those identities defined outside the moral standard of the liberal
state.
The liberal discourse places the individual who is conceived as a small island at the
center whose social life is intervened by the liberal state that is presumed to be
rational and universal. The liberal state has a false moral claim of neutrality and a
claim for anonymity that distances it not only from the citizens but at the same
time destroys the empathy between them that results in increasing solitude,
absence of sociability therefore contributing to exclusion of the other. Because as
Damico suggests, "rights are part of liberalism's program to protect individuals
from society and the state" (Damico, 1986: 177). Protection of the subject from
other individuals and the social bonds leads to a solitary being of liberal individual,
unable and ineligible for social coherence and solidarity.
Liberal individualism leads to asocialization of the individual, his de-moralization
and exclusion. As Barber (1989: 54) argues, "liberalism created a safe heaven for
individuals and their property, but a poor environment for collective self-
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government." This individualism entails both that persons must be free from
outside intervention as well as that they can have, develop and pursue their own
interests (Damico, 1986: 170). Such a notion inevitably introduces an "introvert"
individual. Hence the political is left out of the self's constitution in ontological,
epistemological as well as axiological terms. The liberal rhetoric of " rights" means
to make the political subjects seem "equal", but not necessarily "social", i.e. selves
in solidarity or for that matter, "morally responsible". Because the social and thus
the political is the realm where the ethical resides: "if there is no concern with "the
social" in the public arena, what is left of politics?" (Axtmann, 1996: 53)
Barber (1989: 57, 62) points out that the liberal notion of consent that is presumed
to link the individual with the community has been despised through a weaker
interpretation of its democratic content by rampant individualism and social
inequality It means, the attempt to bridge the liberal liberty with democratic demos
has unjustly favored the former over the latter and hence created a priority of right
over utility, of an abstract individual over community-created citizens. In this way,
the liberal state becomes the Self with its self-definition of the Unitary, the
Universal and the Rational. As Axtmann puts it very clearly: "as a moral regulator,
the state "creates" society . . . the state, of necessity, is a moral(izing) agent"
(Axtmann, 1996: 109) Such a state encourages its subjects for othering and
consequently the other is internalized and made invisible within the "national"
discourse.
The liberal reason "has become instrumental to interests, and virtue has often been
made into something individualistic and utilitarian" (Terchek, 1986: 27) Hence the
liberal political rationality means making individual useful for the state that has the
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monopoly of possessing a history, certainty, universality, therefore the moral
neutrality, and ultimately permanence that provides the cognitive, moral and
actional horizons of the subjects. This is done in such a way to impose cultural
limits to the individual self as contained in the image of nation state where popular
sovereignty resides. The liberal construction of the self, as Kymlicka discusses,
follows an introvert political process because "liberalism wants individuals to be
free, not to go beyond the language, conventions and history of their community,
but to move around within their culture" (quoted in Axtmann, 1996: 94) In short,
"the idea and reality of liberal democracy has always been linked to the idea and
reality of the nation-state." (Axtmann, 1996: 102) The liberal state has also been an
interpreter of the history, (see Bobbio, 1990: 24) as exemplified amply in the
Eurocentric and Orientalist liberal discourses. Rorty claims that "pluralistic
postmodern bourgeois liberalism" is "at least the best possible world achieved by
European civilization," and even goes further in claiming that liberalism is prior to
philosophy and hence needs no philosophical justification (cited in Bernstein,
1990: 234-235).
I can add that it is only through the liberal state that legitimate claims for political
action and organization can be made by the civil society. The liberal state retains
control of the channels through which the individuals could penetrate into the web
of social relations. In other words, for liberals the state remains an agent, but the
only one that can supervise, collect and disseminate the social inputs and claims
for conflict or harmony.
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Let me now focus on certain aspects of liberal normative framework which may
contribute to my discussion on the crisis of the liberal political agenda exacerbated
by change, i.e. globalization.
3.2.3 Between Facts and Norms: The Problems of Liberal Normative
         Conceptualization
The recessing notion of the political as represented by the morally neutral nation
state against the normative configuration of the liberal subject and his political
potential brings about a further question: how can the abstract ideals of liberalism
over such a shaky theoretical enterprise be related to its performance in real terms?
There is a "disparity between the "ideals" of liberty and equality that liberals
profess and the actual state of affairs in so-called liberal societies. The disparity
becomes indeed a gap when we recall that there are so many forces and tendencies
such as class conflict, social division, patriarchy and racism that are "compatible
with liberal political practices, but nevertheless foster real inequality and limit
effective political freedom." (Bernstein, 1992: 245-246) To put it differently, the
liberal reliance on abstract concepts like rights, consent and contract has cost
liberalism the impoverishment of its politics (Barber, 1989: 67).
Liberalism has two main avenues in terms of its ethical claims: Those liberal
thinkers who envisage the good as the basis of politics may lead to the danger of
hegemonic conception of ethics, i.e., transcendental and corruptible politics. Mill is
an example of this concept. He tries to erect a liberal polity out of defining the
man's nature in terms of utility, a concept that carries global connotation, yet
rooted in capitalistic and modern conception of man, his role and his self-
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achievement. However those liberal thinkers who lean on rights and duties as the
escape from this reductionism and essentialism also fall in the same trap of
universalism by adopting the duty, rights and entitlements as values that possess
immunity from change and imply a sense of the good of "submission" prior to
participation. The contractarian approach is part of this escapism, since it provides
a new theoretical beginning through which troublesome social and political
experiences can be concealed and the appeal to the bright future of liberties can be
made (see Bobbio, 1987: 132).
Many including some of the liberal thinkers argue that there is a deep theoretical
weakness of liberalism. In fact, for any moral theory or political moral theory one
needs to scrutinize that the claims of the theory at the "global" and "abstract" level
need to be coherently linked to and complemented by the "particular" and the
"concrete" level. This is at least true for the Enlightenment political theories such
as liberalism, republicanism, and utilitarianism that by and large depict such a two-
tiered moral structure: sometimes in the form of distinctions such as public-private,
general-particular, universal-local, communal-individual, etc..
However, whether the bridging in the liberal tradition between matters of factity
and normativity has been successful is rather questionable. The liberal moral claim
fails to remedy what is already inflicted into its fundamental structure and this is
the reason why even liberal thinkers such as Gray can "express skepticism about
the possibility of providing liberalism with adequate philosophical foundations"
(Mehta, 1997: 506).6 Rorty differs from many other liberals by claiming that
                                                
6 Kekes distinguishes between liberalism as ideology which means "a set of organizational
principles integral to a particular mode of collective being in the world" and liberalism as theory
meaning "a series of reflections responsive to some of the deepest questions human beings have
raised about themselves and the world" (see Botwinick, 1998: 441).
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"liberal culture needs an improved self-description rather than a set of foundations"
(quoted in Bernstein, 1992: 265). He perceives liberalism as a "clarification,
elaboration and redescription of an ongoing practice" rather than "resting upon
universalist foundations" (see Mehta, 1997: 508).
Paradoxically, liberalism is treated more and more as a political practice, rather
than as a coherent political theory that has ethical implications even though it
claims the triumph in an apparently globalizing world. Moreover, by subscribing to
the view that philosophical skepticism can provide any basis for preferring
liberalism to any other political morality, some of the liberal thinkers tacitly
indicate that the liberal stance is in no need of philosophical justification, and just a
fact by itself. This further complicates the definition and redefinition of political
morality in a liberal context and the defense of liberal ethics either in the form of
contractarian, utilitarian, or pluralist versions. Because such an indifference to the
justification and consistency of the theory ultimately leads to conformism and an
intellectual blindness that indeed haunts much of the liberal discourse today in the
wake of globalization discourses. The conformist character of liberalism defies its
historically revolutionary aspect and shows us that it serves as an essential aspect
of power politics. It is possible to ascribe this philosophical weakness to its
Enlightenment-based project of a universal society grounded in a generic humanity
and a rational morality. The aspiration of liberalism is to unite all local and
disperse moralities under one universal morality by the principle that all human
beings can agree upon it by virtue of their being rational persons (Mehta, 1997:
507).
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As can be seen from above, what comes out as problem is not the debate over a
certain policy (like entitlements and property rights, and the central position of
state), but also the indication that perhaps what underlies all these problems is the
conception of man and his relation with ethics. This is an issue that has been by
and large ignored under the rubric of political morality, a derivation rather than the
substance.
It seems that liberalism falls prey to its own ideal, namely that it tries to limit the
government by limiting it in theory, but not in actuality, and that the state becomes
the only legitimate source and guardian of a hypothetical contract that serves only
to its own legitimation, rather than the political ability of the populace.
One of the preliminary conclusions I may derive from this analysis of liberal ethics
is that ethics cannot be reduced to a functional, derivative and secondary element
of politics. It characterizes, determines and generates the ideas about the political
too. Therefore, I will now elaborate on major claims of the liberal discourse in
order to discover the significance and thus problematicization of ethics beyond the
simple discourse of rights, the good life and entitlements.
3.2.3.1 Value Pluralism and Neutrality of Liberal State
i. Value Pluralism: Value pluralism is defined as "the claim that there are
objective values, but these are irreducibly diverse" (for this definition, see Mehta,
1997) For pluralistic liberals, "there is an irreducible plurality of valuable goods,
activities, and ways of life that are conflicting and often uncombinable" (Mehta,
1997: 510). Thus, value pluralism relies on the argument that we humans have
different view points and the conceptions of the good, therefore the liberal state
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must respect the difference of values and more than that, must enforce the best
standpoint in case of conflicts between persons and groups over values.
Starting with the autonomous self and perceiving infinite ways of interpreting and
analyzing the universe and the life under the assumption of universal reason, the
liberal claim for value pluralism aims at representing and respecting all those
multiple claims for the good life by trying to accommodate them through a
mechanism of a modus vivendi among competing and conflicting views of the
good life. The argument for value pluralism is indeed concomitant to the argument
of neutrality.
The historical examples of a liberal pluralistic order have been rather recent and
open to criticism. Because in each of these "pluralistic" liberal practices, one can
argue for a certain exclusion and reduction of various moral positions and visions.
Hence, the  discussion of pluralism represents the critical test for liberalism's basic
arguments and institutions that stress the primacy of the self-justification of the
moral arguments, hence of the individual choice and gain.
Value pluralists defend that the loss of interest is inevitable for any moral position
in conflict because of the plurality of ends and moral motifs.  Similarly there
emerges a conception of political ethics that actually mediates between ideas and
positions in the society claiming moral primacy in any political issue involving
conflict. So, the liberal pluralists like Berlin argue that the liberal state is
"hospitable to the widest flourishing of human values" (Dzur, 1998: 375). Some
liberals argue for an automatic relationship between liberalism and pluralism:
"every liberalism is a pluralism and all liberal societies are pluralistic" so contends
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Flathman, for instance (see Flathman, 1998).7 This argument reflects what Mehta
(1997: 517) highlights: "liberals are rightly accused of sometimes rigging their
procedures so that they issue in liberal outcomes."
Recently, such thinkers like John Kekes, John Gray and Stuart Hampshire have
rejected such an understanding of liberal pluralism and instead defend that the
value pluralism of liberalism is dubious because the liberal state itself propounds
the goods of individuality and equality (Dzur, 1998: 375). Kekes, for example,
defends that both liberalism and pluralism cannot be sustained at the same time
because "liberalism is liberal about anything except the necessity of maintaining a
liberal society" (Botwinick, 1998: 441) Therefore the moral smokescreen of
liberalism fails at the point where it pretends to be the strongest theoretically. It
also implies that rationality argument of liberalism is no longer useful in resolving
the best moral stand point because all values are meaningful for the groups or
persons who uphold their own versions of the good.
As the critiques against the value pluralism of liberalism emphasize, "liberalism
insists upon the use of ranking principles", in other words superior and primary
values, i.e., equality and individuality over others. Therefore the liberal claim is
incompatible with the liberal practice.8 Secondly, social values are ignored in
considering the "lone being" of individual whereas social traditions, rules and
institutions play a very important role on individual's moral flourishing. Thirdly, as
John Gray argues, the argument of equality is incompatible with individuality since
                                                
7 Spragens (1986: 43) affirms the need for the liberal state not to "be totally "neutral" – in the sense
of  being utterly indifferent—to the character of its citizenry."
8 Thinkers such as Nagel and Walsh argue that "neutrality cannot be regarded as the ultimate value
of liberalism, because neutrality tacitly presupposes a particular conception of the good that
identifies the good with neutrality" (see Botwinick, 1998: 440).
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some forms of individual flourishing necessitate inequalities. It is not always the
case that individual capabilities will grow better in relatively equal societies (see
Dzur, 1998: 375-392). It may also be added that "the doctrine of value pluralism
poses a serious challenge for liberalisms of the Rawlsian and Millian kind" because
they emphasize a certain organizing principle, a liberal good so to speak, around
which the liberal society is founded (Mehta, 1997: 503).
Liberal thinkers such as Galston defend that we have to accommodate practices
and institutions we regard as unjust (Altman, 1996). This argument is strengthened
by the liberal conceptions of the individual, community, society, state and politics
which are confined to the ethical paradigm that relies on a unitary and universal
code of reason, human existence and individual agency. I think that value
pluralism in particular and liberalism in general emphasize the notion of conflict or
damage and its management that both constrain the limits of the political and the
theoretical ability to sensibly explain and understand the human condition. It also
results in the prominent negativism of the liberal theory.
ii. Value Neutrality of the Liberal State: Perhaps the principal element for liberal
ethics is public neutrality. It may be said to be the most popular conception of the
liberal state and yet, at the same time, the most fragile to criticism. As Neal says,
"liberalism, if it does not have a theory of the good, certainly has a meta-theory of
the good" (Neal, 1997: 38) The liberal neutrality may be called the "moral
Esperanto" since it aims to accommodate a wide range of selves and beliefs within
a neutral public system (Vincent, 1996: 146).9
                                                
9 He thinks that liberalism and postmodernism stand in parallel in terms of their extreme
individualism.
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Dworkin and Ackerman think that the best response to the plurality and
contestation of various ethical claims and projects of the good life in the society is
the absolute neutrality of the liberal order. The liberal state must ensure only the
moral grounds on which the citizens can follow their differing agendas of moral
life and the vision of the good life. Therefore, it cannot itself advance a program of
the good life and impose it on the citizens. While Dworkin bases his defense of
liberalism on the conception of equality as its constitutive value, Ackerman argues
for a principle of "neutral dialogue" (see Neal, 1997: 16)
In fact, liberalism cannot do without, and presupposes, a non-neutral account of the
human good. Liberal thinkers including Rawls see neutrality as a guarantee for
greater equality in the society since a "thin" notion of justice and rights would
provide the most realizable general consensus of the citizens for a particular
political decision. Hence, the liberal neutrality can be seen as working for
legitimizing the liberal state. Here we again meet the liberalism of fear by which
any conception of the "general good" must be based on rational consensus of
individuals who are assumed to be those who can best evaluate and articulate their
ideas, projects and wishes through the political structure. Therefore, political
liberalism justifies a polity only as long as it sticks to the principle of neutrality and
contrasts itself with those coercive polities who impose a certain version of the
good life on its citizens.
So, it is no coincidence that the advocates of public neutrality almost always rely
on this fear of an impository good that would jeopardize the competing programs
for the good life present in the society. For them, as Lund argues, public neutrality
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becomes a criterion for political inputs, i.e. political participation, more than a
value in itself (Lund, 1996: 483).
The principle of value neutrality presents a serious field of contestation for the
liberal theory. One of the strongest objection to this principle comes from
communitarians whom we will try to elaborate in the next chapter. While the
communitarians attack it for possessing a "thin" notion of neutrality, some others
like John Kekes accuse it to be too "thick", i.e., itself propounding an ethical
"good", thus subverting its own claim of "neutrality". The latter ones argue that the
fact that liberalism presents itself in the disguise of neutrality is a strategy to hide
its real set of particular values and thus implicitly applies an exclusion towards
certain interests and values in the society. Therefore what is presumed "neutral" is,
in reality, false. In other words, liberalism tends to create its own metaphysics, a
metaphysics of freedom and an ethics of neutrality that serve to fulfillment of the
opposite processes of exclusion, inequality and indifference.
Patrick Neal analyzing Ronald Dworkin's interpretation of liberal neutrality
remarks: "liberalism as political morality is of a different, and more deeply
reflective, epistemic order than non-liberal political moralities" (Neal, 1997: 4) For
many liberals the moral dimension of the liberal theory is too feeble and vague and
they perceive this weakness of moral infrastructure as a superior aspect of a polity
that needs to pose ultimately as "neutral". I think this statement fails to account for
the strong moral claims and frameworks liberalism builds behind the veil of
neutrality. Because according to the liberal principle of neutrality, rights stand as
the "ordering principles" for diverse and conflicting positions of the good life in
the society. Yet, as Neal acknowledges, "no state, including a liberal state, can
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practice neutrality with regard to the competing conceptions of the good existent
within its domain of power" (Neal, 1997: 5).
As Joseph Raz explains, it is impossible to be neutral about ideals of the good or to
exclude them completely as reasons for political action (cited in Nino, 1993: 133).
Liberalism which strongly defends its moral-neutral nature, however, converts and
reduces the civil claims of the good into its own conception of the good. As Neal
suggests, "liberalism continues to allow us to speak, but asks that we translate our
self-understanding ... into the language of [the liberal] meta-theory" (Neal, 1997:
38). Hence it tends to hegemonize, transform and intervene with the moral claims
of the good in competition or in contestation within the society. We may conclude
that liberalism is self-contradictory since it does advance the good of its own.10 As
Sandel (1987: 11) explains, "the ideal of a society governed by neutral principles is
liberalism's false promise."
3.2.3.2 Negativism of the Liberal Political-Normative Discourse
An important element in the normative-political configuration of the liberal state in
relation with its claim of value-neutrality is the reliance on negativity as a major
political strategem which connotes prevention, fear, exclusion and cynicism and
hence has a profound impact on the perception, conception and management of
such theoretical instruments as agency, rationality and universality. I will now try
to present a brief analysis of this negativism and some of the important
implications it carries for our discussion.
                                                
10 Dworkin argues in favor of such a liberal good (see Nino, 1993: 134).
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The discourse of freedom is the mythology of liberalism. The liberal discourse of
freedom signifies the conception of a human-centered universe where any
transcendental being or authority is absent in directing and commanding the will of
the individual. Berlin distinguishes between the terms "freedom" and "liberty" that
are used commonly synonymous on the basis that while the former pertains to the
positive liberty, the latter characterizes negative liberty (Berlin, 1969). The
negative sense of liberty finds its best expression in Hobbes when he refers to
freedom as the absence of external impediments of action. The positive sense of
liberty is symbolized best by Rousseau and his theory of general will by which the
presence and intervention on the part of securing freedoms is justified. The liberal
discourse of rights entails a background which paves the way for universal, rational
and individualistic construction of the social universe.11 Liberal rights are often
categorized as "negative", i.e. entailing noninterference from external sources than
the self, and those "positive" rights connoting the provision and intervention by
authority, let it be an individual or an institution (Lomasky, 1990: 84). Classical
liberalism including libertarianism is based on the notion of negative rights which
emphasizes the autonomy and self-direction of individuals without the aid and the
interference form any other being, person or the state. This understanding is
paramount for it is the basis upon which rests the highly individualistic portrayal of
the social life, the construction of interpersonal relations and the relations between
civil society and the state by the liberal theory.
Positive rights argument or "welfare liberalism", on the other hand, claims that the
individuals "possess extensive positive claims on others", in other words,
                                                
11 These rights are sometimes labelled as "legal rights", i.e. those related to the laws of a specific
community, "moral rights" that often back the legal rights but are independent of it, and those
"basic rights", "natural rights" or "human rights" that are universal in application, morally superior
and underly to other types of rights. (See Lomasky, 1990: 101).
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regardless of and besides the argument for non-interference, individuals are
entitled to receive help from others (Lomasky, 1990: 84). Thinkers in this line
beside Rousseau include Green and English Idealists who deny the assumptions of
utilitarianism, reject individualism and the utilitarian view that the man is
prompted by desires.12
While those thinkers like Mill, Locke, Kant, Berlin and others advocate negative
liberties for the argument that the essence of individuals is that they are free,
autonomous, and possess their own brand of morality, the thinkers who stress
positive rights such as Rousseau underline the fact that man is a social creature and
derive their values and ends in life from the communities in which they live
(Birch,1993: 109). The essence of the debate on liberties is the notions of agency
and autonomy and their moral character. While the negative liberty argument
safeguards the individual freedom, and his autonomy, the positive liberty argument
describes him as the possessor of positive rights to resources to complement the
negative rights (for a discussion of these notions, see Axtmann, 1996: 40-42). In
parallel to their respective positions, the proponents of negative liberties argue that
positive liberties approach would lead to a state imposing a certain good on the
people and thus tends to be authoritarian, while the defenders of positive liberties
attack them for estranging the individual and ignoring his social construction.
I think that the negative definition of freedom necessarily enhances the notion of
"liberalism of fear" and undermines such essential democratic values as solidarity,
participation, civic responsibility and care for the other. Because securing the
individual autonomy and liberty by stressing his difference from the Other,
                                                
12 Flathman (1992) refers to negative rights as the proper balance between action and coercion,
while sees positive liberalism something like illiberalism that underlines control and intrusion.
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supported by the neutrality claim which creates enclaves of identities each
possessing its own brand of moral conduct ultimately results in weakening of the
social cohesion and the sense of solidarity. In this sense, the negative freedoms
ensure the relative autonomy of the liberal state to legitimize the interests and the
values of the governing classes as the common good while weakening the moral
and political integration of the individuals. Because in the absence of such a social
cohesion, the individual will almost always is left alone before the state assumingly
acting as the referee for moral questions which indeed do constitute the content of
the political questions as well. Then the state gains unexpected power to advance
the political agendas of the interest groups and certain actors like the corporations
which have greater influence on the liberal state than the mass of atomized
individuals.
3.2.3.3 The Liberal Negation of the Political
In addition to its negativist definition of freedom, the liberal sketch of the human
nature as a container of "appetites and aversions" (Macpherson, 1980: xi) underlies
its negative definition of politics in general and political morality in particular.
Hence Barber is right in calling liberalism "a politics of negativity" (Barber, 1989:
59). Indeed, liberalism carries a strong negative tone regarding the moral
constitution and disposition of the human beings. This is certainly contributed by
the historical milieu fraught with civil wars, religious persecutions and massacres,
bloody revolutions, endless battles that Hobbes, Locke, Kant and others witnessed
in person. This "liberalism of fear" as Shklar (1989: 27-30) calls it, bears a
profound impact upon liberalism's definition of the political and the moral and its
situating them accordingly. Liberalism is an answer to undeniable actualities of
horrors, tyranny, cruelty and violence and that is the reason why it naturally
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concentrates on damage control and that it must remain eclectic since it does not
rely on any other moral philosophy.
Another element underlying the negativity of liberalism and its skeptical
perspective of the human potential and action, as well as the basic antecedent to the
emphasis on justice in the Kantian liberalism is the Christian dogma of original sin
and "the radical evil in human nature" (Reiss, 1985: 38). Kant believes in the evil
nature of the social relations relying on what the "experience" teaches him about
the human existence: "human beings act in a violent and malevolent manner, and ...
they tend to fight among themselves until an external coercive legislation
supervenes" (Reiss, 1985: 137). This, clearly, shows that the historical perspective
in which the Enlightenment and the Kantian ideas about the human nature as well
as ranking of the human races are situated leads them to a distrust, and a deliberate
remedying of it by harnessing interpersonal relations (that is exactly the level
where ethics is confined) through an enforceable moral "equalizer" and a
universally watchful liberal political order.
In other words, liberalism can be called "a therapeutic polity" by which the ways,
causes and moral inclination for destruction, violence and intolerance are assumed
to be prevented. This is the reason why "liberalism has always ranked the problems
of misrule and legitimate authority ahead of the values that might attend ruling
itself" (Damico, 1986: 167) Mill makes the point rather eloquently: "men, as well
as women, do not need political rights in order that they may govern, but in order
that they may not be misgoverned." (Damico, 1986: 171) Most of the liberal
thinkers conceive "liberty" and "power" as two antithetical terms, "denoting two
realms which are mutually conflicting and thus incompatible" which results in the
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notion of negative liberty (Bobbio, 1990: 15). In this non-equation liberty is given
to the depoliticized self, while power is spared for the state. This negative tendency
towards affirmative politics and participation leads to the general moral
indifference and the crisis of legitimacy in liberal societies today.
The preponderance of negativity in the liberal political morality thus leads to
depoliticization since the liberal politics becomes purely a defensive practice in
face of the fact that it is characterized as reactivity (Barber, 1989: 59). In this way,
politics is understood as the realm where only individual private interests and
concerns can meet and which creates asociability in return. Political action is
imagined possible only under conflicting and antagonistic configurations of
relations of interest and power. As a result, inaction and indifference becomes the
main norms of liberal political morality. Cooperation, solidarity and resistance are
all downgraded and the sense of conflict is almost glorified. This fact is best
exemplified in one of Kant's statements: antagonism is "the means used by nature
to further the development of all her dispositions" (quoted in Bobbio, 1990: 23).
One important outcome of the negation of politics and sociability is clearly the
relative dominance of the stable, settled, limited, well-guarded and non-
compromised site of the political power, i.e. the state, and the power politics. In
some ironic sense, the negative notion of liberties result in the inaction on the part
of the citizens while it contributes to amelioration of the means, resources and the
strategies, in other words, the political potential of the liberal state. And the liberal
state may behave like a despotic state against the "civil power" revealing itself
outside the normalized, formal, state-centered politics whether it is manifested
through family, kinship, class or collective identity.  This is yet another reason why
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the nation states that characterize a limited territory and limited notion of
participation could foster relatively well under the liberal discourses since the 17th
century. In other words, the liberal ethics of conflict based on the individual self-
determination ultimately becomes the ethics of the liberal state based on the self-
determination of the state, meaning diminishing popular control upon itself.
It can be concluded that the negativism of the liberal theory meets with the lack of
acknowledgment and accordingly utilization of the factity at the very junction of
the description of a transcendentalized individual. The abstraction of the individual
leads to, and in one sense, stems from the negation of his constant involvement in
the very construction of the liberal state through the notion of the abstract and
ahistorical process of contract that is assumed to be drafted in the absence of a
specific and concrete political craftsmanship of specific and concrete selves.
Sandel discusses that the primacy of justice in deontological liberalism is due to
the fact that the individual interactions are assumed to be based on conflicts
(Sandel, 1987: 11). The stress on rights and justice is therefore the downside of the
individualism of liberalism that advocates it in terms of neutrality that is often a
"false promise" as we have seen before.
In the liberal imagination, the individual as a "solitary being" is assumed to face
conflict as he enters into community. It is through this negation of association and
social relation that the liberal ethics manifests itself as an ethics of "damage
control". Hence, it would be too much to expect from it a thorough and profound
sense of social reality which underlies the roots of legitimacy for any polity that
claims to be non-authoritarian and non-totalitarian. In this way, the liberal morality
consists of configuring peaceful and balanced ways to handle the claims and
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actions of the individuals as "conflict-makers." It results in conceiving political
morality as a surrogate, a remedy of the shortages of the political in terms of its
social requirements. Yet, the political is the arena of contestation but as well as
cooperation, thus the liberal relational ethics and its negative perception of the
sociability eventually leaves the political devoid of its imminent moral content.
Because it also leads to negation of politics in general: politics is often seen by
liberals as a "necessary evil" (Axtmann, 1996: 37) whether they admit it explicitly
or not. The relational character of the modern ethics shows its negative impact
once again in this issue.
Then, "the political" is strictly distinguished from the realm of "the social" which is
then defined as the free-floating area where the solitary beings, i.e. individuals
perform non-essential roles and hence posit no moral significance in their
relationship with others. Thus, "the social" is distinguished from "the moral" too.
It may be also concluded that the process of globalization accentuates the faultlines
within the liberal democratic political stance as it makes the nation state to be more
vulnerable against the pressures of the movements seeking recognition,
participation and a reformulation of the political in line with the democratic ideal
which are characterized by not only their scale of action, but also the imposing
ethical tone of their message. I will turn to these and other concerns about the
liberal normative-political construction in the coming chapters which will be
analyzing the modern liberal interpretations and their theoretical alternatives.
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Now I will try to analyze the liberal conception of identity which also will give us
important clues about the theoretical consistency of the liberal political
groundwork.
3.2.3.4 The Liberal Conception of Identity: Liberation or Suffocation?
It is interesting to note that whenever it comes to defend an ethic of political
liberalism, a conception of transcendentalized individual comes to fore. The
individual, stripped off his sociability, affectiveness, inner dimensions and in
innumerably different typology becomes the single most important argument for
the liberals. Yet, the individual is pushed towards submission to the a priori
systematic constraints, the public realm and the state by defining him/her a party to
an abstract contract that has no history and no practical relevance for his daily life.
Following Flathman's categorization, we can talk about an "agency liberalism" that
descends from Montaigne and Mill to Hart and Berlin which supports the
achievement of individual passions and desires within the framework of a
negotiating state. This brand of liberalism stands in opposition to the "virtue
liberalism" represented by Kant, Hegel, Rawls and Habermas that privileges the
universality of reason and justice beyond particular ambitions and desires
(Flathman, 1992: 124).
For liberalism, individual is both "a blessing" and "a threat". Because as Andrew
Vincent explains (1996: 142), the initial aim of individualism of Locke and then
Kant was to wage a struggle against the fixed hierarchies.13 The self-choice
                                                
13 For those liberals like Flathman the basic feature of liberalism is its voluntarist morality, meaning
that the individuals are the sole creators of their actions and require non-interference from other
sources of power including the state. Individual freedom means individual control of his fate, and
the motives and the outcomes that he may choose. In his account, the voluntarist liberal tradition
stresses the idea that individuals are capable of developing their own beliefs, interests, desires and
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doctrine was used for this purpose. However, with the relative triumph of liberal
individualism in later epochs, this idea of self-choice turned out to be an
"individualistic narcissism" that negated concern for others. Sandel (1987: 10)
argues that deontological liberalism can eschew much of the complexities which
other political philosophies face "by virtue of its independence from ordinary
psychological and teleological assumptions." Deontological liberals even argue
that "liberalism does not rest on any special theory of personality", or as Rawls
indicates it has "no particular theory of human motivation" (quoted in Sandel,
1987). Yet, this does not mean that liberalism lacks a theory of the self.
At this conjunction, Barber's characterization of the liberal subject as the "stranger"
becomes meaningful, since the liberal notion of individuality and individual
interest weakens the democratic practices. Sandel goes even further and claims that
the liberal self is not even an individual: it is merely an apparition because it is
"disembodied" and "dispossessed" (Damico, 1986: 175).
I think the liberal individual is not even synonymous with liberal self since
"individual" is the true container of the rights whereas "self" defined as the non-
political and implicit "being-in-solitude" may be exempted, prohibited, or simply
ignored from possessing or accessing to them by the way of advocation of
property, thus inequality as the real arena for freedom. In other words, while "self"
is strictly preserved within an introvert circle, "individual" is apparently extrovert
and possesses the political quality. The historical examples of slavery, racial,
sexual and ethnic segregation by the liberal states and liberal thinkers themselves is
a case. Thus, a black slave is a subject, a self of the liberal ethical understanding,
                                                                                                                                           
convictions and includes Adam Smith, Benjamin Constant, Immanuel Kant, Green, John Stuart
Mill, Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls. (See Flathman, 1992: 123-124).
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but not an individual since he is not permitted to possess even his own proper
personal name.
The effects of a misconstructed liberal self are exacerbated by the strict distinction
between public and private in the liberal theory. Dworkin calls this "a politics of
ethical and moral schizophrenia" by which we are asked to clearly define what is
private and public in our interests and instincts, as if this is a feasible and
meaningful enterprise Galston, on the other hand argues that the distinction of
public and private in addition to the claim of neutrality leads to a moral elitism by
which the lived experience of liberal life cannot be fulfilled (Lund, 1996: 485).
In any case, even for those liberals who perceive the absence of the conception of
the good in the theory, it is the case that the liberal "good man" is not the same
thing as the liberal "good citizen" (Galston, 1991: 231). Here too, we can see the
instability and inconsistency caused by the liberal distinction between the moral
and political persons in its conception of agency that ultimately results in
"depoliticized" self to add to Sandel's characterization (on the same theme, see
Vincent, 1996: 145). Then, it is easier to understand how such a formulation of
"self cum citizen" gives rise to the legitimacy crisis of liberalism that is primarily
manifested by the multiplication, or a "redemption of the selves" in singular or
collective expressions, that had been buried under the rubric of "liberal
individualism." It is this universalistic tone of individualism, like other universalist
agendas, which is imperialistic because it includes the other in a consensus to
which the other does not participate, or it dismisses the other as unreasonable.
(Bevir, 2000: 135).
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Liberal self is "a fixed being with an identity arising out of theoretically
constructed interests legitimate by the heightened language of rights" that for
Barber, are actually individual interests pausing as moral claims (Barber, 1989:
63). Hence, the self is immutable and fixed as well as his interests, it is natural and
a social monad. "Interests equal moral claims" may be a debatable equation, but
never the one that reads "interests equal morality." Indeed, liberalism may be said
to bear this perennial burden of false moralism.
Kymlicka describes the liberal understanding of individual as "a moral ontology"
that "recognizes only individuals, each of whom is to be treated with equal
consideration" (Kymlicka, 1989: 162). This definition on the moral ontology of
liberalism brings up further areas of discussion since liberal equality and rights are
defined in terms of an individual construct that defies both the concreteness of the
liberal politics that is ultimately manifested through mechanisms through which
the citizens contribute to decision-making, and the abstractness of the liberal
construction of the state and civil society. It is rather questionable how easy
liberals can extract the individual out of the morass of the "state of nature" without
harming his sociability let alone characterized by conflict, violence and distrust.
Moreover, the negative tone of liberal morality is the very element that underlines
the liberal notion of autonomy, since as Kekes argues, "the stress on autonomy
within liberalism is vitiated by the prevalence of evil in the world" and that liberals
overoptimistically assume that "virtues are autonomous, and vices are not"
(Botwinick, 1998: 441).
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The liberal conception of the moral self carries the risk of glorifying the liberal
subject through the use of global markers such as reason and freedom without
establishing necessary and persistent links between the subject and his social
universe. Although the efforts by the advocates of "virtue ethics" have contributed
to a certain blending of the classical, i.e. the Enlightenment liberalism by injecting
sociability and participation into it, and yet upholding the universal and rationalist
assumptions, the liberal self cannot be said to be fully liberated from the very
structural boundaries that liberalism tried to overcome through the discourse of the
individual as an innate and inevitable redeemer of liberty and freedom. So, as
Nancy Rosenblum asserts, the problem with liberal democracy is that it "fails to
mold the moral identity of individuals" (Rosenblum, 1989: 4) and that its moral
definition is too limited, partial and minimal to accomplish that task.
Liberal self has been shaped around a bunch of moral conceptions that various
strands of liberalism utilize selectively. For example, skepticism that is a moral
philosophy in its own right, is the foundational idea behind the individual
autonomy that for many liberals is the ultimate value of liberalism (Botwinick,
1998: 442).
There are those thinkers like Flathman who try to remedy this theoretical weakness
and inconsistency on the part of the conception of the agency in liberal theory.14
However, in doing so, Flathman falls into the trap of facile theorization: namely
that he proposes an individuality-confirming pluralism by which any society
committed to "the ideals of individuality" whatever that may mean, is a society that
                                                
14 His effort is to introduce "Nietzschean and Wittgensteinian reconfigurations of subjectivity and
identity ... while protecting the sanctity of individual human action and freedom of association so
historically central to liberalism." (See Flathman, 1998b).
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would most likely become pluralistic. As we have mentioned earlier, the liberal
self is in need of justification himself, let alone the efforts to impose him additional
"loads" of theoretical missions and qualifications such as those proposed by
approaches emphasizing respect, value pluralism, human flourishing or self-
development. These are "democratic" values that have penetrated into the liberal
sphere in an historical wedding process and can only be considered consistent
within that proper context only.
In other words, the benign individual who deserves liberty and equality can hardly
be made out of the moral foundations of liberalism that stress negativity,
asociability and ahistoricity. What is at hand, then, is just the status quo that tells
us the relevance and even the triumph of power politics and hence the liberal state.
This strong state notion is supported by both classical and welfare state liberalisms.
Especially the New Right that emerged in response to the welfare state liberalism
sees the intervention of the state essential in the capacity of a moral agent "to
combat permissiveness" (Axtmann, 1996: 44). Then the liberal state emerges as the
real focus of the liberal theory, more than the individual who is talked so much
about.
In this section I have discussed about the general contradictions of the liberal
normative-political tenets and its negative discourse on the self and the political. I
also tried to demonstrate its weaknesses in terms of its abstract nature, lack of a
theoretical coherence, and its vulnerability against the difference, disruption,
change and conflict that actually characterize the political.
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My conclusion from this discussion is that the liberal credo at least in its
contractarian, i.e. Lockean and Kantian, and utilitarian representations do suffer
from contradicting, unfulfilling, disempowering and depoliticizing conceptions
regarding its definition of the liberal self, liberal rationality and liberal universality.
In face of all these contradictions of the liberal politico-ethical construction, the
question becomes, as Rosenblum touches upon in her discussion of the morality
and liberalism: whether "liberalism has the resources to repair its failings"
(Rosenblum, 1989: 10). In order to explore that I now turn to whether the Rawlsian
contractarianism has to offer as a remedy.
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CHAPTER IV
THE NORMATIVE DEBATE SURROUNDING LIBERALISM:
 RAWLS AND THE COMMUNITARIANS
My concern so far has been, first, to analyze the ramifications of globalization for
the normative-political configuration of political liberalism and then to highlight
three distinct crises within that crisis, namely the crises of the liberal conceptions
of identity, rationality and universality. In the previous chapter I have discussed the
major normative-political brands within political liberalism and concluded that the
current faultlines of the liberal democratic discourse especially in terms of its
conceptions of identity, rationality and universality as manifested by globalization
process, indeed lie deeper in the foundations of the liberal democratic thought itself
and not an ephemeral phenomenon.
In this chapter I  will try to analyze in what ways Rawls's neo-Kantian
reconstruction of liberalism offer new perspectives and solutions to the theoretical
problems that I have covered in the previous chapter, and to what extent it could
play the role of savior of the liberal credo. I will also engage a critical analysis of
the liberal-communitarian debate and try to pinpoint the strengths and weaknesses
of both approaches with regards to our task, namely, whether the liberal ideology
and liberal ethics can reformulate itself so that it might overcome its current
legitimacy crisis. For this, I will be paying a special attention to the ramifications
of their  arguments with regards to the three sites of that crisis, namely the
conceptions of identity, rationality and universality.
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The liberal conundrum that I have discussed in the previous chapter has given rise
to two distinct movements that seek a reformed and revitalized conception of the
liberal notion of the self, the liberal sense of rationality and the liberal claim of
universalism.
The first response is the Rawlsian contractarianism which tries to correct the
inegaliatarian and highly abstracted ideals of the liberal political theory by
injecting into it certain normative principles which emphasize the social as well as
the ethical. The second major response is communitarian thinking stems from the
debates and discussions around this work that reinvigorated political theory, and
ignited opposition from those communitarian critics of neo-Hegelian or neo-
Aristotelian brand which includes anti-liberals and anti-moderns like MacIntyre,
and egalitarians and liberals like Walzer as well.
Both lines of argument are important not just because they raise a number of issues
that are essential for the democratic practices, but also because they seek new
kinds of justification appropriate to the political ideas within democratic regimes
(Baynes, 1990: 61).
4.1 Rawls and Justice as Fairness
John Rawls and his theory of justice as fairness which presents us "the
paradigmatic statement of contemporary liberalism" (Mulhall and Swift, 1992: x).
His theory may be considered as the first major response to the legitimacy crisis of
liberalism that is heeded from within the liberal line itself, characterized by his
epoch-making work, A Theory of Justice in 1971. Here Rawls engaged himself
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with the questions of distributive justice which aimed at resolving the tension
between the utilitarian conception of the good, the liberal objective of complete
freedom, and the democratic ideal of equality.
4.1.1 Rawls: An Introduction
John Rawls revitalized the social contract theory and political theory in general
with his A Theory of Justice. It is a remarkable political work because it "offers a
fundamental analysis of the uneasy relations between social justice and economic
performance" (Ricoeur, 1990: 533),  as well as it renews emphasis on the political
character of the conceptions of the good. It is at the same time an attempt to defend
"political liberalism which establishes its autonomy from economic liberalism"
(Mouffe, 1990: 218).
Rawls's objective in developing his A Theory of Justice is twofold: to construct a
morality based on agreement as contract, and to formulate a liberal political ideal
by stressing the definition of justice not as a good in itself, but as fairness. In
pursuit of the former, he subscribes to contractarianism with a difference: his
emphasis is not on explaining the emergence of legitimate political power, but of
justice .1 In pursuit of the latter, his theory is deontological, i.e. he takes the
priority of the right over the good in order to preserve the autonomy of the
individual.
                                                
1 As Bobbio (1987: 131-132) argues, we see the revival of contractarianism in him because "the
notion of an original contract to lay the foundation of society as a whole ... satisfies the need for a
sense of a beginning, or rather of a new beginning, in an age of profound upheavals within existing
society."
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The two objectives I have mentioned above reveal his ambition to bridge the gap
between the liberal assumption of an individualistic self and the principle of self-
interestedness with the political ideal of egalitarianism. Rawls tries to inject
fairness and reasonableness into the liberal ethics. Thus, while he is a liberal in
delineating rights and liberties, as a result, creating a liberal theory in its own right,
he also goes on introducing an egalitarian element into the theory by the way of his
argument of original situation in order to balance the liberal excess in emphasizing
the priority of the individual. For this reason, I tend to call him as the political
philosopher of welfare state. He is also responsive to the moral plurality in liberal
societies. He tries to extend the principle of toleration to include the fullest
possible range of practices and beliefs by designing a theoretical framework that
could reconcile the fact of pluralism with the need for social unity. 2
4.1.2 Justice as Fairness: Tenets
The main objective of Rawls's attempt is to establish the principles over which
people would agree upon in constructing a fair organization of the society. Here
the principles of justice emerge as the hypothetical contract or agreement which
are to "govern the assignment of rights and duties and to regulate the distribution
of social and economic advantages" (Rawls, 1971: 61).  The model of original
position is used to highlight the agreement that could be reached in the way to
realize this objective of a society composed of free and equal persons. In short,
Rawls tries to erect a theory which may be called the normative (or justice) theory
of political liberalism.3 It is posed to discard the socialist ideal of egalitarianism
                                                
2 For an interesting analysis of Rawls's political philosophy, see Galston (1991: 162) where he
concludes that Rawls offers a "dangerously one-sided reconstruction of the liberal tradition."
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and a just distribution of income and wealth, as certain thinkers like Galston (1991:
162) argue.
Rawls' political theory is constructed over two interrelated ventures: the original
position and the veil of ignorance as the initial situation of the theoretical
foundation, and, the issue of stability, a conception of well-ordered society and
justice as fairness as the ideal of the theory.
i. Original Position: This step is introduced as something for which any
hypothetical contractarian concept would be utilized: to situate the relevance of the
arguments and the tenets of the theory in a certain initial stage where those
objectives and arguments of the theory would be accepted. In other words, original
position is the equivalent of the concept of state of nature, a common element
found in most classical liberal works. For Rawls, original position provides
justification for both a deontological relationship between the norms and the facts,
a historical but a hypothetical one unlike the Hobbesian or the Lockean versions as
well as for "the principles of justice on which all individuals in society, with their
radically differing conceptions of the good, could agree" (Furman, 1997: 1199).  In
the original position the people make a contract and this is not, drawing largely on
game theory.
ii. Veil of Ignorance: Original position is characterized by an overwhelming
ignorance which is supposed to justify the objective of the theory: that the people
without the knowledge of their possessions and talents would agree upon the same
                                                                                                                                      
3 Indeed such an effort was not without any justification, as Sterba (1989: 410-411) explains, since
new social movements such as anti-war and civil rights movements were questioning the relevance
of the liberal ideals in the beginning of 1970s.
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set of principles of justice. In other words, inequality and lack of freedom are the
outcomes of processes that involve injustice and non-fairness. All persons are
ignorant of their social status, and of their talents or natural endowments.
The people in the original position are ignorant also of their moral conceptions,
and their own idea of the good. This argument is utilized to enable full freedom in
the original position (Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 5).  People do not know what their
beliefs are and how to lead their own lives. Rawls implies that the people must be
free to hold any conviction they tend to, and hence strengthens the Kantian theme
of autonomy by this turn. Persons in this stage have two powers: a sense of justice
and a conception of the good (Sterba, 1989: 413).
Rawls devises veil of ignorance in the original position in order to show that the
plurality of norms may well be related with the consensus of individuals on basic
structure of the society. He, in other words, tries to bridge the normative theory
with the political one. It is the representative instrument for his contractual justice
(Sterba, 1989: 406).  Veil of ignorance is the test for the original position and for
the subsequent principles of justice: it demonstrates us that even without any
preceding conviction or information, human beings innately tend towards social
justice relying on their reason and cooperation (Raskin, 1993: 774).   
Behind this veil of ignorance, the original position is indeed a process of
bargaining. Rational persons try to get as good a deal as possible for themselves.
What prevails in the original position is fairness since without it justice cannot take
root in face of inequalities. Rawls's understanding relies on reducing politics to a
"politics of interest", justifying it by his search for a neutral and agreed-upon rules
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of bargaining (Mouffe, 1990: 224).  This element tends to contribute to the
impoverishment of the political in Rawls's theory.
The introduction of such a veil of ignorance depicts Rawls's theoretical maneuver
with the intention of establishing an argumentational basis which is implausible in
real terms to arrive at the concrete and the plausible conclusion which is the
distributive justice. This is clearly a metaphoric move, yet I think assuming a
complete ignorance of the persons in the original position does not lead to
enhancing the comprehensiveness of the theory at the end, just as assuming
persons' equality at the original position does not automatically lead to a consistent
egalitarian ideal.
Original position is used as a level which is synonymous with the liberal solution:
that the individual is bound to reach the principles of justice that Rawls delineates
in subsequent arguments. In other words, the process in that stage is not that of
agreement but of acceptance. This of course, has consequences regarding the
content of consensus that is aimed by the theory and makes it a prey to some of the
critics' attacks on the ground that the theory limits its liberating role, and instead
pushes the individual towards convergence and unanimity rather than difference
and dissonance. For Rawls, therefore, the source of dissonance in the society lies
with the individual, not with the system (Furman, 1997: 1200).  This moreover
implies that in his framework, difference is just a contingent and marginal element
which needs to be corrected. In this reading, Rawls is no different than many other
liberal thinkers who equate difference with disorder, and dissonance with
irregularity.
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The original position is rather exclusionary: It is based on unanimity and there is
hardly room for disagreement. And what is more is that all this is situated in the
deeper claim for unity or universality of rationality. The lack of disagreement and
dissonance is indicative of a further fact: that the concern for maintenance of
political stability in the society overrides Rawls's concern for the plurality of the
conceptions of the good, and hence giving way to his conformism at the end.
Justice as fairness can be said to be the alternative to the realist assertion that
power determines justice (Raskin, 1993: 774).  Yet whether this intuition is
realized by the theory is not so clear.
iii. Two Principles of Justice: According to Rawls (1971: 302), people in the
original position would accept two principles of justice that would regulate the
society:
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and,
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
However, the persons in the original position would also agree on the priority of
the first principle of equal basic liberties over the second principle of advantages.
They would also agree on the priority of the (b) of the second principle, i.e. the
principle of fair equality of opportunity to (a) which is also called the "difference
principle".
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People in the original position have the principle of maximin, i.e. that they would
find the worst-off position as good as it can be and this leads them to support
equality (Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 8).  As can be seen, Rawls tries to bridge both
the equality and liberty sides of the liberal creed by asserting these principles and
lists them under the motto "justice as fairness" to endow that bridge with a moral
nature.
Contrary to Rawls's reluctance of naming it as such, the original position is indeed
a normative tool. Statement of ignorance and how it leads to fairness, prioritization
of the principles, the assumption of rational human beings are all normative
elements of the theory.
Let me now elaborate on Rawls's theory by concentrating on various significant
aspect of his thought in order to evaluate whether his explanation can offer an
effective remedy to the political-normative crisis of liberal democracy.
4.1.3 The Weaknesses of the Rawlsian Remedy
4.1.3.1. Bridge-Building: Rawls in the Path of Kant
Rawls is Kantian in his deontology, assuming the priority of the right over the
good, and also in upholding the principle of individual autonomy.4 Following
Kant, he (1971: 252) calls his original position "noumena".  However, Rawls is
aware of something that Kant did not observe so acutely in his time: that the
modern western society has a pluralism of goods, those contesting, rivalous, and
often antagonistic conceptions of the good. Therefore Rawls's attempt revolves
                                                
4 There are also some who think Rawls is more connected to Rousseau than Kant in devising his
theory. See Neal, for example, (1997: 51-70).  For an analysis on whether Rawls is a Kantian, see
Baynes (1992: 49-76).
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around introducing a conciliatory element of politics that would mitigate the clash
of those positions and at the same time contain them peacefully within its
institutional structure.5
Rawls does not follow Kant only in espousing a deontological account of politics
and the moral behavior, but also in the "bridge-building" attempt as we have called
it in Chapter III. What he tries to do is to bridge the gap between the liberal ideal of
ensuring human autonomy and freedom with the democratic ideal of equality
which would provide the fairness and peace in overall human relations in the
society. In other words, he tries to find a convergence point between idealism and
realism, as well as between deontology and teleology, individual and the collective
good, the human convictions and the human reason. As Heidi Hurd (1995: 795)
explains, he attempts to show that it is possible to accomplish an egalitarian
distributive justice with free-market capitalism.
Whether this bridge building venture eventually succeeds is an open question. As
in Kant, erecting such comprehensive schemes of convergence requires immense
theoretical venture of defining a set of limited number of variables that would be
used in placing and justifying the whole theory. For Kant, this is categorical
imperative and rationality, for Rawls this is distributive justice and the original
position. It is interesting to note that both Kant and Rawls proceed from similar
grounds of claims of rationality, universality and agency and arrive at similar
conclusions: moral autonomy, rights, and a normative universalization of the
western mode of polity.
                                                
5 However, as Sandel (1987: 11) argues, there is a conflict among competing moral claims which is
contributed by liberal individualism.
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There are, of course, certain differences between Kant and Rawls too: As Ricoeur
(1990: 533) notes, while Kant concentrated on individual rights in his theory,
Rawls rather emphasizes institutions.  In other words, Rawls builds on the premise
of the individually-constructed political morality by stepping up the same
argumentation and this time analyzing the effects of a deontological approach on
the level of liberal constitutional institutions and arrangements. In this sense, it
would be no mistake to consider Rawls as the natural heir to the Kantian
formulation of a politics which combines both the contractarian element on the part
of the institutions and the deontological element on the part of the individual
concerns.
4.1.3.2 State and Power
Rawls defines power as manifestation of public reason which in return determines
the ethical posture and ensures stability. Perhaps it is this conception of power that
essentially weakens the tenets of his theory. Because limiting the notion of power
to the rational and thus the ethical realm necessarily drives the whole theory
towards a rigid institutionalism and proceduralism that results in a weakened
emphasis on the moral relevance of the individual will and absence of enough
space for the contingency, difference and non-consensual modes of social
relations. One of the most striking examples of this weakness is the role of the state
in determining the political and social will of the individuals. For example, the
marriage codes in most liberal societies today do not reflect the gender dimension
and the self-expression of the gender preferences, conversely it is the state which
almost single-handedly determines the identity of any given couple.
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Indeed, Rawls's conception of public culture reveals us the fact that he does not
really analyze enough the extent of the involvement of the liberal state or any state
with regards to creating a "public" culture. Because for him, once a moral
conception is public, it "assumes a wide role as part of public culture" (quoted in
Swift and Mulhall, 1992: 197).  In other words, he tries to define a public culture as
if it is subject to no intervention from the state power or the dominant ruling
classes, but conversely is created in vacuum by a visibility of an abstract moral
idea. The same reasoning would imply that neutrality of the liberal state, an
element of the western public culture, draws its legitimacy from its dominance as
an idea accepted by majority of people and not necessarily created and invoked by
the liberal state itself.6
Rawls seems to have missed the point that it is what he calls the "basic structure"
(Rawls, 1999: 256), i.e. the contemporary western liberal state that is passing
through a legitimacy crisis. Most of the questions of legitimacy certainly revolve
around the role of the state as the repository of political power, such as in the
debates around gender relations, racial segregation, ethnic identity and religious
agendas. The state is the key player in all these debates either as the supposed
"arbiter" or as the "certifier" for which discourses and which identities may benefit
from the liberal repertoire of rights. As we have explained in Chapter II, the liberal
                                                
6 A further question may be raised regarding the apparent equation of the term "public" with the
"social" in the Rawlsian terminology. I arrive at this conclusion not because that Rawls does not
tend to use the term "social", but because he tends to assign the public a more political significance
as understood from his analysis of the basic structure and the relationship between the moral ideas
with the public culture that we have mentioned above. This implicit equation is yet another
problematique that may distort the perception and thus interpretation of complex processes that
involve "social" interaction but cannot reach at the level of becoming "public" since that requires a
somewhat institutional representation and recognition. Hence, this lack of emphasis may also be
another reason for the depoliticized notion of justice and the basic structure in the Rawlsian
liberalism.
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state is no more a non-problematic given: it is at the center of a dynamic and
possibly threatening depoliticization of citizenship along with politicization of
certain identities unknown or taken for granted before. Therefore, it is clear that
Rawls seems to stay away from the very nascent issues involving the liberal state
by resorting to highly abstract notions of the self, reason and the formation of
political morality. Rawls also enhances the neutral liberal state by his prioritizing
stability. Indeed the whole theory may be considered as a precaution and remedy in
favor of political stability under the guardianship of nation state against the
dangers of pluralism.
4.1.3.3 Negativism
MacIntyre calls the modern politics as "civil war carried on by other means"
(MacIntyre, 1992: 62).  Indeed, Rawls presents revolution or civil war --two deadly
fears of any liberal conception, as the malign alternatives to the original position.
He cites the Wars of Religion as the historical basis for the notion of justice,
toleration, diversity and plurality of moral positions that are the so-called
"hallmarks" of the liberal societies (Rawls, 1988b: 4). Hence in Rawls too, the
theory is structured as a conflict management model, but it does not remain there
and the sense of negativity can also be seen in the conceptions of the political and
the sociability of the individual. For him too, like other liberals, liberty is the
freedom from external interference and the task of constructing a positive moral
political order upon this negative basis becomes rather difficult as apparent from
Rawls's theoretical attempt which depends on some sense of exclusion and
exception.
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4.1.3.4 Non-qualified Egalitarianism
One interesting note on Rawls's non-qualified egalitarianism is his rejection of
moral desert. He (1971: 310) asserts that "there is a tendency for common sense to
suppose that income and wealth, and the good things in life generally, should be
distributed according to moral desert. Justice is happiness according to virtue...
Now justice as fairness rejects this conception."   
In other words, Rawls defies by his rejection of desert (Rawls, 1999: 338), the very
premise of his own egalitarian correction of classical liberalism. The principle of
desert is perhaps the only guiding principle for an egalitarian conception of the
society. Moreover, without desert, it seems rather difficult for the individuals to be
encouraged for self-fulfillment, which is yet another element emphasized by
Rawls. Talents are nurtured and developed only within the social framework based
on desert which at the same time improves the sense of belonging and citizenship,
and in turn encourages resonance and elimination of antagonisms. As MacIntyre
argues, in the absence of the principle of desert, Rawls's "task of developing a
conception of justice upon which we can all agree is doomed to failure." (Mulhall
and Swift, 1992: 95)  It also contributes to the impoverishment of politics by
closing another space of politics (Honig, 1993: 131).   
4.1.3.5 Proceduralism
It is interesting to observe how "conciliatory" liberal approaches, i.e. those theories
that try to relate the individual initiative and power with that of the social universe
such as Rawls's, Kant's, and, as I am going to discuss, Habermas's turns out to be
rather proceduralist and tend to defy the very premise they are constructed over.
Rawls is to respond to the question how we can move starting from the level of
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human autonomy, to the level of social contract in such a way that the autonomy
argument would still hold and that the institutional and the proceduralist definition
of the relationship between the men and their political relations in the form of
sharing and participating in common principles of governance would be still
meaningful.   
At the root of his theory, Rawls too is indeed proceduralist. Proceduralism for him
involves not only how the theoretical process of introducing rights-based politics
as situated in a conception of the strictly individual good that must have no bearing
upon the social conception of the good, but also in his emphasis on the theoretical
relevance of the basic structure defined as the western constitutional and
institutional framework in a rather conformist way. However, there is even more to
that. Proceduralism of the Rawlsian kind in the guise of juridical administration
and enforcement actually stabilizes the disruption that constitutes the activation
and vitality of the political. Honig (1993: 129) affirms this finding: "reconciliation,
not politicization is Rawls's goal in A Theory of Justice."  
4.1.3.6 Institutionalism and Formalism
Rawls is keen on stressing the institutional character of his liberalism. Basic
structure, as he calls it, has to do with the social, political and economic
organization the western society has produced. That structure is the ultimate seat of
all the theoretical arrangements and the hypothetical elements he devises. In this
respect, we find Rawls quite in the line with other liberal thinkers, notably Kant
and Habermas.
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Rawls tries to construct a political system that operates mostly on the institutional
and formalist sphere, rather than at the margins of the individual and social
configurations and residues. He posits the stages of his theory accordingly: from
the individual to the institutional level in all four stages, namely the original
position, constitutional convention, legislative stage and application of rules to
particular cases by judges and administrators. This indicates that the moral nature
of politics must be situated at the original position, the most hypothetical of all his
novelties, so that the formal institutional framework becomes moral in a rather
natural way. All the difference claims and all other disturbing signs of dissonance
are thus collapsed onto the realm of practical matters which is then called
"politics". This is not surprising since his notion of politics like his liberal
predecessors such as Locke, Kant and Mill, is predominantly negative.7
Rawls (1999: 233) conceives well-ordered society as a society where institutions
and the individuals relate each other on the basis of consensus and mutual-
justification without any imposition of a common good. In the absence of any
primacy of virtue, however, it remains dubious how he can expound such a society
without taking the virtue of justice in the first place (Mandle, 1997: 420).  This
position may lead to a kind of liberal tyranny. Rawls takes the political to signify a
symbolic ordering of social relations. According to Mouffe, this tends to annihilate
the idea of the political by its emphasis on order, consensus, structure and the
constitutional tradition (Mouffe, 1990: 227).  In other words, for Rawls too, like
other liberal thinkers, the political becomes a mere reflection and sponsoring of the
legal. Just take his portrayal of "constitutional judges as the guardians of the
                                                
7 What Honig (1993: 157) observes in Rawls is interesting in this regard: "Given the choice
between justice and politics, Rawls opts for the former" with the belief that "the disruptions of
politics are symptoms of injustice."
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people's own best selves" (quoted in Bellamy, 1996: 91-92).  More than an
expression of his easygoing liberalism, this characterization reflects also his
reluctance to sponsor a genuine democratic participation broadly speaking.
Here we again find the common futile liberal endeavor of building greater claims
of institutional politics on weaker foundations of the self, rationality and
universality. It is for this reason that Rawls (1999: 388-414) seems to be later
drawn into defining his liberalism a political one, one that is tangible and already
in use, in other words, one that is easier to defend. In Rawls, this abstraction does
not help the intended outcome of his theory since the two principles of justice are
rules which govern the basic structure of society and not intended to guide the
everyday lives (Katzner, 1980: 43).  He fails to account for a significant portion of
the social reality and therefore his theory may hold "only in conditions that Rawls
specifies" (Barry, 1989: 180).8
Rawls has recently emphasized the primacy of certain rights and liberties that are
more fundamental than others. This is also an undeserved conclusion from his own
theory since such a prioritization defies all what he tries to reject: a "veiled" but
metaphysical conception of justice.  In other words, he tries to justify liberalism
with liberalism (Hurd, 1995: 795).
Political Liberalism is the second major work of Rawls which is intended to shed
light and to reflect his response to the mounting criticisms on the part of the
classical liberals and utilitarians as well as the emerging communitarian school.
                                                
8 What Raskin (1993: 773)  suggests in conjucntion with the abstract thinking such as Rawls's is
instructive: "abstract thought, like abstract painting, calls into existence new social and ethical
possibilities although they may not be the relationships the philosopher intended.
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The work may be considered as his abandonment of the Kantian metaphysical
notion of ethics in favor of a liberal notion of liberalism. However, as Rawls
modifies his theory for a certain political brand of liberalism, he meets
inconsistency of his own theorization since the original motifs and assumptions of
the initial work are kept intact (the original situation, the veil of ignorance, and
largely unaltered principles of justice) while their consequences and implications
especially for the political theory are said to have moved from a less political claim
to a more political explanation.9 In other words, Rawls claims to have rebuilt his
home without touching its foundations.
There are mainly two arguments in this later work which indicate that Rawls
intends to modify and clarify his position in A Theory of Justice: first, he declares
that his is a political and not a metaphysical account of justice, given the fact of
"reasonable pluralism" (Rawls, 1999: 425)  and thus concentrates on the issue of
stability (Hurd, 1995: 802).  Second, that his is also based on a traditional
perspective, if we may call it as such. By this he means his theory is one that is
situated in the western liberal society and hence reflects the consensus and the
normative universe of it, partially correcting his overarching universalist
aspirations in the original work.
Rawls argues that political liberalism tries to motivate people to abide by justice
and to justify that justice as fairness is the correct conception of justice (Hurd,
1995: 803).  The features that he distinguishes are signs of this new emphasis: first,
moral conception is relevant for a constitutional democratic regime; second,  it
                                                
9 Rawls (1988a: 254) remarks: "The distinction between a comprehensive doctrine and a political
conception is absent from Theory, and while I believe nearly all the structure and substantive
content of justice as fairness ... is changed when it is seen as a political conception."
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does not presuppose any general religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine, it only
is included in reasonableness of politics; and third, that the new approach is
presented not as a comprehensive moral doctrine, but as in the form of certain
fundamental ideas of public political culture of a democratic society (see Mulhall
and Swift, 1992: 171). Rawls also clarifies his original position and asserts that this
is just a device of representation and is not intended to serve as the ideal model for
his conception of the society. These features are clearly aspects of Rawls's new and
more modest approach to the political morality of liberalism and this is the reason
why he frequently refers to "the constitutional democratic regime" in order to
demonstrate that his intention has not been to devise a new normative theory of
political liberalism. However, with this move that emphasizes democratic (read
liberal democratic) tradition in the Anglo-American world, he implicitly confesses
the impossibility of justifying liberalism just by the help of philosophy. This then
constitutes indeed an escape from the inconsistency of the liberal moral doctrine
which preaches moral neutrality in the name of moralized values of freedom,
individual will and constitutional contractualism.
In this work Rawls tries to distinguish between two moral conceptions: one that is
comprehensive which addresses the problem of justice, and the other the political
conception of justice that is independent of any moral theory. Political conception
of morality necessitates an overlapping consensus about justice. Overlapping
consensus "consists of all the reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and
moral doctrines likely to persist over generations and to gain a sizable body of
adherents in a more or less just constitutional regime, a regime in which the
criterion of justice is that political conception itself" (Rawls, 1993: 15)  In other
words, overlapping consensus indicates a consensus on moral principles that
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allows room for change. However, this alteration of the theory still resists the
hidden virtue in the Rawlsian theory: the liberal conception of the good. Rawls
carefully exempts the liberal notion of the good that is based on self-interest and
the sharp distinction between public and private from his argument of overlapping
consensus. In other words, while all individuals are assumed to move towards a
political conception of moral consensus, the liberal state and its constituent
elements such as powerful lobbies and the bureaucratic circles are placed as
referees within the neutral state picture.
4.1.4 The Implications of the Rawlsian Theory for the Liberal Political-
       Normative Crisis
So far I have discussed the elements of the Rawlsian liberal theory and tried to
present its problems and shortcomings broadly. Now, I will turn to where Rawls
stands in terms of his conception of identity, rationality and universality in order to
understand whether he can really offer remedies for theses three major sites of the
legitimacy crisis of liberalism.
4.1.4.1 The Conception of Self in Rawls
Because of the equation of difference with disorder, the individual self in Rawls is
defined more or less as the classical liberal subject. As Rawls does not sufficiently
elaborate and ameliorate the the conventional liberal understanding of the self, the
individual remains as a being who is isolated, indifferent to the other, self-
interested, duty-bound and the seat of a rational disposition. As we have mentioned
before, persons in this stage have two powers: a sense of justice and a conception
of the good. However, in the face of the theory's claim for its moral neutral stance
on the constitution and nature of the self, these two capacities seem rather
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essentialist and somehow self-affirming. Because both virtues or senses necessitate
a construction and formation of identity that precedes the original position where
no human quality and information is possible. Hence, the inception of the theory's
search for a contractarian liberal justice start to fail just at this point.
The veil of ignorance in the original position tends to favor a conception of the
person who is taken out of his proper lifeworld and his particular connections and
relations. Although this is used to  highlight the hypothetical process of arriving at
principles of a liberal justice, we must not forget that it is this very conception of
the person that makes justice and the deontological claim possible. Hence, in
theoretical perspective at least, the characterization of the self with a lonely
rational being has immense bearing upon other arguments of the theory. Hence,
Rawls's claim (1971: 129), namely that liberalism has "no particular theory of
human motivation"  defies his own conception of the person. Rawls suffers from
his modernist inclinations which also support and nurture the liberal ethics: for
example, for him there is such a thing as moral progress in history, that the man
has a desire for freedom and exercise of his highest powers (Schwarzenbach, 1991:
543).   
The Rawlsian liberalism like other forms of liberalism that we have covered in the
previous chapter falls prey to its own weaknesses. The individual is defined as pre-
political if not anti-political. As Honig (1993: 127) argues, the task Rawls assigns
political theory and politics is "to dissolve the remainders of politics rather than
engage them." Hence the modern conception of rights is dissociated from the social
ends, hence sharply dividing between rights and responsibilities. While the liberal
self has rights, he has hardly as strong responsibilities as he needs to towards the
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public. This, in return, contrasts with the Rawlsian claim of justice as social
consensus and contributes to the modern fact of moral indifference and lack of
public solidarity. Barry (1989: 182) says: "as [Rawls] presents it, justice can be
exercised only by people who are totally indifferent to one another's interests." It
also necessitates a notion of justice that is possible only under circumstances
involving conflict, hence such a conception of justice would lead to
discouragement of sociability and care: a normative indictment of solidarity from
the outset of the theory.
Rawls's definition of reasonableness as the political liberalism is problematic in
terms of the conception of agency. Because he implies that "those who are not
already liberals are excluded from the category of persons from whom an
overlapping consensus about justice is sought" (Hurd, 1995: 811).  Thus emerges
depoliticization, in other words, silencing of the Other. Honig (1993: 128) is right
in asserting that "justice as fairness is forced to draw on otherness as a resource to
secure itself even as it insists that one of its greatest merits is its refusal to treat
others merely as means and not also as ends in themselves." As Hurd explains,
Rawls excludes those who are most in need of his message. Although the real
threat to a liberal regime appears to derive from the plurality of non-liberal and
thus unreasonable conceptions of the good, it seems that the liberal creed does not
need even to convince them before excluding them out from the political sphere.
The self in Rawls's picture is normatively constructed. So, we may also question
whether such a conception of person is desirable at minimum. Swift and Mulhall
assert this fact: "Perhaps ... Rawls's and liberalism's prioritization of individual
freedom is coherent but  undesirable, unwarrantedly emphasizing one aspect of
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moral life at the cost of neglecting others" (Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 13). As
Baumeister explains it, although Rawls assigns certain room for incompatibility
and diversity for philosophical and moral convictions, he endorses a homogenous
conception of the public and hence establishing limits to diversity.
As Benhabib (1994: 175) calls it, the liberal self is a generalized other. It means,
the role, significance and even the existence of any particular individual as a being
of moral respect is codified in institutions in the form of civil, legal, and political
rights.  She thinks that Rawls's theory like other liberal theories, has "proceeded
from models of universal citizenship, and [has] not considered the constitutional
relevance of the standpoint of the generalized concrete others . . . who may want to
preserve their way of life" (Benhabib, 1994: 177).
Rawls clarifies his position in Political Liberalism in terms of the conception of the
self, by stressing that by selves he means people qua citizens (Mulhall and Swift,
1992: 175-176).  This enables him to distinguish between people who as private
individuals can hold certain moral standards and convictions, but still can isolate
these concerns when it comes to their becoming citizens, following the liberal
schizophrenic distinction between public and private selves. This distinction is also
problematic from the viewpoint of the political: it establishes a purportedly less
political figure (person) in the liberal sense before the all-powerful liberal
conception procedural politics, while supposedly more political figure (citizen)
faces a weak and almost non-existing liberal moral political order. In other words,
the Rawlsian liberal self like the classical liberal self which I have discussed in the
previous chapter, is left alone before the moral and political aspects of the liberal
state which are deliberately kept distant. Hence, depoliticization occurs in this very
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plane besides the invented perfection of the original position and the basic
structure. In other words, political closure instead of politicization is the outcome.
And what is even more alarming is that this is done in the name of a political
conception of liberalism.
This in return has an impact on his conception of the political: Although he has
been trying to reformulate the individualistic and natural rights type of liberal
discourse, he cannot be considered to be as successful in replacing it with a viable
alternative because of "his incapacity to think of the collective human aspect of
human existence as constitutive. The individual remains the terminus a quo and the
terminus ad quem and that prevents him from conceptualizing the political"
(Mouffe, 1990: 232).   
As we can see, Rawls's attempt to correct the essentially biased and flawed notion
of the liberal self cannot yield positive outcomes. His self, like that of the
utilitarian, Kantian and the natural rights approach suffers from isolation and his
theory cannot improve the liberal weaknesses of inflexibility towards change,
difference and disruption.
In short, the conception of the self which must be the strongest element in Rawls's
account proves to be the weakest since he loads the self with all the claims and
tenets of the theory that presumes to construct a moral vision. The main drawback
of the Rawlsian conception of the self is not really how a political system utilizes
certain moral elements such as his, but how that political system substantiates a
conception of being which is not victimized in the way of twisting and bending the
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human self to conform to a certain systemic requirement, such as consensus or
purely rational mode of thinking and action.
4.1.4.2 The Conception of Rationality in Rawls
Rawls maintains a difference between reasonableness and rationality although he
thinks they are complementary (Raskin, 1993: 776).  The term "rational" means
seeking of interests and ends of peculiarly private character while the term
"reasonable" tends to seek social cooperation and thus consensus and change. In
other words, while rationality drives towards clash, reasonableness is introduced as
a remedy to it, because it involves cooperation. Here reasonableness also means
willingness to sacrifice or ignore first-order moral convictions in favor of a liberal
solution whose legitimacy and moral significance is actually in question. But
without discussing this aspect, he arrives at the conclusion that "the most
reasonable political conception of justice for a democratic regime will be, broadly
speaking, liberal" (Rawls, 1993: 156).  However, as Mouffe (1990: 224-225)
argues, the difference between the rational and the reasonable does not permit any
space "for something properly political whose nature we could establish
independently of morality or economics." This notion of rationality posed to secure
agreement is a direct threat to the notion of the political as the expression of
disagreement, as argued by Mouffe (1990). Rationality as the guarantee of
consensus is not a viable conception of the political.
The rationality argument in Rawls is certainly aimed at guaranteeing the unity of a
universal subject which is supposed to think, act and be governed in the same way.
However, it also has its burdens: by placing rationality within the positivistic
framework, the Rawlsian rationality cannot remedy the liberal misconception
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about the human nature, nor can it replace it with a new perspective that considers
the individual and the Other as necessarily situated and bound in each other's
being. Hence, the rational individual tends to cause the same type of problems that
we have discussed in the previous chapter.
Rawls's argument for rationality is directed against the perils of moral
fragmentation by pluralism.  Public reason mitigates such negative effects for him
since it is the means by which individuals of different moral conceptions can come
up with a common, just and political solution. In other words, reason here is taken
as something against individual convictions. However, by looking at the primacy
of instrumental rationality in Rawls, it is hard to deny that that type of rationality is
certainly yet another moral conviction. This is why Rawls characterizes rational
persons as moral persons following Kant (De Lue, 1986: 97).  It is also the reason
why Rawls comes to claim that "a rational individual does not suffer from envy",
for example (Katzner, 1980: 56). Through the use of rationality argument that has
as universal claims as Kant's "rationality as morality" formula, Rawls in fact tries
to justify his attempt, overlapping consensus as a partial agreement, or the claim
that individuals can agree on disagreeing. This claim however is subject to
criticism because it tries to easily get rid of any possibility of clash of moral
positions in modern society and thus distorts the reality. Because, almost all moral
discourses including many religious positions today utilize the same icon of
instrumental and calculative rationality in defending their own positions.
Therefore, the theory once again falls down as it fails to acknowledge the diversity
not only within moral positions but also within their respective conceptions of
rationality.   
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Reasonableness as the only element for cooperation is contentious, because each
conception of reasonableness is hidden within a certain epistemological set of
principles, and it would never be easy for individuals just to drop these
backgrounds which are at the same time ontological trajectories for them, and
subscribe to a completely different conception of the life, world, the good and the
final political solution. Rawls acknowledges social construction of individual, but
his claim for rationality negates it as he argues that the parties in the original
position are "mutually disinterested calculators whose sole interest is to secure the
greatest amount of primary goods possible for themselves" (Baynes, 1992: 52).
Hence, his conception of the self with a rationalist color is not poised to cooperate
and prove solidarity, does not nurture care and compassion, but depend on the
primacy of material interests in the way of participating in a just society.
Some critics also charge Rawls's political liberalism by suggesting that if the
persons are so divided about their first-order moral convictions, they would hardly
agree upon two principles of justice that Rawls talks about, and that it may not be
reasonable for them to put aside their religious and philosophical convictions when
they are discussing how to apply those principles to real issues.
This argument of reasonableness also carries the risk of excluding those
convictions and moral positions which prove to be in contrast or outside the liberal
certification process. Hence, the argument is not only theoretically implausible, but
may become totalizing and hegemonizing at the same time. Rawls exhibits the
common perils of the Enlightenment conception of a unitary self, and a universal
rationality which would be justified in reference to a homogenous normative
framework by which diverse and communal values are ignored or negated. In this
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sense, he seems to fail to reclaim liberal ethics from the weaknesses that I have
discussed in Chapter III. Moreover, we can still see the common liberal notion of
rationality as equivalent of calculation of and advancement of "interests" although
Rawls calls them "aims". When rationality is confined to this sense of bargaining,
the solidarity and cooperation that is expected to issue from any arrangement
designed with the ideal of justice or any other moral ideal tends to bend towards
injustice since any such bargaining could function in favor of the more powerful,
not more just. Even more, as Bellamy (1996: 81) explains, it is also possible for
persons to rationally decide that "the advantages of the exercise of a given liberty
are outweighed by its destructive effects on other valuable aspects of social life."
4.1.4.3 The Conception of Universality in Rawls
While Rawls presented his A Theory of Justice in a rather universalist
interpretation, his later work, Political Liberalism manifested that his main focus
was the contemporary western liberal society. In some sense, this is related to his
mentioning of certain "our" public political culture which signifies the embodied
moral principles in contemporary western political institutions and social practices
as well as the tradition of their interpretation.  Schwarzenbach (1991: 541) explains
this further in relation to Rawls's conception of the self and rationality: "[A Theory
of Justice] furthers the illusion that mankind itself is to be conceived on the model
of modern Western bourgeois individualism and its instrumental, market
rationality." Hence, it is not surprising to conclude, just as Barry (1989:185) does,
that the principles that would be acquired by the participants behind the veil of
ignorance in the original position would be "those of liberal nationalism."
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Not only the state retains its center in Rawls's theory, by only changing its locus, it
also enables the submission of the selves to it even more by the virtue of its
justificatory power. In other words, the selves in the Rawlsian perspective are
encouraged to become "relatively passive consumers" of the state's goods and
services (Honig,1993: 129).
Communitarians, and especially Walzer, argue that Rawls's theory is designed to
apply universally and cross-culturally. In replying this charge, Rawls asserts that
his notion of the self is derived from the western political culture and hence
culture-specific. This may be taxed as his "being ethnocentric" (see Taylor, 1989:
165). He seems to strengthen this charge since he continues to argue that "a society
arranged in accord with his theory is the best sort of society for human beings to
inhabit" (cited in Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 212-213).  Rawls does not take his
principles of justice to be rational, but instead claims that they would be rationally
chosen (Katzner, 1980: 69).  For him, liberalism is the universal morality (Brown,
1988: 69).
Rawls regards the basic structure of "our society" referring to the western liberal
society as a coherent pattern of shared ideas (Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 172-173),
thus uploading the universal ideal with a color that serves only to legitimize the
existing power structure in that society which also has dominating and encircling
effects outside its historical tradition and geographic boundaries.
With his recent approach to political liberalism, Rawls comes closer to the
particularist approach of the communitarian thinking. Indeed some scholars now
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tend to call him a "communitarian liberal" (Doppelt, 1990: 49).10 This does not
indicate that all those quasi-universalist arguments found in A Theory of Justice are
abandoned. Just to the contrary, Rawls points to the Anglo-American liberal
democratic model as the intuition behind his notion of a political morality of
liberalism. In other words, his metaphysical universalism in the former work is
replaced by a particularist and explicitly West-centered universalism. This new
universalism calls for a new modeling of the liberal political creed not only by
reinvigorating its universalized elements such as freedom, respect, individual
autonomy, etc., but also by recentering its universalist neutralist claim that is
peculiarly and inevitably defeated by its particularistic, i.e. Eurocentric orientation.
We can see clearly how the claims for universality and conformism support each
other in his theory as well as in liberal theory as we have tried to show in the
previous chapter. This is a symbiosis that elevates power as a moral ideal and value
over any other conception of political morality. And it is for this reason that
empowerment as well as disempowerment takes place in the same terrain as the
tactics and maneuvers are introduced for moralization and remoralization of the
same power structure. In parallel to this process, the political changes its nature
from being a constitutive, dynamic and resistant feature of the human agency and
social life, to a passive, conformist, and proceduralist game whose only vibrant
feature remains legitimization of the existing political order.
Walzer's critique highlights well this finding: "since justice as fairness is intended
as a political conception of justice for a democratic society, it tries to draw solely
upon basic intuitive ideas that are embedded in the political institutions of a
constitutional democratic regime and the public traditions of their interpretation"
                                                
10 Rengger (1995: 216) says, "Liberals like Rawls have stolen some of their communitarian critics'
clothes."
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(Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 180).  So, although Rawls rejects Walzer's charge that he
does not attend to particularity, because he does exactly what the above sentence
explains, his conception of the constitutional democratic tradition is itself
universalist.
The ramification of this confusion between the local and the universal in the liberal
thinking is another factor that negates the limits of the political as well as the
ethical. Because, as communities or individuals are defined with reference to a
certain tradition and existing framework of social and political organization, those
shared meanings and traditions themselves become the essential –though perhaps
the most fragile-- elements for the universalist claim, and  therefore constitute a
model, a normative ideal that in return supports the relevance and legitimacy of
that particular tradition. In other words, the Eurocentric emphasis on particularity
both substantiates its privilege as a distinct and the most complex form of the
human organization in moral as well as political senses, and at the same time it
makes it the only deserving model in the service of the humankind.
Hence this distinctiveness as well as the emulative ideal based on the modern
western liberal society limits the options left to other societies whose principles,
norms and behavior of human organization may differ slightly or radically from
the western one. This means a limitation of the political sphere not only in those
societies which are encouraged to follow the example of "the city on the hill", but
also in the very societies where those particularistic idealist, i.e. Rawlsian or
communitarian views are rooted since the universalized interpretation of their
traditions and institutions would also restrict alternative political and ethical
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formations and configurations which are most possibly to be acquired from the
"outside".
In this sense, the universalist accent on particularity becomes an anachronism,
something that both suppresses it and at the same time glorifies it. It also has a
direct impact on the othering process, as any universalist aspiration leads to a
narrow notion of the ethical responsibility and the care for the Other. It is therefore
not surprising to observe that the Rawlsian universalism in the form of his "justice
as fairness" argument on the one hand, and the Rawlsian particularism in the form
of his endorsement of the western "liberal society" as a model on the other,
perpetuate the same liberal practice of Othering and negligence of commonality
with the Other in favor of a homogeneity at home. However difference lies at home
too. And this fact is the very reason why political and normative resistance to the
universalist modeling that we have mentioned emerges in the forms which
liberalism cannot grasp and eventually become a victim of its own strategy of
disempowerment via false promises.
It is an interesting coincidence that this remodeling took place as the supremacy of
the American brand of the liberal world order started to ascend after the late 1980s.
Thus this new universalism based on the liberal tradition has a new element to
offer to the rest of the world: a model which is tested and proved successful prima
facie. However, with the advent of new social movements, new claims for
collective identity and other effects of a globalizing world, along with the
disrupting postmodern thinking, Rawls's correction of this own theory seems to be
defeated once again at the very juncture it seems to claim a victory: that the
political liberalism can no longer burden the heavy load of universalistic claims in
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the face of decentering and displacing phenomena that I have defined as the
"change" in Chapter II.
In this section I have provided a critical overview of the elements of the Rawlsian
theory and his position regarding the liberal conception of identity, rationality and
universality. I concluded that the "justice as fairness" approach of Rawls, although
endowing the liberal theory with a very significant theoretical and normative
extension, however suffers from similar misconceptions and problems on the part
of its consideration of the relationship between ethics and politics. Let me now
present a similar analysis for the communitarian school which challenges the
Rawlsian extension and the liberal theory with its reliance on a neo-Hegelian
conception of politics based on virtue, community and communal responsibility.
4.2. Communitarians: Any Better Remedy?
In the previous section I have critically presented Rawls's theory and indicated its
shortcomings. In this section I will attempt to discuss the elements of the
communitarian theory and how it relates to our question of the legitimacy crisis of
liberalism. This will give us a balanced view by which we can determine whether
and to what extent the non-liberal approaches to the problems manifested by the
legitimacy crisis of liberalism can provide a satisfactory response by which the
corroding and depoliticizing effects of the crisis perpetuated by the liberal
conceptions of identity, rationality and universality may be overcome.
4.2.1 The Communitarian Position
Since 1980s, a circle of thinkers especially of the Anglo-American affiliation has
been involved in a debate on the limits of political liberalism. They advocate social
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responsibility alongside with individual rights, and that individuals are situated
within communities. This circle is generally tagged as "communitarians".
Communitarians like Etzioni (1998a: xiii) conceive community as the expression
of shared meanings and values. They reject the Rawlsian priority of the right over
the good.  Instead, they think the good comes prior to the right which indicates that
they attribute more importance to the moral self-realization of the selves. The
communitarians object both authoritarianism and libertarianism (for example, see
Tam, 1998).  We will analyze in subsequent  paragraphs whether this
understanding is coherent in the face of plurality of values and meanings in the
modern liberal societies.
Communitarians defend a common good and its relevance for the communities in
their political, moral, economic and social relations. They defend social virtues and
argue that civil society, not the liberal state, is the best guarantor for fulfillment of
the common good (Etzioni, 1996: 157).  They also claim to replace the Kantian
Moralität with the Hegelian Sittlichkeit in that they argue that a political morality
can only be defended with reference to the shared traditions of a certain
community (see Kymlicka, 1989: 54-55).
Communitarians believe that the quest for ever greater liberty does not make for a
good society. What is needed for them, is "a profound commitment to moral order
that is basically voluntary, and to a social order that is well-balanced with socially
secured autonomy" (quoted in Lloyd, 1997: 28).  They generally emphasize
communal values such as solidarity, reciprocity, fraternity, and community itself
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(see Frazer and Lacey, 1993: 110). They, like Etzioni (1996: 157), see individual
rights and responsibilities as complementary.
Communitarianism relies on diverse sources and thinkers.11 Especially in its
political manifestation, it can be understood as the effort to find an optimal balance
between individual freedom, equality, and social solidarity. Yet it often remains a
vague project. Amitai Etzioni, the champion of its popular version, calls it not an
idea, theory or doctrine, but a perspective. For him, communitarianism is
"liberalism properly conceived" and he calls for a "moral awakening without
puritanism" (Lukes, 1998: 87-89).  This is the reason why some even call them
"liberals in disguise".  In this sense, there are cleavages between different sorts of
communitarians. While some like Etzioni may be considered as conservative,
Alasdair MacIntyre, and Sandel for example, refuse to be called a communitarian
(see Dagger, 1999: 182; and Lukes, 1998: 89).  Walzer, on the other hand, takes
welfare state as the very symbol of community whereas Taylor relies on a
linguistic analysis of the communal bonds we have.12 Just as there are many
differing positions within liberalism, communitarians too lack coherence from the
neo-classical MacIntyre to the socialist-minded Walzer.
The projects sponsored by various communitarians are also different. For instance,
Sandel (1999: 209) is for a republican democracy that favors the cultivation of
civic virtues.  While Walzer, Benjamin Barber, and Sheldon Wolin argue for the
civic importance of maintaining strong and direct democratic processes,
MacIntyre, Taylor and Sandel emphasize the importance of allowing democratic
                                                
11 Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Jefferson, Tocqueville, Hegel,
Arendt are some of the thinkers presumed to be on the communitarian lineage (see Fox, 1997: 562).
12 Some scholars like Mulhall and Swift (1992: 162) characterize MacIntyre and Taylor as "the
most fully-fledged communitarians" than Sandel and Walzer, for example.
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politics to operate in light of authoritative and constitutive traditions (Fox, 1997:
563).  In general, the movement may be said to embody a marriage between the
republican virtue with democratic equality (Kautz, 1995: 2).13
The communitarian rhetoric often relies on a critique of the Rawlsian interpretation
of liberal democracy. In its essence, the neo-Aristotelian communitarian critique of
liberalism is largely a critique directed against Rawls's neo-Kantian account of
distributive justice. What characterizes the debate between the liberals and the
communitarians is this fact rather than the general discrepancy between liberalism
and other types of critique.
Communitarians have focused on the critique of Rawls for variety of reasons: First,
Rawls has reinvigorated political theory and the communitarians are motivated by
his new emphasis on moral basis of liberal democracy. Hence, Rawls's theory
represented a fertile ground for debate on the question of the political and the
moral. Secondly, Rawls has fast become the liberal thinker of our time, one who
most powerfully echoes the efforts of the classical liberalism to cope with today's
facts, such as pluralism and multiculturalism. Thirdly, Rawls touches upon the
social nature of the liberal self which is by itself a novelty for the liberal theory and
thus benefits any critique of the theory from the vantage point of  the primacy of
society versus the individual. Fourth, with his proposal of a deontological
approach, Rawls has triggered the attack by the neo-Aristotelian and the
teleological perspectives which in this case are best represented by communitarians
such as MacIntyre, Taylor and Sandel (see Thigpen and Downing, 1991).
                                                
13 In this sense, communitarians have certain affinities with the republican, hermeneutic,
Habermasian, pragmatist, socialist and feminist lines of thinking (see Frazer and Lacey, 1993: 102).
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The communitarian critique of Rawls may be grouped in five phrases, following
Mulhall and Swift (1992: 10-33): 1. the conception of the person is problematic, 2.
it propounds an asocial individualism, 3. it is universalist, 4. it is subjectivist and
moral skepticist, 5. it is anti-perfectionist and has a false neutrality claim.
My purpose in this part which analyzes the communitarian response to the
Rawlsian political morality is twofold: On the one hand, we will try to see to what
extent and how a neo-Aristotelian alternative to the liberal conundrum fares, and
on the other hand, how the versatile and multifaceted communitarian critique of
Rawls provides us means which we can use in finding out to what extent Rawls'
theory can be an amelioration of the liberal thought in repairing the liberal
legitimacy and the faults of the liberal political morality.
I will try to analyze the communitarian response to Rawls in the same way as I
have done in the previous chapters, i.e. by relying on our distinction between three
sites of the legitimacy crisis of liberalism: the conception of the self, the claim for
rationality and the appeal of universality. In my discussion below I will try to cover
main figures of the communitarian thinking as we consider their critique regarding
Rawlsian liberalism under each of these headings.
4.2.2 The Implications of the Communitarian Thought for the Liberal
       Political-Normative Crisis
4.2.2.1 The Communitarian Conception of Self
Taylor suggests what may be one of the best phrases to characterize the
communitarian notion of the self: "community is a structural precondition of
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human agency and selfhood" (Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 121).  Indeed, the main
difference between the Rawlsian liberalism and the communitarian thought is that
the latter emphasizes the primacy of community in shaping the self while the
former grants it an a priori existence.
The major assault on the Rawlsian liberal self comes from Michael Sandel. Sandel
is the communitarian thinker who exhibits the flaws in the distributive justice
theory basically stemming from the conception of the person. Sandel launches five
major arguments criticizing the Rawlsian notion of the self. First, Rawls is
committed to a conception of the self that is metaphysically rather than
substantively flawed, in other words, the self in Rawlsian account is attributed a
certain unchanging essence. Second, he accuses Rawls of defending an asocial
individualism and the lack of community in his theory. Third, he thinks Rawls
reduces moral choices to arbitrary expressions of preferences, and thus becomes a
moral subjectivist. Fourth, Rawls's supposed neutrality between competing
conceptions of the good is false given his endorsement of a liberal good in the form
of  individualistic values. Fifth, Rawls is inconsistent in his portrayal of the self
since sometimes he uses the intersubjective notion of the self  against his own
conception of the antecedently individuated self (see Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 40-
69).
For Sandel, Rawls subscribes to a very specific nature of the human subject. His
accent on human being as the autonomous chooser of his own ends leads him to
emphasize the priority of self over his ends. The self is unitary and constructed
before his ends, i.e. he/she is antecedently individuated, so the autonomy of the self
becomes easily asocial and carries a normative value in itself. Hence the Rawlsian
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self is metaphysical and disembodied. It is not liberated, but dispossessed (Gill,
1986: 112).  Plurality and separateness are two essential features of the human
beings for Rawls (Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 48).  This, in turn, defies Rawls's claim
for a well-structured society that is established over consensus of the selves.
Sandel focuses on the flaws of the Rawlsian self as follows: First, the person
always decides alone on which ends to pursue, no other external factor has a role in
play in this determining. Secondly, the self is not permitted any intra-subjective
understanding of the self. Thus it risks the way Rawls thinks how the self is
positioned towards social cooperation, and distinguishes between his own end and
the social ends. Third, Rawlsian self commits him to an impoverished
understanding of political community. The good of the political community is
participation in a well-ordered system of cooperation for mutual advantage, hence
both the identity and the interests of the participants are ruled out, making the
political dissipate in this formalist and proceduralist scheme.
I think Sandel is right in pointing out this fact of depoliticization and
disempowerment in the Rawlsian theory (see Gill, 1986: 112).  It is of course based
on how he defines the political subject and relates him to the larger social domain.
What is striking in the Rawlsian theory is the imbalance between the construction
of the individual and the well-ordered society: while the persons are considered as
rational and thus self-interested, Rawls tries to balance this centrifugal force by
introducing his principles of justice under the very dubious assumption of people
giving up their first-order moral conceptions for the sake of the political
agreement. Thus two ends of the formula, namely the self and the society tend to
pull apart, rather than pull closer as he intends to do. So the bridge he tries to
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construct between an autonomous and indifferent self and the contractual social
order and the political domain collapses since it lacks sound and consistent
foundations.
Sandel is also right in revealing that Rawls suffers from the common liberal fallacy
of moral neutrality since an autonomous and rational self is necessarily a self
which is situated in a certain conception of the good As MacIntyre argues, in
addition to the fact that political liberalism has its own  good, it tends to eliminate
other goods in the society. (Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 53).  Rawls with his moral
skepticism actually enhances the false neutrality argument of the liberal thought
since no particular good may be sponsored by the state, according to Rawls.   
In other words, Sandel is worried that such an autonomy would lead to
undermining of social ends and bonds that he wants to stress. The alternative
which Sandel proposes is a constitutive attachment to the community and the
communal values. However, he does not approach the problem of the self in his
case from a similar vantage point as he does in critiquing Rawls. Because for him,
human beings being socially constructed and following social ends would become
a better political society. This normative view, however, merits further discussion
since the question then becomes which community, which constitution and which
common values and ends? I  will try to answer this in following paragraphs.
Sandel characterizes the Rawlsian conception of the self suffering from a liberal
"metaphysical myopia". He argues that the Rawlsian liberal conception of an
autonomous self actually conceals "the imposition of strong and implausible
restrictions upon the range of values, projects and conceptions of the good from
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which that person is permitted to choose" (Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 55).  I agree
with this critique, however I also wonder how Sandel would reply the same charge
when it was turned around by changing the "liberal self" into the "communitarian
self" and posed against his own profession of communitarian values. In that case, I
believe Sandel's own project could too be easily labeled "metaphysical
hypermetropy" since  such a vision that is based on the priority of the social ends
and projects could endanger the individual will and autonomy.
In the same light, Sandel's critique of Rawls for his ignorance of the social or
communal human goods, in short, sponsoring an asocial individualism clearly
makes an important point. However, what communitarian conception of the self
offers us in return is not much more promising since it risks imprisoning the
individual will within the larger and more powerful will of the community.
A further critique by Sandel revolves around the subject of desert. He argues that if
the person is defined as the being whose talents, natural assets, character and
abilities are not deserved as Rawls claims, then those attributes cannot be integral
to the identity of the self.  Hence the lack of the principle of desert in fact pushes
the whole theory towards a sharp distinction between the self and his possessions
or attributes, thus giving way to the Kantian notion of a disembodied self (Mulhall
and Swift, 1992: 62).  According to Sandel (1987: 14), the self as defined by Rawls
is "essentially unencumbered subject of possession" and is both morally
objectionable and internally incoherent. This makes the self separated from his
ends and thus undermines the very notion of moral agency since a self that exists
prior to his ends must be a self "wholly without character, without moral
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depth"(Sandel, 1987: 180).  In the words of MacIntyre (1982), such a self is
nothing but a "ghost".
Consequently, Sandel argues that Rawls's general commitment to a self that is
antecedently individuated necessitates a political community "as a system of
cooperation between mutually disinterested persons", thus disturbing the very
promise of a well-ordered society. The political in this sense is weakened and
instead the primacy of proceduralism and order comes in. On the other hand,  his
"conception of moral judgments as arbitrary expressions of preference" reduces
moral positions and differences to mere rational choices, and eliminates the
relevance of particular moral positions except that of the liberal state in political
configurations. It also implies a moral skepticism and subjectivism that are
presented behind the liberal motto of "moral neutrality" (see Mulhall and Swift,
1992: 66).
Michael Walzer favors moral plurality and is against conservative agenda of
imposing family values. He is closer to the liberal creed in sponsoring the
equivalence between autonomy and toleration. He suggests that toleration makes
difference possible; difference makes toleration necessary. He is as well suspicious
about religious majorities. For him, diversity and difference are important
concepts. He perceives the postmodern ethics as something dangerous since it
tends to lead people to think of life without clear boundaries and secure identities.
He is worried about the effects of this postmodern project especially those effects
like high divorce and illegitimacy rates that produce dissociation (Wolfson, 1999:
37-51).
159
Alasdair MacIntyre launches a critique of liberalism based on his general critique
of modernism and remarks that it is just a reflection of the general modern inability
to perceive that every human good or end has its origin in social matrices, i.e.
communal values and traditions. MacIntyre thinks that the liberal conception of the
self is emotivist and hence unencumbered, and as a result, moral judgments made
by such a self become arbitrary and subjective rather than rational. He also thinks
that Rawls's theory is doomed to fail because his unencumbered self cannot deliver
the rational grounding the theory requires and thus the theory will not be able to
form the substance of a political consensus in his society (Mulhall and Swift, 1992:
93-96).   
As Charles Taylor explains, the communitarian conception of the self presents
itself in a hermeneutic way: moral thought is inseparable from our own social life.
The communitarian rhetoric draws upon hermeneutics and social constructionism.
(Haste, 1996: 47). The selves are related to the community not only in ontological
way, but also in his self-interpretation. Thus it is always situated in the community.
Taylor says freedom without social bonds is a void (quoted in Kymlicka, 1989:
47).  Sandel adds that moral thought is itself embedded in families, political
communities, and groups.
For communitarians, the men are self-interpreting animals, therefore they can only
exist in their individual and collective self-interpretations. Such a view makes the
communitarian notion of self theoretically more meaningful. While it is true that
individual autonomy does not exist in a vacuum, but is situated in various aspects
of social life, their proposal for a community-wide sphere for action and its motifs
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is rather restrictive. Here the mistake of liberalism seems to be balanced with yet
another mistake by putting more weight against it.
There is a further problem with the communitarian conception of the self. They
offer a socially embedded self as an alternative to the liberal conception of an
"autonomous, ahistorical, self-distancing individual." (Selznick, 1995: 34)
Nevertheless the communitarians do not take into consideration the fact that those
"socially situated selves" have already gone through the isolating and separating
experience of the liberal culture.  In other words, even if the communitarian project
wins over the liberal one which it actually does not really aim at, the persons out
there will not be any more the Aristotelian or the Rousseaudian members of a polis
or a city who would be inclined to share, deliver and burden responsibilities out of
nowhere. In other words, a plausible communitarianism could assume not only
fragmentation of the human self, but also the fragmentation of political and moral
value (Frazer and Lacy, 1993: 152).
In this sense communitarianism seems a rather limited attempt in practical terms
and remains an abstract ideal. Because the liberal experience has already colored
those "communal values" and virtues that the communitarians talk about. One
example is the racial segregation and discrimination that has been at the root of a
long period of history in Europe and America which was nevertheless made
possible under liberal governments. Hence, some of the communal values may
indeed be the worst nightmare of any communitarian who genuinely wants a real
democratic framework. This takes us to the conclusion that the communitarian self
is a compromise between the liberal individualism on the one hand, and
nationalism and paternalism on the other (see Frazer and Lacey, 1993).
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Communitarians equate political action with identity. As the MacIntyre's neo-
Aristotelian conception of the political community signifies, the political becomes
the arena for developing the understanding and the good life and hence pulls
politics closer to the shared ideals and hence may be seen as more friendly to
participation than liberalism (Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 99-100).  However it is
rather unclear how the priority of the communal action would require a purely
communitarian politics.  In other words, the communitarian definition of the
encumbered self is not sufficient to devise a specific type of politics which could
be called purely "communitarian". Because the communal aspect of the individual
is but one attribute of his political figure. The selves may well be inclined not to
cooperate and make solidarity, but instead to imperialize the relations they have.
Then, it is the content more than the form of the communitarian definition of the
political self-rule that matters in practical terms. There is no guarantee of
elimination of antagonism as the selves are defined having common attributes,
because even larger and stronger commonalities have already been designed and
imposed by the liberal nation state, yet these commonalities are now often the
cause of estrangement, indifference and annihilation of the other.
Some initial signs of this dangerous turn can be observed in the communitarian
dismissal of difference and "radical multiculturalism." Selznick (1998a: 5-6)
suggests that "in contemporary popular liberalism, equality as difference threatens
to swallow equality as humanity." He also reiterates the objection to radical
difference for it is  a prescription for fragmentation and that it prevents the unity
required for ideal of community.14 In the light of these observations, we may even
                                                
14 To highlight that communitarianism is not an alternative to liberalism in the context of the
conception of the self, it is useful to recall how Sandel defines their own thinking: "an attempt to
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conclude that under such a shaky theoretical endeavor of communitarianism, the
risk of creating antagonisms and turning difference into annihilation seems even
more likely than the liberal theory.
4.2.2.2 The Communitarian Conception of Rationality
Teleology is the moral theory of communitarians. For them, the individual moral
conduct needs to be following a certain end, which would provide him with its own
purpose of being. There are also variations in sponsoring this approach within the
communitarian school though. For example, MacIntyre argues that in the absence
of any moral tradition that could have survived the modernity's ordeal, the only
option left is teleology.15
MacIntyre believes that the current moral deprivation from a consistent meaning of
truth and reality dates back to the Enlightenment's rejection of the Aristotelian
teleology. The outcome is free-floating concepts of truth and reality. The
teleological concept describes a goal, a telos for the individual which is fulfillment
of one's own essential nature. The modern and liberal conception of morality
though takes the man as he happens to be. This amounts to the amoralization of
civic life as well as politics and creates a sense of disruption. It also plays into the
hands of justification of the power even in its most evil appearances.
                                                                                                                                      
identify the limits of the attractiveness and worrth of autonomy; not an attempt to deny that
attractiveness and worth altogether" (quoted in Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 164).
15 He is as well pessimistic about the moral state of the mankind and wants a remoralization in the
line of Thomas Aquinas because "the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers, they have
already been governing us for quite some time" (quoted in Oakes, 1996).
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Communitarian thinking seems to be more concrete and tradition-based than the
liberal tradition. Liberal thinkers, as Selznick argues and as I have demonstrated in
the previous chapter, tend to be unrealistic about their assumptions on man and his
political and moral behavior because of their reliance of rationalistic schemes.
However, communitarian thinking claims that reason and reflection are empirical
as well as theoretical. They accept critical morality which they warn should not be
confused with a universalistic ethic (Selznick, 1995: 35).  Yet it seems that
communitarians like Selznick (1998a: 9) accept the Enlightenment and the liberal
contribution of rationality in the "moral order" without any significant analysis of
what that rationality implies for their very ideal of community.
Considering the virtue-based and teleological approach they adopt, the
communitarians too load rationality with the claim that the individuals can hardly
burden. Their understanding of common good and values indicate that the
individual moral reasoning will have limits. This leads to an inevitable division
between the personal and the social use of reason. Suppressing the personal interest
and reasoning for the benefit of the others will not enable the political to become
the arena where people participate in order to understand each other. Hence, that
type of teleological rationality will inevitably lead to imposition of a certain code
of meaning-making by which the selves will be exempted from relating themselves
in their own reasoning.
Moreover, the communitarians do not directly talk about an alternative rationality
against the instrumental rationality as they conceive the self socially situated and
embodied, their emphasis on individual moral reasoning remains rather limited to
the liberal understanding of the content of that process of reasoning. In other
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words, the communitarian self has no more room in his rational behavior apart
from the enhanced concern for the Other than the liberal self. Communitarianism
seems complementary to liberalism, not its alternative in this respect too.
4.2.2.3 The Communitarian Conception of Universality
Communitarians like MacIntyre and Walzer tend to argue that the inadequacy of
liberal morality stems from its universalism. They sometimes present the
particularistic morality as its remedy (Beiner, 1995:18).  Yet, without recalling the
implications of the liberal ethics for the political as well as for the legitimacy crisis
of liberalism, we cannot really grasp the significance of this negation of
universalism by some of the communitarians.
The communitarian criticism of the liberal ethics centers around the observation
that "the proper focus of the new morality, and what it censors or affirms, is
behavior, not thoughts and attitudes." (Etzioni, 1998b: 42-43) Therefore the society
has become a "punitive society" which emphasizes issuing laws to prevent
negative behavior instead of strengthening the moral values and virtues, and in the
absence of moral guidelines and a moral order. They think that too much
intervention is going on for undermining the communal morality and communal
principles.
Community is defined as a particular gathering of persons sharing common goals
and understanding of life. However, what we see in most of the communitarian
literature is a tendency to equate the term "community" with the modern western
liberal society into which is added a bit of solidarity and common understanding.
They point to the Western liberal society as the model when they face any critique
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against their universalism. Indeed it is also this limited notion of community that
prevents the communitarians to advocate larger issues than those already debated
in those societies. In other words,  communitarianism shares the ideal of
universalism of liberalism, but this time taking it to mean the predominance of
communal bonds worldwide. Walzer "sees the universal principally in what we
find to be the same as ourselves within different moral political cultures" (cited in
Orlie, 1999: 148).  This is thought of preventing otherness to contaminate
similarity. However, the homogeneity of communities when conceived as a "fact"
indeed leads to conceiving it as the normative example thanks to the singularist and
rationalist elements present in the communitarian thinking. Hence, the
communitarian proposal is no more hospitable to the idea of otherness than the
liberal alternative.
Selznick (1995: 35) argues that liberalism advocates universalism while
communitarianism advocates localism.  Conversely, I think both theories have their
own qualifications in their universalistic arguments. Because both the liberal and
the communitarian universalism relies on the model of the modern western liberal
society and its constituent values and so-called virtues. For this reason, what
Sandel (1992: 24) claims for the liberal notion of community shows us how much
both perspectives share in relation to their respective universalist claims: "the
liberal vision ... is not morally self-sufficient  but parasitic on a notion of
community it officially rejects."  Neither the moral skepticism of liberalism, nor the
moral constructionism of communitarianism can become automatic models for the
rest of the world which may possess different historical, ethical, political and
cultural traits.
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The notion of community, used by communitarians is the very source of confusion
(see Frazer and Lacey, 1993: 148).  Some of them subscribe to a notion of
"community of communities", conceiving each community "as nested, each within
a more encompassing one" (see Etzioni, 1998a: xiv).  However, such a conception
of community is hard to be found in real life situations in the modern western
societies because, as Boler (1995: 130) rightly points out, "it is often an ethereal
feature of our lives constituted by imagination more than by neighborly
conversation."  This sense which communitarians attribute to the term
"community" is a past station for the western society and was relevant long before
the advent of the separation between State and Church, ethics and politics,
individual and society. As Mouffe (1990: 222) suggests, "moral and religious
beliefs are now a private matter on which the state cannot legislate and pluralism is
a crucial feature of modern democracy."
Some critics charge that the term "community" as used by the communitarians
refer to either past communal structures or an exclusionary self-contained units.
Amy Gutmann suggests that the communitarians want us to live in Salem. Phillips
accuses them of wanting to turn back to the past. Although these charges may be
justified to some extent, not all communitarians share these views. Those
democratic communitarians for example ask for communities that are the seats of
democratic participation and decision-making away from the intervention by the
non-democratic processes such as bureaucracy and some government regulations.
They also defend a notion of community which is open, tolerant and permissive
(see Etzioni, 1996: 156).   
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Communitarians are non-universalist when discussing liberal individual rights, but
overtly universal in expounding "human virtues" and social cohesion. For example
MacIntyre defends three universal virtues: justice, truthfulness, and courage. He
fails, however, why these three virtues are the only ones of universal appeal and
how they are diffused universally (see Ferrara, 1990: 33).
It is clear that the greatest difficulty for the communitarians is to define what they
mean by community under this hidden universalist and liberal conception. This
confusion and ambiguity of the term "community" together with the lack of a
thorough analysis of political power results in the communitarian failure to design
a consistent political model for the communal values and framework they try to
sketch. In other words, in the face of the plurality of communities, such as
linguistic, religious, professional, etc. their vision of a unitary community seems
rather implausible. It may even exacerbate the effects of the moral and ontological
fragmentation of the self by the liberal modern system. In this context, it is usefull
to recall what Walzer suggests, namely that both liberalism and communitarianism
stand in parallel position with regards to universality because "as liberalism tends
towards instability and dissociation, it requires periodic communitarian
correction." (Walzer, 1990:21).
4.2.3 Communitarian Ethics: A Serious Alternative?
The communitarian ethics as defined by Selznick (1998b: 61-71) may be said to be
composed of the principles and values of equality, mutuality, stewardship and
inclusion. In the light of the communitarian claim for the unity of politics and
morality, and their often moralized agenda of modern issues and conflicts, such an
ethics seems at least implausible in the theoretical sense against a liberal ethics
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which seemingly guarantees the moral autonomy of the individual hence
establishes itself as the guardian of the tolerance. Communitarian ethics cannot
succeed in implementing its agenda in the absence of a genuine communal
experience that they can show how it is possible and observable in the very liberal
societies they inhabit.
The communitarian proposal with its ultimately failing theoretical assumptions fits
well what MacIntyre says about the critiques of liberalism: "Liberalism is often
successful in preempting the debate .... so that [objections to it] appear to have
become debates within liberalism" (quoted in Oakes, 1996).  Despite the hot debate
the communitarians have created over the Rawlsian liberal ethics, some critics find
the communitarian attack "fundamentally vague and misguided" (for example, see
Schwarzenbach, 1991).  Some others criticize communitarians for their
enforcement of homogeneity (see Elliott, 1994).  George Kateb goes further to
accuse communitarianism for risking to become docile and even fascistic, while
Kymlicka contends that the development of any common good or language leads
to exclusion of historically marginalized groups (Fox, 1997).  Feminists such as
Frazer and Lacey (1993: 130, 141) too negate communitarianism as being
potentially conservative and that it appeals to "a romantic and unrealistic vision of
the past" while offering "no critical basis for assessing or trying to modify the
status quo." Moreover, it may be said that the communitarian thought confuses
community as a term with community as an ideal.
Indeed communitarianism in many respects actually complements the liberal creed
of individualism and the moral value of separateness of the self. It actually tries to
answer the question "what's missing in liberal society?" The answer is often
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communal solidarity, and rootedness in a local community (see Beiner, 1995: 22).
Eurocentricism is one of these views: For instance, Etzioni believes that some
societies have "too much rights" and some others "too little" and the
communitarians need to fight for greater rights in countries like China where those
rights are few and vice versa in some other countries like the United States for the
less (quoted in Lloyd, 1997: 29).
Here emerges the critical test for the communitarians: whether the liberal state with
its load of rights and responsibilities can continue facing those challenges on the
part of its claims for equality, freedom and welfare for all. Etzioni thinks that the
rights discourse of liberalism tends to overshadow the responsibilities that the
individuals have. Instead responsibilities are loaded on the government.
"Back to the community" may be the motto the communitarians may use against
the all-pervasive liberal government, however, all types of inequalities and
injustices such as racial discrimination that is still plausible in these democracies,
economic distress and the cultural undermining, are inflicted not only by the
government, but also by those communal standards that are expected to instruct
responsibilities to its members. Hence communitarianism tends to ignore that those
negative communal values and virtues which stand for intolerance and separation
are not created in vacuum and for most part are either "trained" or "tolerated" by
the liberal government. Then the question "how much government?" turns into
"whose government?"
Communitarians ask for cohesive communities more than the liberal conception
would permit. However whether their concept of community is an alternative to the
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liberal society remains a difficult question. As I have argued, the connotation of
"community" in the sense the communitarians understand is either historically
irrelevant, a past station, or rather implausible to take root in the social and cultural
milieu of the modern liberal societies. This may be the reason why some of
significant contributions of this thought including its stress on social constitution of
the self, and the importance of normative construction of democracy are easily
dismissed as being counter-productive, even misconceived.
Consequently, I think the communitarian attempt remains as a corrective
measure16, a measure that would mitigate the negative effects of the individualistic
and rights-based understanding of liberalism which I have tried to explore in
Chapter III. In essence communitarianism does not constitute a real alternative to
liberalism although it may claim that their aim is to extend the sphere of politics
against a liberalism that tries to limit it (Avineri and De-Shalit, 1992: 7).   
Their argument is less an alternative than a balancing act for liberalism and this
fact has important repercussions for the attempts they make in relation to the
legitimacy crisis and three normative political sites of that crisis which liberal
democracy faces. In this sense, communitarians rather than overcoming the
politico-ethical crisis of liberalism that we focus on, seem to be a part of it.17 This
                                                
16 "It is clear that the debate [between liberals and communitarians] was carried out ... under the
auspices of liberal universalism, with communitarianism playing at best a subsidiary or remedial
role" (see Dallmayr, 1996: 281). Honig (1993: 164, 199) too underlines the same fact in suggesting
that Sandel's insights are "important correctives to Rawls's liberal assumptions" and elsewhere as
"the opposition between Rawls and Sandel begins to look more like an alliance one whose success
has been the exclusion and marginalization of destabilizing perspectives and characters."
17 Indeed some communitarians like Taylor think that liberalism is not irrelevant, but needs to be
detached from certain erroneous or incoherent ways which overshadow its central claims (see
Mulhall and Swift, 1992: 101). Perhaps, it is for this affinity that Gutmann (1992: 133, 136)
proposes communitarian politics may be combined with a commitment to basic liberal values. She
also concludes that: "the worthy challenge posed by the communitarian critics ... is not to replace
liberal justice, but to improve it.
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explains why several writers associated with communitarianism have recently
asserted their commitment to liberalism (see Frazer and Lacey, 1993: 146).
There is a common ground between the liberal and the communitarian
understanding of universalism. They share the idea that the particular conception
of the specific ideals and traditions of the western society is something that has
universal appeal and they do this by refusing the universalist charges. It is perhaps
for this reason that Mulhall and Swift (1992: 199) tend to consider Rawls as a
"distinctively communitarian" thinker.18
Communitarianism promises to correct what is mistaken by liberalism. However,
in most part, they tend to lean towards conservatism because they lack a
comprehensive view about the political power, and the roots of the indifference
and resistance of individuals to "calls of moral reawakening and mutual concern"
(see Lukes, 1998: 89; and Frazer and Lacey, 1993: 148).  As Kymlicka (1992: 185)
explains, the notion of a state bringing all members of the community to a shared
understanding is the faulty notion of politics of the communitarian school. They
tend to think that otherwise "individuals will drift into anemic and detached
isolation."  It is in the same vein that they tend to ignore the inequalities created by
the market processes which they often defend against the libertarian and the
authoritarian alternatives.
                                                
18 Mulhall and Swift (1992: 401) also assert that "if the communitarian claim is methodological –
that justice consists in fidelity to a community's shared meanings—then Rawls's justice as fairness
is a  better communitarian theory than is Walzer's." Similarly, Mouffe (1990: 219) argues that
"Rawls has been moving away from a universalistic framework and is now stressing the 'situated'
character of his theory of justice."
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As I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter, the Rawlsian and the communitarian
theories have their own respective weaknesses which prevent them to become
formidable projects for a reconstruction of the liberal political ethics. As Dallmayr
(1996a: 281) explains, both movements are ahistorical and abstract: both tend to
treat their own version as "invariant essences or ideal types that can be instantiated
at any time or place."  While the liberal approach has not sufficiently consider the
social origins and justification of basic rights, the communitarians have not
adequately addressed the nature and conditions of democratic citizenship (Baynes,
1990: 61).   
Finally I agree with Doppelt (1990: 59) that both approaches share the failure "to
rethink and transform the moral identity they posit .... in the light of a more
complex and less coherent normative reality then either is aware of."   
In this chapter I have concluded that both the Rawlsian extension of the liberal
theory and its communitarian rival suffer from similar theoretical problems which
do not remedy, but are identical with the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy
especially in terms of their arguments regarding the constitution of the self which
is problematic, the relationship between morality and rationality which tends to
contribute to formalism and conformism, and the universalist discourse which
reveals at its roots a Eurocentric tendency.
In the next chapter, I will consider another neo-Kantian venture, the Habermasian
theory of deliberative ethics which aims at constructing a new theoretical realm
where democratic participation and equality based on the communicative processes
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are emphasized. I will also elaborate on radical democracy approach in general and
agonistic democracy in particular as other significant responses to the legitimacy
crisis of liberal democracy. My attempt will be to determine how these theories
may respond to the current legitimacy crisis of the liberal democratic framework
and how they perceive the relationship between ethics and politics in general
which also lies at the heart of our inquiry.
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CHAPTER V
THE SEARCH FOR A PARTICIPATORY SOLUTION:
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND RADICAL DEMOCRACY
My analyses in the two preceding chapters indicated the theoretical problems and
inconsistencies of the contractarian and utilitarian brands of liberalism as well as
the Rawlsian and the communitarian approaches in the realms of identity,
rationality and universality. In the previous chapter where I have discussed the
"justice as fairness" approach and the communitarian critics of Rawls I concluded
that both approaches suffer from identical biases and misconceptions or
misplacements of these three sites of the legitimacy crisis of liberalism. Therefore
they offer little in emphasizing and reconstructing the democratic legitimacy
beyond what the liberal thought would permit.
However this analysis would be incomplete if I did not consider two other major
approaches to the liberal democratic legitimacy or the normative-political
configuration: the Habermasian deliberative ethics and radical democracy. In this
chapter I will critically analyze both theoretical models and endeavor to draw some
conclusions for my study which seeks to answer the question whether the liberal
ideology and liberal ethics can reformulate itself so that it might overcome its
current legitimacy crisis. Again, in this chapter too, I will be focusing on the
implications of both approaches for the legitimacy crisis of liberalism, and within it
the conceptions of identity, rationality and universality.
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5.1 Habermas and Deliberative Democracy
5.1.1 Habermas and The Discourse Theory
The legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy not only led to a reconsideration of the
basic tenets of political liberalism as we have seen in the previous chapter, but also
gave rise to a strong reformulation of the modern ethical and political question.
While Rawls tried to overcome the "liberal conundrum" of legitimacy and ethics
through his formulation of "justice as fairness", the attempt by German philosopher
Jürgen Habermas represented a revival of the modernist paradigms of
universalism, rationalism but also the concern for democratic participation. For
him, "the project of modernity, the hope of the Enlightenment thinkers, is not a
bitter illusion, not a naive ideology that turns into violence and terror, but a
practical task which has not yet been realized" (Bernstein, 1991: 3).1 He guards
"the modern philosophy's goal of formulating and defending universal standards of
rationality" (d'Entrèves and Benhabib, 1996: 13).2 Despite his observation that
"modernism finds almost no resonance today", Habermas (1996a: 41) is the
guardian of the modernity project.3
Habermas is aware that the postmodern critique against the very tenets of the
modern project is not just a facile opposition, but needs to be countered by
                                                
1 Habermas continues the critical theory tradition and synthesizes it with the American pragmatists,
especially Mead, Peirce, and Dewey. "Like the participants in the great eighteenth-century
Encyclopédie, Habermas seeks to bring all human activity under one project" (see Strong and
Sposito, 1995: 263-4).
2 Strong and Sposito (1995: 284) criticize this self-appointed guardianship: "No one can be the
guardian of rationality – which means that the role Habermas reserves to the philosopher needs to
be approached with great caution."
3 Habermas (1996a: 41) criticizes Nietzsche for his "radical antidiscourse that rejected the entire
framework of the Enlightenment" and his antihumanism; Heidegger for his "blind devotion to
Being"; and postmoderns in general, for rejecting all procedures and canons of the post-Kantian
enlightened reason.
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furnishing a new reading of and reconstructing the basic idea of the Enlightenment
(d'Entrèves and Benhabib, 1996: 7-13).4  In this sense, he tries to balance the
normative preponderance of the modern thinking with a new core that could
remedy the shortcomings, difficulties as well as those dangers like
foundationalism, reductionism and essentialism that the postmodern and
poststructuralist thinkers similarly indicate. Habermas's venture can be seen as a
comprehensive response to the growing postmodernist inclination to radically
criticize and condemn the modernist project.5 In ethical terms, he categorically
dismisses the poststructuralist tendency to undermine the normative ideals of the
Enlightenment (Schubert, 1995:432).  "Habermas privileges the responsibility to
act in the world in a normatively justified way", whereas the postmodernists
celebrate the responsibility to otherness, namely, the openness to difference,
dissonance and ambiguity.
The modernism that Habermas tries to reconstruct connotes a set of ethical,
political and metaphysical presuppositions derived from the European
Enlightenment. It refers to cognitive rationality, moral autonomy and social-
political self-determination (Dallmayr, 1996: 59).  He tries "to bring the project of
emancipation into the light of public by going back to the Enlightenment legacy of
practical reason" (Benhabib, 1986: 329).  He agrees that the modern rationality has
flawed, but iterates that it can be remedied and not altogether dumped. He also
stresses the achievement of the modernist project in terms of human freedom.
                                                
4 Strong and Sposito (1995: 279) argue that "there is a touch of disdain, an intimation of naiveté, as
if his subjects did not know that they were playing with something dangerous."
5 He sees postmodern and poststructuralist thinkers as neoconservatives who do not have
"adequate" theorization and will harm eventually the modern achievement of freedom. See Fleming
(1998: 432).
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Therefore he prefers to reform, reconstruct and "complete" the unfinished project
of modernity.
The theoretical venture Habermas is involved includes the immense and
contentious task of establishing bridges. One of these bridges relates to covering
both norms and facts within the same explanatory framework. He similarly tries to
gap between rationality and legitimacy through introduction of his concept of
communicative rationality. Moreover, the particular and the universal are defined
in relation to each other as the self and the society are interrelated in
intersubjective definition of moral dispositions. Similarly, the good and the just are
also involved in an entwining activity in his thinking. All these bridging refer to his
critical theory background that tries to unite the theory with praxis which can be
seen in his attempt to develop a theory of deliberative democracy.
Habermas's interests and the intellectual contributions to political theory are so vast
that I will be limiting my discussion to his ideas on the normative construction of
democracy. In this Let me now elaborate on principal elements characterizing
Habermas's formulation of deliberative democracy, and deliberative or discourse
ethics.
i. Deliberative Democracy
For Habermas, the ideal of democracy needs to be reconceptualized without
recourse to mistaken illusions of a homogenous and united people, possessing one
united will, but on the basis of communicatively shaped norms and institutions that
imply diversity contained around the principle of rationality and universality
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(Benhabib, 1997).6 Discourse theory is an answer to the perennial question of
change. Habermas tries to incorporate social change and social interaction into the
democratic theory with his stress on sociation, intersubjectivity and social and
communicative construction of the moral-political choices.
Democracy carries two distinct opportunities for Habermas: it is the only viable
system of public negotiation and problem solving, and it alone can provide a
legitimate system of governance. With these reasons, he advances his arguments
for the principle of universality derived from the Kantian model, rational and
autonomous self, communicative action and a public sphere founded around the
principle of discourse, the emphasis on consent and its identification with
communicative public sovereignty and the institutional representation of this
consent through legal frameworks such as constitutional rights. We will be
analyzing major elements of the theory in coming paragraphs.
Habermas's is a normative democratic theory based on rational consensus
(Bohman, 1994: 897).7 It is a participatory democracy by which Habermas embeds
the radical democratic principles into his theory. Deliberation for him is the
medium that will mediate and transform the conflict by issuing in consensus
                                                
6 Habermas may be considered as the rescuer of the critical theory from the risk of nihilism, as
argued by Bowring (1996: 77).  For a critical evaluation of Habermas's roots, see (Outhwaite,
1994).
7 What Axel Honneth (1995) reminds us while discussing the postmodern turn to ethics is very
important for any critique of metaphysics: "whoever attempts to uncover the separated and the
excluded in the thought systems of the philosophical tradition is driven finally with a certain
necessity to ethical conclusions, at least when, with regard to these 'others' , it is a matter not of
cognitive alternatives but of human subjects." This, however, does not exclude the critique of the
totalist, universalist and Eurocentric ethics that is based on the Enlightenment Project which is also
the source of modern political liberties and liberal democracy, but imperialism, interest-based
politics and inequality as well.
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(Knight and Johnson: 1994: 280).  Hence the Habermasian principle of democracy
is defined in his Facts and Norms as: "Only those juridical statutes may claim
legitimate validity that can meet with the agreement of all legal consociates in a
discursive law-making process that in turn has been legally constituted" (quoted in
Baynes, 1995: 208).   
ii. Discourse Ethics (Diskursethik)
Unlike Kant, Habermas thinks that morality is created not by individual intentional
acts alone, but their communicative, hence social interaction. In other words, the
individual moral judgment is a result of sociation which involves the resistance of
the moral choice by others. Similarly, it follows that individual choice does not
precede the public discourse (Ingram, 1993: 301).  Habermas defends a post-
conventional level of morality, one that indicates a capacity to criticize and
evaluate norms on the basis of higher or hypothetical principles (Bowring, 1996:
82).   
Discourse ethics means that "one must be able to test whether a norm or a mode of
action could be generally accepted by those affected by it, such that their
acceptance would be rationally motivated and hence uncoerced" (Habermas, 1989-
90: 36).  Here, there are important theoretical extensions: the assertion of
consensus as the sign of democratic agreement, both as the outcome of the
deliberation as well as the comprehensiveness and scope of the participants
including those who are affected; the primacy of rationality of discourse, and the
fact that this deliberative process omits any plausible coercion, thus the lack of
regulative authority, or assertion of the principle of  autonomy.
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Habermas's normative theory is an answer to pluralized moral positions in modern
societies. He argues that in traditional societies facts and norms were fused by
sacred and metaphysical codes and texts. In modern societies this unity is eroded
and dissolved by disenchantment, pluralism and complexity (Habermas, 1996b:
23-24).8 Deliberative democracy envisages a society that is necessarily and
inevitably composed of pluralized, contending and often contradicting identities.9
What is needed is to develop an ethic that could sustain the democratic ideal by
recognizing the participation of all identities in political decision making through
the medium of deliberation.
Complex modern societies experience an identity fragmentation that is a direct
challenge to liberal democracy, as we have seen in previous chapters, that claims
legitimacy across differences within its populace. As traditional lifeworlds
disintegrate, individuals find themselves burdened with new demands, choices, and
freedoms. That leads to the fact that new identities must be generated by
individuals themselves. The Habermasian response is to provide open spaces in the
public sphere, institutions that are designed to meet these demands that would
secure solidarity, authority and collective action.10 And as civil society is
                                                
8 Habermas (1996b: 23-24) asserts that now that the old transcendental justificaiton and setting of
meanings have lost their power and relevance thanks to the secularizaiton process of the West, we
cannot go back. The sacred meaning and the transcendental moral positions cannot be justified
anymore. This is also clear in the title of one of his essays: "To Seek To Salvage Unconditional
Meaning Without God is a Futile Undertaking."
9 Joshua Cohen (1996: 96-97) calls this type of difference as "fact of reasonable pluralism",
implying that all moral positions consider themselves as reasonable. He thinks that defined as the
absence of a comprehensive consensus on values, deliberative democracy cannot be accused of
being "procedural".
10 Warren (1995) suggests that Habermas sees dmeocracy as a means of conflict settlement and
collective action rather than a process with certain institutional aspects.
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politicized in this way, the legitimation power of institutions, such as traditions,
and market dissipate. Therefore democracy emerges as the only element of
legitimation, because other sources of legitimation as above cannot provide
authority on political issues anymore.11
Discourse ethics is a meta-ethical theory that distinguishes moral, practical and
ethical-political questions. Moral discourse aims at impartial regulation of
interpersonal conflicts, law and legal institutions respond to bridge the gap
between moral judgments and practical implementation and ethical-political
concerns the realization of self and collective identity. Here political power is
understood as communicative capacity for common will (see Murphy, 1994: 112).
Habermas has three worlds in which three different claims for moral validity can
be differentiated: "the subjective world (the validity claim of subjective
truthfulness), the objective world (the validity claim of prepositional truth), and the
social world (the validity claim of normative rightness)" (Chriss, 1996: 39).
Habermas wants to structure morality around the concept of dialogue or
deliberation (Habermas, 1990b: 203; Cohen, 1994: 137-138).  Discourse ethics
presumes certain conditions for universally valid moral claims to emerge. One
such is the original freedom of all members of a community. Moreover, the
arguments for a norm must be rationally motivated, in other words, must be free
and uncoerced (Habermas, 1989-90: 6).  This may be called the consent element of
                                                
11 Gregg (1997) suggests that Habermas tries to respond this fragmentation by not rejecting
trsanscendentalism, but attempting "to fashion one appropriate to contemporary democracies." For
Gregg, he tries to achieve this by considering democratic polity's self-justification and hence
ensuing proceduralism. Hence he comes up with a certain theory that can be called "normative
pluralism."
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the theory. Similarly, all participants must be equal, meaning that they must have
the equal chance in voicing their positions regarding proposed norms and
procedures.12
There are three basic principles of discourse ethics: The Principle of
Universalizability ("U") states that "a norm is valid if all accepted can accept the
consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have
for the satisfaction for everyone's interests." The principle of Deliberation ("D") is
that "only those [moral] norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with
the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse"
(Habermas, 1990a: 66).  These principles delineate the participatory nature of
deliberative ethics and are conclusive to the grounding of participatory democracy.
The third principle is related to freedom of the participants: consensus can be
achieved only if and as long as all participants participate freely. For Habermas,
the truth can be understood as the combination of freedom and justice. This he tries
to achieve by his communicative ethics theory (Benhabib, 1986: 286).
Habermas contends that discourse ethics contains or leads to a theory of
democratic legitimation. He asserts that it is more descriptive than normative
(Chambers, 1995: 233).  It is an antipositivist or postempiricist theory that counters
all forms of emotivism as well as moral relativism and moral skepticism that is
characterized by the postmodernist position.13 Communicative ethics aims at
                                                
12 To consider the participants in a discourse as equal means that each participant is respected in the
Kantian sense, not for being a means, but as ends in themselves. Impartiality, that is the whole
objective of the theory is achieved by putting oneself in the position of the other and trying to see
from his perspective (see Chambers, 1995: 239).
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providing yardsticks for an increased need for ethics, along with scientific-
technological change that may otherwise be seen as diminishing the need for the
ethics in general.
Discourse ethics shows affinity to the Anglo-American "good reasons" approach of
Toulmin and Baier, and demarcates itself from the neo-Aristotelian approach such
as MacIntyre's that stresses the practical judgment. It also stands opposite to ethical
skepticism that is currently propounded by Rorty.  Deliberative ethics is
cognitivist. It argues that moral questions can be solved through rational and
cognitive processes. This requires the elimination of moral skepticism that argues
for inability of rational thinking over moral issues. Habermas pursues the
cognitivist track rather pragmatically for, in his view, any emotivist argument may
lead to particularism that would mean inability to form a universal framework (see
Honneth, 1995: 303-304).
Habermas aims at amending the Kantian ethics. Kant had similarly tried to bridge
the position of natural rights that was the hallmark of his period with the position
of individualistic liberalism. Kant's formulation of categorical imperative can be
regarded as an attempt to establish an ethical link between the individual and his
facticity with the society and humanity and their norms. In his case, the medium
for this linkage is rationality, for Habermas, it is the communicative rationality.
Habermas similarly tries to bridge what he calls "Republicanism" or
communitarian position that underscores the priority of the community in
normative system vis-à-vis the individual, with the liberal position that sees the
                                                                                                                                      
13 Dallmayr (1990: 2) characterizes the theory as a "cognitive ethics of linguistics" that relies on
"insights garnered through participation in communicaitve or discursive exchanges" instead of
stressing factual or intuitied data.
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individual as the agent capable of generating political values and positions
independent from the society. He has a similar place for informal public sphere and
formal administrative institutions.
As Benhabib puts it, communicative ethics is intimately linked to "the viability and
desirability of a democratic public ethos" and is concerned with institutional justice
(italics original. See Benhabib, 1986: 283).  Discourse ethics refers to an ideal of
"democratic procedural justice that provides a universal basis for civil, political,
and social rights" (Ingram, 1993: 294).  The ethics of deliberative democracy tries
to achieve this by agreement among individuals not through common historical
interests that is often the characteristic of the contract theories, but on social
interaction and unfettered communication that results in a general agreement of
universal scope. Hence democracy is defined in relation to an ethic that favors
participation, intersubjective contacts, and justification of decisions through
communication channels open to all. This stands in contrast to the representative
democracy that stresses institutional mechanisms and symbolic agreements on the
part of those institutions like political parties.
Discourse ethics calls for a "real" and "concrete" decision making at all levels of
society, the Habermasian lifeworlds and within the public sphere. Hence, it offers
something new: democracy is universalized along a rational deliberative process at
the same time institutionalized along the constitutional lines, and can only be
legitimate as long as the opportunities exist for all parties to participate, negotiate
and reach a common understanding. It takes the democratic ideal beyond the
historical clichés such as elections and party mechanisms and reconstitutes it in
every day social relations. This also means that the political question could be
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redefined in terms of sociability, rather than as an abstract relationship between the
individual and the state.
In deliberative democracy, the participation of citizenry is provided by their
discursive link with institutional decision-making. This requires that while on the
macro level, the Congress or the Parliament functions in a broader and
"anonymous" communication, the public sphere is equipped with concrete and
direct communicative interaction.14  There is the need for an institutional arena for
public discourse and civic participation to counterbalance the pressures of both
state and market (London, 1995: 38).   Ingram suggests that a political system in
line with discourse ethics has two levels. The first is the participatory democratic
potential materialized through informal, public spheres and economic units, and
the second is formally organized mass parties and state bureaucracies (Ingram,
1993: 320).15 However, Habermas discusses neither hegemony nor the cultural and
structural barriers to participation.
The aim of discourse ethics is not only to enable the democratic procedure to
function by participation and mutual understanding, but also to bring about
Bildung or education of the citizenry. This falls parallel to the radical democratic
position that emphasizes constant transformation and sensitization of the populace
in terms of freedoms. It also bridges the normative span between the theory and the
praxis. Democracy is thus conceived as a polity that reveals, mobilizes and utilizes
                                                
14 Habermas thus ties together metaethics and democratic theory, rights discourse and a
"reinterpretation of popular sovereignty in a new and provocative way" (Benhabib, 1997).
15 Social rationality varies according to these levels. While it is more leaning to consensus and
procedural equality at the local context, at the level of party politics and administrative machinery,
more compromises and inequality become the case.
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the potentials of individuals. Of course a direct critique of such "development
explanations of democracy is that they tend to describe and, through theoretical
models, try to impose certain goods that may endanger the very nature of
democratic framework. Hence Habermas's reliance on a democracy for self-
development risks to alter his theory from a meta-ethical one into a metaphysical
theory.
Habermas also underlines the "evolutionary" notion of deliberative morality. This
is yet another problematic area of his theory. For such a framework to be
evolutionary, it means that the guidelines and the trajectory of the deliberative
process is not only self-transformatory, but also system-wise self-reflexive and
possesses an autonomous logic, the deliberative Geist.
Let me now discuss various aspects of the Habermasian theory which relate
directly to my study.
5.1.2 A Critical Overview of the Elements of Deliberative Democracy and
      Discourse Ethics
5.1.2.1 Normative and Institutional Framework
Discourse ethics tries to bridge democratic norms on the one hand, while
addressing the facts of social complexity, on the other.16 In other words, Habermas
tries to escape both idealistic theories without social relevance such as that of
Rawls, and those descriptive theories that lack normativity, like that of Luhmann's
systems theory. But, Habermas does not undermine the liberal position
                                                
16 This is why Habermas finds liberal thinkers such as Rawls naive for their ignorance of social
complexities (see Bohman, 1994: 910).
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altogether.17 Instead, his attempt can be seen as something that tries to correct the
liberal shortcomings, and liberal myths such as neutral state, homogenous and
rational self, natural or contracted rights, and the sharp division between the public
and private. There is no doubt that Habermas tries to level arguments to balance
the criticisms made by especially postmodern thinkers that underline the muting of
differences by the liberal political thinking. But he does this by following two
tracks of historical liberalism: consent theory of Rousseau that ultimately finds its
expression in present day's communitarianism and the universal moral choice
approach of Kant that underscores almost all conventional liberal theories. Hence,
Habermas can be called both a liberal and a radical democrat, both a Roussaudian
and a Kantian (see Bohman, 1994: 899).   
In his essay, "Three Normative Models of Democracy" , Habermas (1996c)
criticizes the ethical understanding of both liberal and republican positions. For
him, republicans overvalue the virtues of the citizens, hence become too idealistic.
In deliberative democracy civic autonomy is not determined solely by ethics, but
also by procedures. Deliberative democracy provides both ethical validity of
norms, at the same time it calls for justice. It does not rely on just one set of
communicative procedures, it includes the network of a "fairly regulated
bargaining processes" including pragmatic, ethical, and moral discourses each with
different procedural characteristics (Habermas, 1996c: 25).   
While both the liberal and the republican models see a society centered around the
state, deliberative democracy argues for a decentered society. It agrees with the
                                                
17 He says: "The liberal interpretation is not wrong. It just does not see the beam in its own eye.
With the bankruptcy of state socialism, [welfare state liberalism] is the eye of the needle through
which everything must pass" (cited in Love, 1995: 46).
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republican view of the process of political opinion and will-formation, but contrary
to that, it upholds constitutionalism. This is provided by the institutionalized
communication in the public sphere. It also tries to escape the reductionism of the
liberal political process to the representative bodies or of the republican view that
views individuals following the system requirements blindly. Deliberative
democracy upholds both the proceduralist and institutional elements at the same
time fostering the informal networks of the public sphere. Informal public opinion-
formation leads to "influence" which then is converted into "communicative
power" through the channel of political elections, and then it is turned into
"administrative power" through legislation. In this sense, solidarity is seen as a
counterbalance for two existing poles of political power in liberal democracies:
money and administrative power. Deliberative democracy thus legitimizes
democracy through the people who not only monitor it, but also participate in it.
In terms of popular sovereignty, republican model talks about a fusion between the
self-rule and the state, so people cannot delegate sovereignty. In the liberal model,
representation is the means for popular sovereignty to manifest itself. In
deliberative democracy, on the other hand, state and society are not considered as
"the whole and the part", hence popular sovereignty is dissolved in the "subjectless
forms of communication". Habermas concludes by saying that, political system is
just one of the many social action systems, hence deliberative politics remains a
component of a complex society. The role of law here is to be the medium of
political communication with all other action spheres.
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5.1.2.2 Legitimacy and Democratic Legitimation
Discourse ethics is defined as a moral theory, yet it is focused on legitimation of
democracy and democratic rights. Hence, it may be considered as a political ethic
rather than a moral theory. He situates democratic legitimacy around unfettered
public deliberation. Discourse ethics envisages a complementary relationship
between morality and legality. This rather interesting turn is enabled by
Habermas's emphasis on the communicative rationality as Moralität. Hence law
serves as a medium for social integration (Bohman, 1994: 904).  Discourse ethics is
meant to be the framework that implies democracy creates its own legitimacy for
its unique characteristic of publicly debated and adopted norms and values: "the
democratic process bears on its own entire burden of legitimation" (Cohen, 1994:
141).
Habermas reverses the Weberian query about how political legitimacy can be
derived from legality, asks instead, how we can justify the legitimacy of legality
(Benhabib, 1997: 91).  Democratic legitimacy is thus tied not to some abstract and
proto-historical contract or transcendental rights and entitlements regimes, but to
the actual and concrete intersubjective and rational communication, deliberation
and agreement among human subjects. For him, law is the medium through which
communicative power can be channeled to the administrative power. This surely
provides legitimacy of the polity, it also defines law as an element of public
discourse and hence grants it a democratic meaning very much in parallel with
constitution or social contract.18 This is practiced in a diffuse public sphere and
through deliberation.
                                                
18 As Baynes (1995: 205) says : "In highly differentiated and pluralist societies the task of social
coordination and integration falls to institutionalized procedures of legitimate lawmaking that
transform into binding decisions."
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Habermas introduces a set of principles of the constitutional state: popular
sovereignty, the guarantee of legal protection, the legality of administration, and
the separation of the state and the society. The communicative power that is
derived from the public deliberation should not be confused with some sort of
general will but rather "as  the product of an overlapping and intermeshing of a
variety of pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral discourses." 19 Hence the liberal
rule of law can become the rule of the people.
In this conjunction we see that Habermas offers us the relationship between
democracy and the rule of law. In other words, private and public autonomy
reinforce each other, so they are equiprimordial. This suggests that democracy
needs legality and laws not only as mechanisms for materialization of the political
power and as certificates of the public and private rights and entitlements, but
rather as the essential content and product of democratic decision-making, in other
words, as its strategy of legitimation. In the Habermasian account, deliberative
consensus making necessitates and at the same time supports the legal process, so
that political and social rights can be meaningful. Discourse ethics calls for social
institutions in which norms and practices are legitimated by dialogue. This
provides a legality based on dialogic consensus. As Murphy suggests, for
Habermas, "law and morality are two complementary systems of norms which
work together to preserve the social integration of the lifeworld" (Murphy, 1994:
111).  Law bridges the gap between the facts and norms through legal procedures
                                                
19 Political institutions are geared towards making of laws. However, as Bohman (1994: 213)
indicates, what Habermas understands from legality is different from the Weberian sense of rules
enacted according to formally correct procedures. Here too he subscribes to legitimacy of legality.
Because for him, law must be coercible, but at the same time legitimate in order to be valid.
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which translate moral insight into a legitimately enforceable regulation of the
sphere of action.
However moral judgments may prove to be fallible. For this, Habermas proposes
the remedy of coercive law. The law in this case is the "rational" means of securing
an "ethical" process. There are clearly problems with this notion. Especially when
we recall that at the initial setting of deliberative democracy is an autonomous self,
and the emergence of a public sphere centered around the concept of free
communication and the subsequent issuing of understanding. Putting law into the
picture, Habermas tries to eschew the ambiguity of the moral outcomes through his
deliberative process. In a certain sense, he aims at eradicating the risks through
solidifying the proceduralist and legalist measures.
The problem here is that once a deliberatively arrived consensus is made into law,
or governed by one that is already legally coercive, then much of the accent on
participatory democracy is lost. For the modern conception of law stems from the
abstract and distinctive sense of norms that can sustain its legitimacy and
effectiveness through its claim of  universality and rationality. For such a
participatory and "real" project like the Habermasian, law therefore becomes the
theoretical "panopticon" that supervises the interactive process that is the cause and
effect of it at the same time. In this sense, the paradox of Rousseau is back: the
state needs a citizenry that sustains the democratic governance but at the same
needs to be educated, transformed and informed so that the state can reflect its
position.
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Habermas attempts to follow a two-track strategy with regards to rationality and
legitimacy. The liberal position signifies the rational political system that lacks
legitimacy, so Habermas proposes two solutions for this. First, decision making
processes must be open to inputs from informal, vibrant public sphere, and second,
they must support rationality of the various types of discourses (Bohman, 1994:
913).20 While the first is intended to ensure participation, the latter tries to provide
effectiveness, both concepts that contribute to democratic legitimacy.
John Bohman finds several difficulties with Habermas's two-track model, i.e., the
formal institutional set-up and the supporting public spheres in deliberative
democracy (see also Benhabib, 1997; and Gregg, 1997).  First, the theory
emphasizes participation, however retains the strong notion of unanimity or the
agreement of all citizens as the goal of democratic practice. For him, this runs the
risk of creating problem because pluralized western societies can hardly produce
such strong consensus in issues especially of those having an ethical nature.
Secondly, if, as Habermas asserts, democratic political power has to depend on
popular will, the "anonymous" public cannot match the deliberative majority
(Bohman, 1994: 927).
Jean Cohen (1994: 146) considers Habermas's moral theory as a misguided attempt
at blurring the proper boundaries which should exist between public and legally
binding norms and private moral concerns. This confusion may result in
undermining of individual moral autonomy. For her, there is no way to know
which issues can be classified as "existential" and hence given to individual's
                                                
20 As Mansbridge (1990: 21) remarks, deliberative democracy "assumes common interests among
the citizens . . . [and] derives its legitimacy from reasoning."
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discretion while some others are considered as "political" that means to be
regulated by the state.21
Legitimacy in the Habermasian project implies the moral justification and practical
embodiment of the norm by the people. Therefore the option of not abiding by the
norm or civil disobedience has not much room in such a position. Furthermore,
Habermas's emphasis on norms as universal rational agreements falls short of such
contradictory cases where it would have been the disagreement rather that
agreement that could be called universal.
The Habermasian reply to this type of dissent is that, "the core intuition behind
modern universalizability procedures is not that everybody could or would agree to
the same set of principles, but that these principles have been adopted as a result of
a procedure, whether or moral reasoning or public debate, that we are ready to
deem reasonable and fair" (Benhabib, 1989-90: 12).   In any case, any discussion
on procedures of "bargaining" of this sort that is defended by Benhabib cannot
separate the procedures from the implications of the content of the bargaining nor
the constitution and perception of the parties to it. It is critical for deliberative
ethical approach to take into account not only the criteria of truth for the moral
propositions and the procedures to arrive at a certain consensus, but also to include
the contextual configurations and "the moral contingencies" that could be so
powerful as to modify, question and at times even nullify the "universal"
                                                
21 Cohen (1996) understands discourse ethics as a political ethic, a theory of legitimacy and basic
rights to communicaiton that has been unnecessarily burdened with further objectives. She thinks
that blurring the distinction between the private and the public would result in the fact that legal or
political decisions were determined by a single viewpoint, then plurality of values and modes of life
would be endangered. Secondly, she thinks that moral reasoning is monological, not discursive.
Furthermore, the expansion of discourse ethics into the private realm threatens the individual moral
autonomy.
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procedures and principles, especially when the other is not present in deliberation
emphatically, but only nominally.
5.1.2.3 Morality as Consent and Moral Consensus
Habermas is against any sort of abstract definition of consent such as the
Rousseau's general will. His understanding of consent is also different than what
Kant envisaged: "citizens must be 'convinced by reason' that the institutions and
norms of their community are in the general interest" (Chambers, 1995: 236).  His
is a "sophisticated version of consent theory, . . . one in which the legal-political
order retains roots in the processes of communicative sociation" (Baynes, 1995:
206).  This is the reason why he proposes a communicative procedural democracy
that is shaped and sustained through constant public deliberations. This leads him
to denounce the important liberal concept of popular sovereignty since such
sovereignty cannot respond to the social complexities, and leaves "people" as a
fiction because decisions in nation states are taken in a political center that is
distant from consensual decision making (Bohman, 1994: 903).    
Discourse ethics adds deliberation and democratic procedures to the Kantian moral
validity framework. For Habermas radical democracy needs "realistic" measures,
those that rely on abstract, yet critical concept of "discourses" and their validation
in the public sphere. Discourse for Habermas means  "intersubjective structure of
communication exhibited in the form of reflective and reciprocal communication"
(Bohman, 1994: 902).  The aim of discourse as an idealized version of
communication is to bring about understanding among participants (Chambers,
1995: 237).  Understanding and the ensuing consensus can only be made through
rational argumentation. In order to enjoy the full potential of communicative
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power, the discourse is endowed with certain principles. These rules are associated
with practical, moral, pragmatic and ethical discourses. Democratic deliberation
entails all of these discourses. Deliberative democracy envisages a legal process by
which all laws must meet the agreement of all citizens, and that they must be made
along the discursive process, in other words through mutual recognition.22
However, as a result of the strict formalism of the theory, and the strong emphasis
put on the principle of consent as the basis of normative validity, there emerges the
risk that a consensual violation of the very same principle. It is sufficient to
remember Rousseau's famous dictum – "On les forcera d'être libre". The solution
to this paradox can be found in adopting discursively principles that would restrict
such an outcome. However, this time such a principle would contradict the very
principles of discourse itself (Benhabib, 1986: 303).  Moreover, as Murphy (1994:
134) puts it, "the depiction of consensus as the proper telos of discourse would not
do justice to the activity of politics, reducing it to a mere means for the production
of consensus."23
5.1.2.4 Rights as Discursively Constituted Norms
Habermas disagrees with earlier liberal thinkers who assert a precedence of
abstract, transcendental or hypothetically constructed political rights before human
                                                
22 Habermas believes that practical discourse enhanced by dmeocratic procedures as in the
parliament and public spheres provides the best means to strengthen the moral element of law.
However he is aware that it is often the case that the debates in parliamentary bodies work against
formation of a moral consensus (see Murphy, 1994: 116). Because while deliberation is open
ended, decision-making is not (Chambers, 1995: 255).
23 Murphy criticizes Habermas's juxtaposition of justice on agreement, since in life there are certain
cases where justice needs to be done without agreement. Discourse ethics works against a political
solution, because first, a strict delineation between the good and the just would remove most
practical issues from the arena of debate.
196
association, and instead argues for the perspective of consociates who are
embedded in structures of communicative action, meaning the ability of the
speaker or the hearer to accept or reject the validity claims of mutual speech acts
(Benhabib, 1997: 91).  Rights in the theory are very general norms that regulate the
interaction of participants in the practice of their communicative freedoms.
Habermas's objective is to find a place in liberal constitutional theory for the
positive aspect of freedom, the fact that the people author their own laws which
they are going to abide by. Habermas underlines that the system of rights is the
"reverse side" of the principle of democracy and essentially intersubjective
(Baynes, 1995: 209).  The intersubjective process of defining of rights is assumed
to permit him to preserve the moral autonomy of the individual. Hence, the system
of rights are universal not because they are given as natural rights, but because they
are subject to the universal and communicatively rational procedures. It is this
notion of system of rights that results in legitimacy of legality.
5.1.2.5 Moral Proceduralism
In Habermas's account, moral obligations arise from individually initiated,
intersubjective and rational debates that make individual rights more meaningful
and concrete. In this sense, Habermas claims that rights in his theory are much
better grounded than the social contractarian alternative. Moreover, he thinks that
by deliberative process he could link individual autonomy with the democratic
solidarity hence remedying not only liberalism but also communitarianism.
Deliberative democracy is not only an ideal that is established over the idea of
communicative rationality and discourse ethics, but a procedure at the same time.
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Hence the Habermasian response to the liberal legitimacy addresses a radical
change in the conception of the ways and means of articulation and arriving at the
decisions by the public, together with its accent on linking action with intention, as
well as the objective of having the good as well as the right.
The weakness of the discourse ethics in this regard is that it tends to support
deliberative procedures as the critical element for arriving at the ideal of a
democratic governance based on consensus that is hospitable to change, social
interaction, self-transformation, differing interests and lifeworlds and open to
participation for any socially possible decision. Hence, the introduction of
procedures tend to overshadow the initial aim.24 Because while at the root of
discourse ethics lies the stress on individual, the choice and its moral and rational
justification, at its practical implications there is a tendency to overload legality
and proceduralism with the task of steering the whole large social process of
decision making. There is no doubt that this important contribution can ameliorate
the representative liberal democracy. However it cannot supplant it.  When
combined with the principles of universalizability and rationality this approach
may become yet another formalism and pose dangers for the revival of the
democratic ideal since it presents yet another set of monologically crafted,
                                                
24 As Lyotard says, "the cause is good, but the argument is not" (quoted in Ingram, 1996: 288).
"Such ethical formalism is considered a part of the Enlightenment project of rationalism and of the
political project of liberalism" (Benhabib, 1990: 331). What comes out of the discussion of the
Habermasian theory is, as Ingram puts it, that "one could hardly justify democracy as a universal
and pure type of political rationality." Charles Taylor (1991: 30) thinks that a purely procedural
ethics is inconsistent. He also asserts that even Kant had to return to substantialist, i.e. Aristotelian
ethics.
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Eurocentric and monolithic principles that is considered as the very threats before
the perpetuation of democracy in face of the liberal crisis.25
5.1.2.6 Solidarity for Social Integration
For Habermas, the rules of speech are not enough, we need solidarity between the
participants too. Everyone is required to take the perspective of the others and thus
emerges an understanding of the self in conjunction of the world. Hence the
discourse ethics envisages a transformation of the political question from the "I"
position to "the other" and finally to "we". Whether it is capable of generating this
transformation, though, is questionable. The stress on justice prevents Habermas to
root his theory firmly on the ground of social solidarity, a concept that could
mitigate the destructive effects of othering. Rather he contends that there is an
interdependence between justice and care for the identities formed through a
complex network of communicative interactions. He (1989-90: 47) says, "justice
required deontologically requires solidarity as its reverse side."
This approach that is similar to the liberal version of rights and entitlements does
not tell us which subject is the intended locus for care. Habermas intends solidarity
to be a factor that only engages through the communicative integration of the
society, and as a necessary outcome of the communicative process that would
                                                
25 Baynes (1995: 225)  thinks that, the abstract and proceduralist project of radical dmeocracy of
Habermas has the strength of deriving democratic legitimation from the intersubjective and
discursive processes, a view of democracy with basic rights discursively formulated. However, due
to its weakness of its being highly abstract, he thinks that Habermasin project may fail in face of the
dilemmas of difference and more specific debates about basic rights. As Brooke (1998)  indicates
on the subject of abstraction from history and his attention to law making Habermas faces with a
paradox: On the one hand, Habermas avoids the historically specific; on the other, he grounds his
analyisis on the results of history. Same paradox can be projected to his discussion of rationality
and proceduralism.
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require individuals to take into account the welfare of the others just because of the
one's identity is embedded in his deliberative relationship with others.26 I think that
deliberative democracy lacks the moral resources necessary to sustain solidarity.
Because by situating the society composed of anonymous and symmetrical
individuals, it actually benefits those who can or are in an asymmetrical power
level to make a difference, not only in terms of their bargaining power, but also in
terms of dictating the interest-based facticity as the normativity. Hence what is
produced may come out to be false moralism.
In short, the element of ethics of care is missing in the theory.27 This proceduralist
construction of solidarity easily slides away, because discourse ethics ignores those
moral attitudes in which, without considering reciprocity we approach the concrete
other and provide help and support.
5.1.2.7 Right vs. Good: The Deontological Emphasis
Discourse ethics is primarily an ethic of deontology since it propounds objective
and universal forms of rationality for the right and that the good is considered to be
outside this context. In this sense, discourse ethics stresses that the moral life is
associated with Moralität, more than Sittlichkeit. This occurs by virtue of its
emphasis on justice and rational proceduralism. Habermas leans towards an
understanding of morality that is directed towards justifying norms. Hence he links
                                                
26 As Hendley (1996: 512) argues, the problem with this approach is that Habermas tries to
construct sıolidarity through the communicative action whereas, care is a substantive response to
the other's vulnerability.
27 Habermas replies to this position by stating that solidarity is built-in any social relation because
participants must recognize one another not only as equal persons, but also as unrepresentable
individuals (see Honneth, 1995: 317).
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the moral stance to both deliberative, interpersonal, intersubjective sphere, as well
as he underlines the primary function of deliberation is not a search for a norm, but
for justifying any claim for normative validity.
In Habermas, there is a sharp distinction between the "questions of the good life"
and "questions of justice", similarly between norms and values. However, unlike
many within moral philosophy, he does not eliminate one for the other. His
construction of the discourse ethics as part and parcel of a universal agreement,
and his insistence on the centrality of rationality leads him to assign each of these
roles for his explanation. So, while for questions of justice he utilizes the function
of legitimation of norms, for the good of the society he envisages prudent choice of
norms. Hence he tries to bridge not only the particular with the universal as we
have seen, but also the deontological elements with teleological concerns.
Following the Kantian tradition, Habermas contends that by situating the
individual imperative in the "universal right" of deliberative competence, and by
enabling the subject to accept through dialogue other "points of view", the
individual understanding of the good will be conditioned and adjusted to accepting
the right as the good eventually.28
However, this view lacks a very important dimension: the definition of the
individual good often coincides or at least interacts with the definition of the right.
In the modern world where values diverge rather than converge and where
cosmological values have lost their relevance as Habermas emphasizes,  the right
                                                
28 Kant tried to balance the individual good with the universal right by formulating the categorical
imperative which reads: "act according to that maxim which we can at the same time will should
become a universal law" (see Reiss, 1985: 18).
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often conceals and even suppresses the good. This binary definition of the modern
morality also contributes to double standards, antagonisms, and annihilation of the
Other. Regardless of the justice it may serve, it is also this perception of the
individual or the collective good that the identities legitimize their antagonism
towards the Other.
In order to escape the determinism of the moral stance of good life, and to respond
to value pluralism, Habermas suggests the need for a moral theory such as his, that
could provide the free space for pluralism of many different "good lives". At this
conjunction, Heller (1984-85: 14) says that Habermas faces with a dilemma, a
vicious circle by making a strict separation of the good and the just: "on the one
hand, needs and interests are informed by values and norms, on the other hand
sociopolitical norms are to be legitimized directly by an agreement resulting from
interests."29 This dilemma is the natural effect of almost all proceduralist theories
that claim to yield a moral outcome.
I think this observation is important, since the theory tries to achieve its objective
by eliminating theoretical tools such as a balanced evaluation of the good and the
right which Habermas avoids by self-imposing the primacy of democratic
procedures and legality prior to any moral agreement. Hence, the effort to "inject"
some morality into the liberal democracy meets with the difficulty of a mechanical,
and procedural polity to produce universal and binding moral coherence, since in
                                                
29 Benhabib, like Heller, point to the difficulty stemming from Habermas's to make a sharp
distinction between the just and the good which prevents his theory to fully deal with moral issues
(see Murphy, 1994) for an evaluation of Benhabib and Heller's critique. Taylor (1991: 32) also
finds this distinction as "falsely construed . . . the unhappy consequence of the underlying decision
to opt for a procedural ethics.
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my view, democracy is the last polity to rely on a transcendental, overarching
conception of the good.
The Habermasian theory by emphasizing the question of justice over the good,
runs the risk of giving way to harmful selfish actions that do not only endanger the
democratic process in general, but also weaken social interaction and cohesion.
Because justice in modern sense is intimately associated with the institutional
legality and legitimacy. It is harder to impose justice in the absence of such
normative institutional frameworks. Hence the objective of justice alone cannot be
sufficient to yield a socially produced and adhered norm. It requires a larger vision,
that of good life, just as it requires more empathy than rationality of the
participants in the dialogue.
I think it is not only the just, but the good that all the political debate and moral
reasoning often focus on. Moreover, it is in the conceptions of the socially good
more than the legally just that the people find their similarities and differences. It is
on the side of the conceptions of the good that injustices can be created that can be
legitimized using self-interested and self-justified arguments. Therefore, if we are
to seek a balance, it is not that we have to stress the primacy of the deontological
tradition that the western philosophy has produced since Kant including the liberal
rights, entitlements, and liberties, but we have to revitalize and reconsider the
eudaimonistic aspect that has been downplayed as a result of the alienation,
fragmentation and secularization of the selves.
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5.1.3 Implications of the Habermasian Theory for the Liberal Political-
       Normative Crisis
So far I have presented the tenets, conceptions and mechanisms which constitute
the Habermasian theory to re-construct democratic legitimacy by emphasizing
participation based on dialogue and consent. Now, let me elaborate on his position
with regards to the three sites of the legitimacy crisis of liberalism, namely,
identity, rationality and universality.
5.1.3.1 The Conception of Self in Habermas
Habermas thinks that the post-Kantian tradition from Hegel and Marx, to
Nietzsche and Heidegger, to Foucault and Derrida grappled unsuccessfully with
the principle of subjectivity, and reproduced dilemmas of subject-centered reason.
His communicative rationality is an answer to the ambiguity and tension of these
thinkers (Fleming,1998:  432).  The accent in Habermas's account of the self is that
the individuals are capable of rational agency, of taking some substantial degree of
conscious charge of their own minds and lives, and making and pursuing their own
judgments about what is good and what is right.
Habermasian definition of the autonomy of the self is a pedagogical and ethical
one at the same time: the self must be autonomous so that it can transform himself
into a person who has the ability to make projects, create ideas. In such a context,
autonomy becomes a normative ideal (Warren, 1995: 172-173).  Habermas sees the
autonomous self as reflexive, developing within a social fabric, thus participating
in an intersubjective process of reasoning and reason giving, reciprocal recognition
of identities in a dialogue, and responsible. By assuming a democratic ideal based
on moral autonomy, Habermas fills in the blank that Kant has left behind: namely,
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that the ethical position of the self is dialogical, not monological. The stress on the
communicative reason as opposed to convention or a transcendental reason
provides us with a democratic ethic that is open both to social construction of truth
as well as moral learning. Nonetheless, as with any other grand project, the
question is how comprehensively and significantly discourse ethics can explain the
perceived factity and further be used to transform it in the way of radical
democratic ideals of equality and solidarity.
The centrality of communication does not grant any automatic theoretical
consistence nor practical feasibility to the project. For instance, we know that the
lacking element of communication today is not so much simply the occurrence of
it, since with increasing channels of interaction in concrete as well as virtual terms,
more and more people have access to this sort of deliberation. What matters for the
question of democracy and the democratic decision making yet is rather a more
complex issue. The parties to any possible deliberation are not homogenous, naive,
monolithic, transparent subjects. The "speech community" is no paradise. It has its
own hells and heavens within its varying and shifting borders. The powerful
speech partners in terms of influencing the decision are often the ones that are
equally powerful in terms of their socially and politically structured positions. The
hierarchical structuring of any deliberation, thus the exclusion and ignorance of the
Other in any deliberation seems inevitable for the same reason that Habermas
advances his communicative ethics project: that the public sphere cannot provide
us with the whole array of clearly positioned and defined entities. Instead, many of
the identities even if seen as concrete other, hide within themselves further sub-
identities that remain silent or passive (for a critique of Habermas's understanding
of alterity, see Coole, 1996).
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As Lyotard argues, infinite diversity of human communication and its forms,
motives, styles, differing varieties of rationality and the effects cannot be reduced
to universal pragmatic rules of conduct (cited in Rojek, 1998: 10).  The aims of
human life are not exhausted in communication either. Communication may even
reduce all those aims to silence or mere speech. The aims involving the other may
be hindered by the rational and procedural communicative action, rather than
strengthened by it.  And it is even more plausible that individuals possess those
aims as a part of their self-reflection that is embedded in inner dialogue rather than
speech, and that that self-reflection is the general framework in which dialogue
occurs. By reducing the aim of the self to plain talk, Habermas risks the richness
and diversity in oneself to be given away to the requirements of the external world.
Meanwhile, care and the sense of solidarity may be lost in the enumeration of the
rational principles of communication. What matters, though, is the positive and
constructive side of the inner talk that supports solidarity with the other through
not only language, but also "regarding" the other, similar to what Levinas has put
as the "face of the other".
There is a danger that the rationalistic overloading of discourse may give rise to a
tyranny of discourse over "the necessary and desirable ambiguity of inner
experience." As Warren (1995: 194) says, "because the body's nonlinguistic 'talk'
cannot be conveyed in linguistic form, it will come to seem illegitimate." This may
marginalize those political groups such as women, ethnic minorities, etc. whose
styles of discourse may differ from this rational pattern.30 And, as Benhabib
                                                
30 We may legitimately ask: Who are the participants in practical discourse? And "whether 'all'
refers to all human beings or all beings capable of speech or 'all concerned' (Benhabib, 1986: 315).
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asserts, discourse ethics' reduction of all human potential to speech and at best to
consensus "disregards all existing natural and social differences as irrelevant in
defining the moral core of one's humanity" (Benhabib, 1986: 291).  The
Habermasian public sphere lacks any significant consideration of difference and
excludes difference's creativity stemming form critique and  subversion of
established norms (Gould, 1996: 173).31
The dimension of the affective silence is also absent which may give the
impression that prima facie a smooth external speech is taking place. Neither
Habermas nor his intersubjectivity do not account for a tension with this type of
silence (see Strong and Sposito, 1995: 280). What is involved here is "talking"
rather than "telling" which would concentrate not only the linguistic contact, but
would also require the dialogue over meanings to be shared. Habermas thinks that
the procedures inherent in discourse oblige participants in a dialogue to take the
moral point of view of the other. Here, the other is reduced to merely the other side
of the interlocution and he cannot explain the estrangement or exclusion that
comes along by the implicit or explicit manifestation of the intentions, biases,
meanings and suggestions that actually lead to apparent moral agreement, or
disagreement, for that matter.
Benhabib dismisses Habermas's attempt to restrict moral discourse to
universalizable questions of what is right or just for everyone.32 Benhabib is also
                                                
31 Bowring (1996: 78) argues that the Habermasian formulation of lifeworlds is not sufficient to
explore the whole array of complexities and the interchanges among the social subjects. He
suggests that by rationalizing the lifeworld, Habermas actually hinders the individual potential of
freedom and responsibility. This is further accentuated by his separation of rationality from
intentionality, and validity from meaning that results in reduction of emancipation to normative
discursive validity claims.
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critical of the "generalized other" in Habermasian theory since it is based on the
liberal notion of rights and entitlements and excludes and silences "the concrete
other" (Benhabib, 1986: 341).  Instead, she suggests that discourse ethics must
grant a central place for the concerns of the concrete other in its understanding of
the justification of moral principles. The liberalisms like that of Rawls based on
universal citizenship models ignore the moral point of view of the generalized
concrete other (Benhabib, 1994: 179).  While for Habermas impartiality aimed at
being provided by his proceduralism and universalism would serve to creation of
respect for the other, Benhabib insists on putting oneself in the other's place
(Young, 1994: 165).  She thinks that generalized other abstracts from individuality
and concrete identity of the other. This symmetry is harmful for the universalist
and utopian dimensions of discourse ethics (Benhabib, 1985: 93).  Because it
supports the liberal view that what can be the best morally possible approach is the
rights and entitlements to a symmetrically defined domain of individuals, hence
ignores the question of the good.
The modern moral theory sees the generalized and the concrete self as opposite,
the other's moral dignity is recognized in terms of the commonality, rather than
that distinguishes the self from the other. This commonality is determined by
"norms of interactions" which are "primarily public and institutional ones"
(Benhabib, 1992: 157). Therefore, the discourse on rights, obligations, entitlements
and the corresponding moral feelings of respect, duty, worthiness and dignity
emerges from this definition. For Benhabib (1992: 159), the selves are concrete:
"each and every human being [is] an individual with a concrete history, identity
                                                                                                                                      
32 Benhabib (1992: 9) is right and here we can see once more how legalistic and entitlement-based
understanding of justice without a sufficient moral content regarding the definition, sustenance and
materialization of the good can plunge us into the very same abyss of moral relativism and the lack
of legitimacy that Habermas warns us to stay away from.
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and affective-emotional constitution."   Therefore, moral and universal assumptions
can be made only on this concrete formation of identities, not in their "generalized"
or "abstract" representations such as those of Habermas.33 What is needed today is
both a new definition of rationality, that is discursive rationality and recognition of
the fact that "subjects are finite, embodied, and fragile creatures, not disembodied
cogitos or abstract 'unities of transcendental apperception'" (Benhabib, 1994: 174).   
This explication of the "concrete self" is a significant extension of the Habermasian
project, since it takes the abstract theory closer to the reality. However, there is a
paradox here: while Benhabib tries to establish the concrete lives, everyday
practices and social relations within her definition of the self in an attempt to better
ground the dialogical self, she nevertheless cannot escape the opposite outcome,
for by making the self more concrete, defining him/her on the basis of the social
interactions we may make the self a prey to the "generalized self" once again.
Because by considering the self socially constructed --while beneficial for our
conception of his potential for dialogue and open-ended entity-- we however lead
the way for "abjecting" him beyond his self, beyond his inner self-perception, thus
ending up in an another type of "generalization" or abstraction which is certainly
not the initial intention of Benhabib. Here the paradox is the same as what
Habermas faces: attaching any universalist or rationalist string to the pragmatic
conception of the constitution of the self and his sociation or individuation does not
make the self more concrete eventually, rather it tends to pull him away from
                                                
33 Benhabib (1999) refers to fascism and all authoritarian movements as the manifestations of the
"abjected" or projected other that is excised from oneself, placing it outside and hence drawing
secure boundaries around the self. Benhabib talks about a moral dialogue, open and reflexive, of the
self with otherness.
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everyday life and put him in a surreal picture. Hence, the probable outcome of the
theory could defy its own purpose.
In the Habermasian theory, since the self is socially constructed, the relation of the
self with the other also becomes complex. Because, as Young (1994: 171)
indicates when discussing the reversibility of the perspectives, we cannot know
which perspective that is supposed to take into consideration of the other and
reverse his position with the other is the "concrete" one.  In other words, as the self
is defined by his relations with the others and as the self is linked to the other by
reversing his role as the self, "putting himself in the other's shoes", perspectives of
the others cannot be adopted because "the others" are anyway our very
"perspectives", the entities that we project a certain identity. As a result, the
political equality and participation of the moral agents cannot be secured since the
perspective of the other cannot be easily adopted especially in situations involving
political conflict.34
Discussing the notion of the self within Habermasian model, Stella Gaon (1998)
finds out that it fails to "detranscendentalize" the Enlightenment subject. On the
contrary, Habermas defends a transcendental conception of reason and a
teleological subject that seeks its rightful end with his assumption of the rationality
                                                
34 For Bowring (1996: 88), it is the absence of the subject that is devoid of intersubjectivity,
communication and self-production that de-radicalizes Habermas's theory. Because "the result of
the effort to see others as symmetrical with myself may sometimes be that I project onto them a
perspective that complements my own." She thinks that such a symmetry is not possible or
desirable because it denies difference, not possible and politically dubious. For her, "the idea of
reversing perspectives assumes that all the perspectives .... are equally legitimate. Where structures
social injustice exists, this may not be true." Moreover, the claim that communication could be
facilitated by the same idea may not hold true, since any sel-construction of the other's perspective
constitutes a fixed representation of the other, hence the unwillingness to contact with them. She
concludes that "neither the concreteness nor the otherness of the 'concrete other' can be known in
the absence of the voice of the other" (see Young, 1994: 167-173).
210
of the moral principle. Moreover, as Habermas discusses the proper end of
individual and collective transformation, his claim, namely that discourse ethics
includes emphatic dimension remains unfulfilled. Hence, Gaon concludes that
Habermas's discourse ethics perpetuates, not remedies the Enlightenment
metaphysics.  The problem at this point is whether the self we are talking about is a
black box or an unknowable ontological entity, or a transparent and open one. Here
the modernist conception of the self as defined by his actions or transcendentally
free being comes into the picture.
I believe that this problem will continue perpetuating and creating other theoretical
problems unless we situate the self not in his environment, not in his social
appearance and social role alone, but in himself and in the other. Because I think
that the self is constituted both by his social orientation and interaction and by an
emphatic dimension that provides him to utilize these relations for some explicit or
implicit intentions, motives, goals, and interests. To state this fact means to admit
that the self too is ambivalent and open to change. Conceiving the self in this way
does not harm the fulfillment of the dialogic promise as Habermas and Benhabib
rightly try to deliver, since the self so constituted is open to social as well as inner
change and talk and interaction and is freed from the chains of cold and formalist
responsibilities that any socially-constructed self would inevitably face.
Discourse ethics may be said to be failing in terms of its egalitarian assumption.
Because being equal in deliberation and dialogue does not mean equality as
political subjects. Politics functions over the social processes that constantly takes
in and out the energies of involved parties, and thus presents no stable ground on
which the equal status of interlocutors to deliberate could be secured once the
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issues of contention and conflict arise. In such cases, it is more probable that the
participants would go back to their cognitive jungle and take out their emotive
weapons to bring to the rational democratic battleground. Hence, the principles of
equality and rationality in dialogue can immediately turn out to be the tools for
advancing dominating and exclusionary rational arguments.35
I can suggest that the self is problematically constructed in Habermas's analysis.
The implication that the post-conventional morality requires an "advanced"
understanding and procedural perfection is problematic too. This falls in sharp
contradiction to the theory's emancipatory mission since the selves thus constituted
and "processed" to be eligible for the post-conventional level would probably
become something different than their initial definition as "autonomous" and
rational. In other words, like in other levels of explanation within the theory, this
aspect of the situating the self within the larger deliberative norm-making and
political decision-making proves to be rather complex and contentious.36
5.1.3.2 The Conception of Rationality in Habermas
Habermas defends rationality through not philosophy of consciousness, but in
favor of a philosophy of communication. This is a precaution against the
                                                
35 Young (1996) says that deliberative democracy's tendency "to restrict democratic discussion to
argument carries implicit cultural biases" and its assumption that unity is the goal of democratic
discourse both can lead to exclusion in practice.
36 Benhabib (1992: 153) tries to respond this by asserting that the self is not a fictitiously
established entity, the universal process is "the concrete process in politics and morals of  the
struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy." See also Touraine (1995: 272, 275)
who suggests "two faces of the subject", in other words, mind and body, reminding the Augustinian
definition. He rejects the Habermasian use of developmental psychology and the suggestion that the
Self and Ego is one and the same. He argues, instead, that "only the destruction of the Ego permits
the emergence of the I".
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totalitarian drives that rely on a self-contained Subject (Geist). Ingram (1993: 296)
suggests that this fight against totalitarianism is fought on multiple fronts, implying
both Habermas and Lyotard share the same objective. Rationality of deliberative
process indicates the need for a conception of the self that is constituted by
communicative rationality.37 By relying on a strategic medium of action, that is
communication, Habermas intends to foster the individual action in the public and
private life which is intended to enhance democratic participation and solidarity.
Communicative action is a type of social interaction that is oriented to mutual
understanding (Bernstein, 1991: 18).38 It is dialogical, linguistically-oriented and
rational. All communicative action is performed towards consensus. Habermas
argues that, any communicative interaction must perform a speech action that raise
universal validity claims and suppose that each claim may be accepted or rejected.
The prevailing agreement is based on "better argument" (Bernstein, 1991: 19).39
For Habermas, public reason includes the unofficial arenas of the political public
sphere. These may be independent public forums independent from both state and
market, such as voluntary associations, social movements, and other processes of
communication in civil society. Moral questions should be understood as practical
questions that can be debated rationally. Because pluralistic modern societies
reduce the moral questions to questions of justice, in other words, to questions
                                                
37 However, as Cohen (1994: 138) indicates, it is rather difficult to theoretically justify that "one
overarching principle of practical reasoning" can be provided for the whole moral domain.
38 "The theory of communicative action is envisioned as a platform upon which the project of
critical theory, . . . can be rebuilt" (see Parkin, 1996: 422).
39 As Bersntein (1991) indicates, this position is taken from the example of scientific discourse. For
him, the novel side of the communicative action theory is that Habermas argues that there is the
same appeal to redeeming validity claims through appropriate types of argumentation is implicit in
practical (moral and legal) disputes as well as in disputes about aesthetic judgements.
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"which have the potential of yielding a consensus – a legitimate and hence publicly
binding solution" (Murphy, 1994: 114).  Here too, we can see the influence of the
Kantian deontological approach and the Habermasian stress on legality.
Habermas claims that there are different rationalization processes by which a
certain action become reasonable. But he selects the communicative type of
rationality to save the destruction of the lifeworlds from the assaults of the type of
rationalization that Weber has referred to. This links the argument to what Passerin
d'Entrèves claims, namely that the theory of communicative action offers "a
systematic theory of societal and cultural modernization capable of explaining both
the achievements and pathologies of modernity" (d'Entrèves and Benhabib, 1996:
1).40 By aligning the rational political preferences to the communicative
competence of the individuals, Habermas both strengthens the modernist ideal of
universability and rationality and at the same time remedies its shortcomings by
launching a redefinition of rationality not on the basis of rational decision-making
and instrumental reasoning, but by focusing on the interpersonal relations through
the medium of everyday communication. Hence the profane speech becomes the
ultimate legitimation instrument, the social and affective medium that necessitates
a regrounding of democratic theory in new moral, institutional and conceptual
foundations.41
                                                
40 As White (1995: 8) argues, Habermas presents the instrumental rationality of modernity as a
pathology, since it leads to "colonizaiton of the lifeworld" that is the cause of meaninglessness and
dwindling freedom. In this regard, the theory's stress on universalism and rationality as
reasnoableness may be seen as a general achievement. He, however, loads communicaitve
rationality with even more emancipatory mission, since the power of communicaitve rationality is
renewed with each understanding and living together in solidarity in our everday life. Thus he
claims that communicaitve reason operates in history as an avenging force.
41 In this sense, Habermas is not offering anything that is familiar to the liberal understanding of the
political question. In his discussion of the moral communication, Charles Elliott (1994) argues that
Habermas has several difficulties in his theory: First is that the conditions under which a
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Therefore communicative rationality emerges as the alternative leitmotiv of
modernity as intended by Habermas. This introduction facilitates his quest for
redefining the modern political process that is more or less described as a liberal
state --majoritarian, constitutional and based on sovereignty of nation-state. The
political question in deliberative democracy is tied to the social question in a rather
innovative way. Despite the classical approach to the social as constituting the
framework of the political structure, and the basis upon which democratic
participation, organization and civil society elements are built, Habermas offers us
a social process based on communicative action that redefines the political and
provides it with legitimacy.
Discourse ethics focuses on our everyday actions and tries to create a framework in
which the society's institutions and norms are being formed by deliberation
between the citizens. Rationality in this process is not an end in itself, but the
element which makes the discursive practice to take root and be legitimate.
Habermas wants to achieve both rationalizing and democratizing of our debates
(Chambers, 1995: 244).  Democracy is presented as the general ideal in which all
social diversity of opinion and interest could be "managed" through not imposition
of an explicit and overarching truth, but a "consented" moral truth that is achieved
through the equal participation of all those who are concerned. Discourse ethics
                                                                                                                                      
community can discover moral agreement are extremely demanding, in other words, all parties
must be committed to the deliberative process. Secondly, Habermas holds that in ideal speech
situation all participants have equal power that is intended as a measure against dictation, however
this is not attainable even in theoretical terms. Thirdly, Habermas proposes abandonment of
ideologies in discourse whereas this is hard to realize since all moral positions need a certain
reference. Communication, thus is open to radical change as it is open to failure. Elliott further
indicates the relativizaiton of moral positions as a result of the Habermasian communicative action,
that is inevitable as Habermas admits, but may turn out to be working against the universalist claim
of the theory at the end.
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therefore also aims at shifting the participants in formation of a public opinion
from the inner debate between elites to the general public.
Habermas's communicative rationality has a universal core: it is the "procedural
unity of reason" that "enables him to rebut both the Weberian-inspired value
relativism of contemporary ethics and the postmodern skepticism of 'grand
narratives'" (d'Entrèves and Benhabib, 1996: 32).  In other words, rationality
belongs not to a natural source, a monolithically defined human being, but to the
reasonableness of the deliberative procedure (see Benhabib, 1986: 291).  Here we
can see the formalism of Habermas at work. How much such a formalism could
prove to be the solution for the legitimacy crisis of liberalism is open to question.
Because if one of the reasons for this crisis is the lack of appropriate participatory
channels for decision-making, the other and perhaps more important one, is that
participation itself is curbed by the notions of alterity and exclusion, hatred and
indifference. Unfortunately Habermas's theory does not attack this essential
element, but rather turns its head to the explicit and procedural side that leads him
to offer not a radically emancipatory theory, but a reformative one for the liberal
democracy.
Seen in this light, the theory could even come to justify the shortages and the very
legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy as long as it relies on formulating the
"strategic" solutions, and not the primary task of rejuvenating the ideal of a
democracy that is not a polity defined in terms of atomized individuals all self-
interested and rational, but a democracy that can generate solidarity and care. This
formalism stands opposite to the Habermasian effort to bring about "real" and
"concrete" solutions to the legitimacy crisis by the way of suggesting a "concrete"
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medium of communication, that is at the same time the milieu for opinion-
formation and opinion-exchange, as well as the chief element in constructing
public morality.
The assumption of reasonableness of deliberation is not free from risks. One
danger is that "the requirement of deliberation can be an invitation to hypocrisy
and deceit" (Sunstein, 1988: 1545).  Secondly, knowing that there will be losers
and winners participants will be likely abstain from adhering to the standard of
reasonableness because of their interests that are also constructed on the premise of
rationality. Moreover, as Martin Seel (1991: 48) warns us: "The fact that reason is
situated in communication does not justify labeling reason as itself
communicative."   
This Kantian definition of the communicative reason also faces the question
whether it is capable of producing the social morality, and that whether it can
provide us with a reason to do one thing than another. It seems that Habermas
collapses both individual and social agreements and political consensus to one set
of homogenous and self-affirming reasonableness found within the deliberative
process that becomes manifest through action. Therefore, the moral resources
utilized by each individual are incorporated into same set of "social logic" though
it is argued to be reflexive and responsive by its communicative nature, however at
the end the moral choices made by individuals are subject to the socially
determined consensus which in turn are expressed in legal norms. I think that the
"social" and the "individual" elements present in deliberation process risk to be lost
when faced with this level of "political" choice-making. Therefore, although
Habermas defends a normativity that is born out of social interactions, the
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discussion towards and taking position with regard to the political decisions, the
inevitable consequence is imposition of a certain kind of morality that cannot
support this emancipatory process.
5.1.3.3 The Conception of Universality in Habermas
The underlying principle of the reformulation of the political question in Habermas
is intersubjectivity. The intersubjective determination of the good as well as the
just in Habermasian ethics creates a paradigm centered around communication,
rather than other forms that reduce interpersonal relationships to such institutional
rubrics as state, firm, family or group.
The theory's claim to universalizability which is derived from the Kantian
categorical imperative by adding intersubjectivity into it stresses the link between
the particular and the universal. It also underlines the need to connect the morality
that emerges in interaction, with the facts, and to establish a nexus between the
morality of the particular or of the moment, and the morality that guides and
informs the human action regardless of the particular hence the universal norms.
Like Kant, Habermas understands this principle to yield immediately a requirement
of  impartiality that would secure existence of different moral and actional choices
(Dallmayr, 1990: 8).
The stress on universalism is a defense of the modernity project against various
forms of relativism. Because its absence may lead to the weakening of the
emancipatory dimension of the Enlightenment and the risk of emergence of
authoritarian politics. Habermas thinks that the U is not only for argumentation,
but applicable in everyday conflicts involving moral choices. The U is justified as
218
a pragmatic and at the same transcendental principle that both meets the practical
needs of everyday politics and provides the applicability and relevance for the
consensual formation of general will. The "U" is intended to provide reciprocity as
a measure against othering by "requiring of everyone a willingness to take the
concerns of others" (Hendley, 1996a: 505).  In other words, a morally justified
principle is one that is fair to the interests of all that are directly or indirectly
affected by the decision adopted. The U principle is linked to the principle of
deliberation, "D" at this junction.
However, the universalist assumption inevitably implies the question of exclusion
of the Other. Benhabib tries to remedy this weakness of the theory by trying to find
a middle ground between Habermas's "strict consensual model" and his "prioristic
universalism" on the one hand, and other more radical forms of contextualism on
the other.42 She understands universalism as "the principle that all human beings,
by virtue of their humanity, are entitled to moral respect from others, and that such
universal moral respect minimally entails the entitlement of individuals to basic
human, civil, and political rights" (Benhabib, 1994: 173).43 Benhabib tries to erect
a democracy that is universal not only in its appeal, but in its recognition of the
individual differences that nevertheless nurtures committed care and responsibility
                                                
42 For this, Benhabib (1994: 176) aims at explaining why the spread of ideals of equality has
coincided with the drive towards prejudice towards others. The reason for her is that modernity
destroys otnological or theological bases of justification, thus giving rise to a "need for the
repression in order to reestablish difference and discrimination."
43 Benhabib (1992: 2) claims that the critics of this version of universalism are not particularly
against universalism per se, but its rational defense. Thus her attempt is to reconstruct, rather than
dismantle the "achievements and ideals" of the Enlightenment project: "moral and political
universalism, ..; the moral autonomy of the individual; economic and social justice and equality;
democratic participation; the most extensive civil and political liberties compatible with the
principles of justice; and the formation of solidaristic human associations."
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to others. In this respect, she accuses modern universalism to be devoid of moral
emotions and everyday moral interactions with the other.
On the other hand, Agnes Heller finds discourse ethics offering very little in
finding ways to practical difficulties (Murphy, 1994: 118).  Habermas uses "U" to
separate the good from the right, and thus becomes entangled in a vicious circle
that while needs and interests are informed by values and norms, the same norms
must be legitimated directly by a consensus that is based on interests.44 Here we
come back to the basic flaw of the theory, the confusion and inconsistency between
the ends and the means. A direct outcome is that discourse focuses on procedures
and the modality for bargaining, rather than a means for achieving that the norm
thus achieved is good or just. As Habermas says, bargaining has a place in politics,
but "how to keep it in its place is the real issue" (Chambers: 1995, 255).
5.1.4 A General Critique of the Theory of Deliberative Democracy
In the preceding section, I put forward a detailed analysis of the Habermas's theory
of deliberative democracy and exhibited its weaknesses and problems as well as
promises in reconstructing not only the legitimacy of the democratic element of the
liberal democratic framework, but also the general relationship between ethics and
politics. Let me now attempt a general critique of the deliberative democracy
model.45
                                                
44 However, as Chambers (1995: 253) indicates, democratic decisions are not made by assessing the
rationality of the deliberation and argumentation but by counting the votes.
45 In his study on deliberative democracy, London (1995: 53) specifies nine distinct areas of
contention and critique of deliberative democracy. The first is that deliberative model fails to
provide a secure foundation for fundamental liberties; second, deliberation is politically ineffective;
third, that it does not incorporate the empathy and the irrational elements such as feelings and
intuitions present in deliberations; fourth, group decisions are based more on conformity than
unanimity; fifth, groups often follow a closed circle of deliberation where the alternatives are
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i. Discourse theory does not realistically define democracy. The first element that
is missing in the Habermasian theory is the recognition of democracy's discontent.
This point made by Benhabib is especially significant since Habermas avoids
responding to the anomalies of democracy that may not necessarily because of the
structural deficiencies inherent in democratic theory that Habermas tries to address,
but because a more radical evaluation is needed in order to the basic logic of
democracy as "a bargaining process" as I call it, actually works to produce them.
Moreover, the theory cannot particularly explain and devise ways against the
neofascistic and xenophobic movements prevalent in today's "mature"
democracies. It is clear that Habermas aims at social transformation. However,
many observers think that this does not hold true because his theory is seen highly
utopian, and of little practical relevance for the emancipatory struggles. Moreover I
may suggest that the theory may divert attention away from the analysis of
concrete social and political situations.
ii. Discourse theory paradoxically tends to favor the liberal conundrum. Habermas
(1990a: 95) insists on the primacy of mass political parties which, he thinks,
transcend narrow differences of ethnicity, regionality and economic opportunities.
It is known that the communicative potential of individuals within mass parties are
reduced to minimum and what is at play most of the time is not what Habermas
seeks with his theory, but money and material power that is generated by dominant
                                                                                                                                      
excluded; sixth, the group psychology creates certain illusions and biases that interfere with rational
decision making; seventh, since genuine consensus is practically impossible to achieve among
individuals who deliberate, some mechanism for aggregating group ideas is inevitable, this however
weakens the function of deliberation; eighth, deliberative democracy supposes that people would be
willing to participate in public debates while this may not be true for a considerable number of
people; and lastly, deliberative democracy is utopian since it has no applicability for the modern
mass societies.
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elites. This concession to status quo signifies clearly the conflict Habermas has in
between his theoretical framework and the practical realities. To offset the
disadvantages of this, Habermas comes up with a compromise to the radical
tradition by underlining the spontaneous proliferation of grassroots and informal
organizations.
iii. Discourse theory is inconsistent in terms of its objectives and means.
Habermas's formulation of the political question not only dangles between facts
and norms, but between two types of normativity: the rationale of the present and
the future democracy, the fact that the fact of the social rationality runs counter to
the rationality he proposes.
Habermas comes up with an ethics that "cannot normatively recommend particular
values anymore, but can only provide a specific procedure of conflict resolution."
This understanding of democratic ethics as "conflict management" constitutes
indeed a significant barrier before any attempt to ground ethical norms that prevent
violence, othering, exclusion and isolation. While Habermas, like Rawls, tries to
erect a "democratic ethics" that is based on positive values such as justice, trust,
solidarity and care, he nevertheless cannot escape this basic premise that implies
clearly a negative understanding of human relations that is reflected in terms of
conflicts. On the other hand, it is implausible how a theory that is oriented towards
finding strategic solutions to the crisis of liberal legitimacy can, at the same time,
provide a framework for truth. Any conception of a minimalist ethic will fall short
of explaining and as in the case of Habermas, transforming the moral behavior
through its claim for universal truth. Habermas himself admits that the hypothetical
moral capacity tested by the theory does not translate into a corresponding capacity
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to form "the right, correct, appropriate judgment in real life contexts" (quoted in
Benhabib, 1986: 322).
Benhabib talks of a vacillation between two models of public life in the theory, the
first a juridical, legalistic model, and the second a more participatory-democratic
model in communicative ethics. However, "it runs the risk of falling into a certain
rationalistic fallacy of the Kantian sort, in that it ignores the contingent, historical,
and affective circumstances which made individuals adopt a universal-ethical
standpoint in the first place" (Benhabib, 1986: 322).  It also follows that the
juridical side of the theory delineates a "generalized other" that is in so much
similarity with the liberal definition of the self subject to rights and entitlements,
while the objective of the theory, or its content implicitly calls for a "concrete
other" that would actually nourish its participatory side with its definition as based
on solidarity and needs. Benhabib is right when she criticizes the lack of emphasis
on the latter.
I believe that this vacillation becomes a tension with the introduction of a
universal, rationalistic, Eurocentric, reductionist and reformative theory. Habermas
relies on the juridical domain to produce the more radical and essential domain of
the participatory domain that creates in itself a conflict. Benhabib (1986: 300) calls
this as "a dialectic of form and content."  Communication alone cannot solve this
problem that ignores all human dimensions that involve complex non-linguistic
and non-rational elements such as feelings, biases, hatred and drive to annihilation
of the other as well as solidaristic mood and care for the other.
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In conclusion, although offering substantial tools to realize a participatory and
democratic project and a political morality based on dialogue, the theory becomes
yet another "universalizability theorem in the tradition of neo-Kantian ethics
operating with the myth of a general interest transparent to all rational minds" with
its Eurocentric, abstract, proceduralist and strictly formalist character. (Benhabib,
1986: 315)  One may ask: how much value one can grant to the Habermasian
framework that tries to inject morality into a project that already has exhausted its
moral resources by mechanizing the human will and human dignity.
As I have tried to demonstrate, the theory of deliberative democracy is not
sufficient to provide the necessary theoretical input that could transform the way
the modern man looks at the problem of the relationship between self and the
other, and the interests and the justice. This confession sounds rather apologetic in
face of the inability of the theory of discourse ethics to remedy the immense moral
injustices the elements of rationality and universality has created in the name of
human development.
In this section, I have provided a critical reading of the Habermasian approach and
concluded that this approach, although providing very strong inputs to the
rejuvenation of the political with its accent on the social and the ethical and to the
reconstruction of the political ideal of democracy, yet suffers from certain
theoretical weaknesses and hence falls far from fulfilling the mission to reclaim the
democratic element which faces a profound legitimacy crisis in its association with
liberalism as demonstrated by the disruptions in its conceptions of identity,
rationality and universality. Let me now consider radical democracy and the
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agonistic democracy approach in order to assess their contributions, promises and
problems as well.
5.2 Radical Democracy and Agonistic Democracy
My interest in this thesis is to find out whether present prominent theoretical
models both in the liberal as well as non-liberal thought can provide a consistent
and satisfactory response to the legitimacy crisis of liberalism and whether and
how they may contribute in terms of re-establishing the intrinsic and perennial
relationship between politics and ethics. My concern in the preceding section of
this chapter has been evaluating the deliberative democracy approach of Habermas,
a major non-liberal alternative to the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy.
However, there is a further approach, i.e. radical democracy and the agonistic
democratic model, that also may merit a separate discussion for our concern. Let
me now attempt to broadly delineate the tenets of this approach and gain an insight
into its potential in achieving the task of re-legitimizing the democratic element
and regenerating the normative-political nexus in political theory in order to
overcome the destructive tendencies fueled by the collective claims shaking the
conventional liberal notions of self, reason and the universal validity.
5.2.1 Radical and Agonistic Democracy: An Introduction
The radical democratic thought shows different lineages in America and in Europe.
While it is influenced by a socialist or social democratic tradition in Europe which
emphasizes the economic and social equality, it often relies on the republican
tradition that aims at enhancing democratic participation in the USA. (Phillips,
1993: 3) Hence radical democracy may be traced as back as to such figures as
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Jefferson, Marx and Gramsci, John Stuart Mill and Dewey. The radical view of
democracy that unites these diverse thinkers is that "democratic participation is an
important means of self-development and self-realization" (Warren, 1995: 167).
This means that participation will produce individuals who are open to difference,
reciprocity, and tolerance. For radical democrats, democracy produces its own
ethics and values.    
The agonistic critique of liberal democracy focuses on the discussion of formation
and sustenance of identities. Judith Butler argues that the main flaw of liberal
democracy is its compelling of individuals to forge collective identities that
ultimately undermine democratic values such as liberty and equality. She, like
Habermas, thinks that democracy is more than the ideals of equality and liberty, it
calls for appropriate ways and means to achieve that (Grisat, 1998).   
5.2.2 The Democratic Ideal
The radical model of democratic politics relies on considering democracy as an
ideal, a system that does not close itself to change, uncertainty, transgression and
contestation by sticking to certain "foundations". For radical democrats, democracy
is not only a form of government, but a mode of being. Hence, all the liberal
attributes to democracy should be critically analyzed.
Agonistic democracy is an offspring of radical democracy. It argues that all
identity/difference need to be perceived as inevitable and certain and that the
contestation and the conflict between these identities are not "challenges", but do
constitute the basis of the democratic ideal. In this respect, democracy is the
political moment. Agonistic democracy is against the boundary-drawing of the
226
modern liberal state that centers some identities and situates others as mere
"anomalies" or points of alterity to be domesticated, contained and hegemonized.
5.2.3 The Radical Democratic Critique of Liberal Democracy
In evaluating the characteristics of late modern democracy, William Connolly
(1995: 88-90) argues for a three-tiered structure: "normalization", meaning
justification of unequal identity\difference configurations in the social order, not
only as defined within a norm, but also as seen as a natural or true standard;
"depoliticization" referring to the fact that political conflicts that incur risks for
certain identities are left outside the scope of the political; and "pluralization" that
relieves the society from these risks by fostering cultural diversity.  A normalizing
society is the one in which difference is seen as perversion and is converted into
otherness or neediness.   
The modern state is a "guardian of boundaries" both in territorial as well as on its
role in fixation of identities. Democracy is not where the political is located, but
how it is experienced. Wolin  thinks that constitutionalism has drawn a similar
boundary to democracy by stressing homogeneity and stability. She suggests:
"democracy needs to be reconceived as something other than a form of
government: as a mode of being that is conditioned by bitter experience, doomed
to succeed only temporarily, but is a recurrent possibility as long as the memory of
the political survives." (Wolin, 1996: 43)  Hence democracy is defined as a project
that is constantly in making and has no moral, political or social fixture, it appears
and disappears as the political in identity/difference relations reveals itself.46 For
her, the renewal of democracy cannot be assigned to the modern state, because the
                                                
46 Keyman (1996: 106) emphasizes this by indicating democracy's simultaneous existence and
nonexistence.
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citizens are able to find commonality between themselves through their
contestation of unequal power that means solidarity.
Chantal Mouffe (1996) focuses on the "ineradicability" of power and antagonism.
She thinks that liberal pluralism tends to miss the dimension of the political by
defining plurality in terms of fixed and essential identities. Democratic theory
needs to be rethought along the lines of disharmony, ambivalence and antagonism,
and that democratic society cannot be though as an entity that has already fulfilled
harmony. There is a constant rupture, contestation and conflict that is at the same
time what makes democracy political.
Liberal claims of rationality and neutrality only hides violence and exclusion.
Rationalistic defense of liberal democracy falls into same trap as totalitarianism
that it criticizes: "the rejection of democratic indeterminacy and the identification
of the universal with a given particular." Agonistic pluralism, on the other hand,
recognizes permanence of conflict and antagonism, and tries to underline the
opportunities of  exploring the commonality between identity/difference. Mouffe
stresses that the liberal notion of absorbing otherness in unity is unacceptable and
that alterity cannot be domesticated. Radical democracy rejects the possibility of a
coercive consensus by rational argument as Habermasian theory advocates and
instead "protects pluralist democracy against any attempts of closure." This is the
factor that secures the functioning of democracy in a dynamic way (Mouffe, 1996:
245-256).
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5.2.4 The Self and Identity/Difference
What matters beyond identity is difference and the democratic project is
constituted by the interaction, contestation and the constant transfiguration
between these differences. The answer of the agonistic democracy to the crisis of
fragmentation of identities and the anti-democratic movements characterized as
micro- or ethnic nationalisms, fundamentalisms and other exclusionary tendencies
is to stress the significance of pluralization as of identities. Agonistic model of
democracy underlines the element of change and contingency in construction of
the political. It assumes the politicization of difference as a social reality and
attempts "to restructure this process to produce a politics of difference in a
democratic way" (Keyman, 1998: 207).   
The problem of difference is a significant element for the agonistic model of
democracy. Bonnie Honig (1996: 257), for example, argues that difference is not
simply a different identity, "it is also that which resists or exceeds the closure of
identity." Difference is an outcome of identity, not its counter-notion. The stress on
conflict and resistance comes once again to fore in her argument for agonism, since
not only identity but difference should be considered within democratic theory.
What characterizes such a political arena is dilemmas that each person faces in
daily life. Agonistic democracy takes dilemmas not only as signs of moral
pluralism, but also a sign of "the ineradicability of difference from identity."   
In this sense, agonistic democracy can be defined as "the democratic governance
that enables social identities to recognize the limits of their very demands and
interests while voicing them, and hence prevents the process of politicization of
difference to become a process of 'annihilation of the other'" (Keyman, 1998: 209).  
229
For Keyman, this requires two enterprises: First, the assumption that politics is
essentially an ethical practice, and second, that the social consensus on the
principles and values constituting the normative basis of democracy should be
considered as the constitutive element of democratic legitimacy. Hence the basis of
democracy becomes agonistic conflict, rather than consensus, and this constitutes,
at the same time, a major critique to the theory of discourse ethics (see Keyman,
1996: 101).  In short, the main attributes of agonistic democracy is its openness to
change and to the ambivalence of the relationship between identity and difference.
5.2.5 Connolly and The Ethos of Pluralization
Connolly (1995: xii) devises the ethos of pluralization which refers to the effort to
ground democracy once again in the identity\differences and their ambivalence and
contingency. It is an attempt that tries to situate the political back in its
participatory and ethical dimension. It argues against conventional democratic
pluralism that is centered around the nation state and basic rights and entitlements
that remain "sting, cramped and defensive."  This is the reason why real
pluralization of identities and ethical-moral stances are often seen as perils by the
liberal pluralist imagination.
The effort of Connolly (1995: xv) is to refashion "the pluralist imagination" to
cultivate "an ethos of critical responsiveness to political movements that challenge
the self-confidence and congealed judgments of dominant constituencies."  Critical
responsiveness stands opposite to fundamentalism in its relation to the existing
pluralization drives. In other words, it is an attempt to inject generosity and
morality into the existing liberal pluralism. However, it requires more than a
reformative endeavor. It necessitates a double action on the part of the pluralization
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ethos: first, to acknowledge and cultivate the critical responsiveness to new
movements of pluralization, and second, to provide a milieu in which new
identities can live in peaceful coexistence.
For Connolly, identities are both relationally and collectively constructed. Critical
responsiveness in this regard is a political  response to the politics of
identity\difference. This is not a moral code in itself, because it is only a modality
that is used to cultivate respect for a politics of pluralization that is over any
conception of political morality. The reason is that violence may often become
transcendentalized and converged with morality.
Connolly's ethical suggestion is, however, to connect the intrasubjective and
intersubjective differences and open "relational possibilities of agonistic respect,
studied indifference, critical responsiveness, and selective collaboration between
interdependent, contending identities" (Connolly, 1995: xix).  In other words, this
is an effort that tries to establish an ethical framework that is not foundationalist,
universalist, transcendentalist and overly rationalistic. This makes the ethos of
pluralization different than the liberal, communitarian and the Habermasian
responses to the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy that I have described in
Chapter II.
The ethos of pluralization is a project to revive the democratic ideal and to
unburden it from the Eurocentric, rationalist, discursive and totalizing associations.
Hence Connolly proposes "governing assemblages" that would actually constitute
"micro-democracies" across different identities. It does not, however, mean that
this is a communitarian response, since Connolly emphasizes "crisscrossing
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multifarious lines of identity, difference, connection, indifference, and opposition"
and not a single "we". Connolly is cautious towards the efforts to perceive a
unified nation or community since it necessarily leads to a conversion of difference
to otherness. This process of othering poses significant barriers before building
majority assemblages of democratic governance. His approach, thus, is not to
disregard difference, but to productively and constructively utilize it in a
participatory democratic framework. Because, each identity creates its own
difference. Connolly (1995: 93) argues that there is a common misconception of
diversity as "limbs branching out from a common trunk . . . [that] might be
Christianity or Kantian morality, or the history of a unified nation or secular
reason." He negates this notion calling it "arboreal pluralism" and instead proposes
majority assemblages. These are mobile constellations involving different
identities to find common themes that are of interest to at least some of them, and
refer to neither national will nor general consensus. Democracy becomes the mode
in which all these identity\difference claims are responded with a moral and
solidaristic manner. The greatest danger in all those liberal, communitarian or
discursive attempts is that they try not to consider, but repress difference.
Reviving of the background of the political action and relation in terms of this
pluralization, then, means also reviving the political along all possible sites and
types of action. Because a pluralizing culture embodies "a micropolitics of action"
by the self on itself, "a politics of disturbance" that identities continually remain
alerted to normalization of difference, "a politics of representational assemblages"
through which general policies are adopted, and at the international level, "a
politics of interstate relations" as well as "a politics of nonstatist, cross-national
movements" (Connolly, 1995: xxi).
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This reactivation and expansion of the political is made possible by recognizing
that the ethics is not limited to contractual morality as liberals would argue,
command morality as communitarians defend, or teleological morality as neo-
Aristotelians subscribe to. It is also designed to respond globalization and its
effects on state actors, its implications for the emerging role of non-state actors in
world politics and cultural scene.
Connolly's approach to ethics is characterized by something in between the
command and teleological versions of ethics: it pursues an ethic of cultivation
rather than of contract or command; and it does not pretend to construct a
teleological morality, on the contrary, it aims at disturbing traditional virtues of
community and the individual. It is not a single universal ethic, therefore it departs
from the Habermasian version too. He believes that in a pluralizing culture like the
one we witness today, "the sources as well as the mandates of ethics will be
marked by plurality" (Connolly, 1995: xxv).  In short, it is a position that
underlines the necessity of ethics while resisting any singular and hegemonic
definition of it. His position with regards to the political question can be called
"ontopolitical", in other words, the assertion whether something is fundamental or
that nothing is fundamental. For Connolly (1995: 40), "nothing is fundamental ...
Therefore, almost everything counts for something". It is because of this
ambivalence that an ethic of care should honor both indispensability and fragility
of ethics.
What is needed in is selective collaboration and agonistic respect that would
provide a relationship between interdependent and intersecting constituencies, in
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other words, where identity\difference is recognized without establishing a fixed
content of their relationship.  Hence, what he proposes is a normative and agonistic
positioning of the self vis-à-vis the other based on ethics of care. The democratic
ethos, then becomes the political field where an active tension exists between
"cultural drives to identity and the persistent ethical need to contest the
dogmatization of hegemonic, relational identities" (Connolly, 1995: 92-93).  The
crux of the matter in this conception is that the need for sustaining democracy as a
polity that is open to change, contingency, historicity, relationality and
ambivalence.
Connolly (1995: 104) proposes that democratic ethos is pluralistic not only that it
incorporates the diversity, but also the types of ethics and identity sites for
democratic debates. Therefore, the pluralizing ethos is to be aware that any
consensus is subject to contestation and that what is fundamental is nothing but
"difference".
The democratic ethos is created when the constant "surpluses, resistances,
intransingencies, and protean energies of diversification" are maintained in these
constellations of identity\difference (Connolly, 1995: 97).  In this "ambi-valent
democracy", disturbance and pluralization acquire a positive value. Consent must
go along with critique. In this democratic model, state is granted an important
function: it is the key political site where majority assemblages can work against
the normalization process which otherwise could be producing a suffocating
"consensus" under the state (Connolly, 1995: 103).
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Connolly argues for a representational democratic politics that enables the citizen
to serve both as a participant in procedural democracy and as an activist in social
movements. This controversial view, however, needs some clarification with
regards to its formal feasibility. Once representation is defined as the "labeling" of
diverse and immensely unique individual and group perspectives, it is questionable
whether such a generalization and fixation of the identity claims can still be
supported by representation itself. No social movement genuinely reflecting
identity claims can be considered as part of the representational system of liberal
democracy since they generally cannot enlist themselves as distinct actors
participating in formal party politics, and hence they need to converge with those
"labeled" political entities that are the very "normalizers" of the social movements
at the same time.
The paradox here stems from Connolly's own formulation of a tension between the
form and content of the agonistic politics, similar to the Habermasian conundrum:
while the form of democracy is preserved, what is proposed as dynamizer and the
catalyst for greater participation and thus representation works, implicitly, to its
disfavor and instability. It is hard to see the practical relevance of such an
approach, despite appreciating its strong accent on the very much needed
component of care and solidarity between identity\differences.
Wolin, on the other hand, understands politics as the idea that a society composed
of diverse identities can still enjoy commonality and that its collective power
through deliberation can be used to the well-being of all. In her terms, democracy
should be understood as the project that is concerned with the political
potentialities of ordinary citizens through "the self-discovery of common concerns
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and of modes of action for realizing them" (Wolin, 1996: 31). Barber focuses on
the question of foundations of democracy, or whether democracy needs
foundations. The foundationalist approaches to democracy emphasize "a
construction of democracy that favors natural liberty and absolute rights" (Barber,
1996).  This certainty of democratic foundations, however, is itself irrelevant for
democracy. Because democracy is not a fixed polity. It is dynamic and shaped and
reshaped through its attributes such as a revolutionary spirit that underlines
spontaneity, creativity and responsiveness to change; its autonomy that entails
engagement, participation and empowerment; and commonality or publicness of
democratic judgment that generates a certain sense of communitarianism and
common will. Therefore, democracy is a regime that legitimates itself without the
help of foundations that can be said to be synonymous with fixtures, closures and
certainties.
5.2.6 A General Critique of Agonistic Democracy
Agonistic democracy presents us with a picture that actually Habermas intends to
bring about, but fails due to his theory's universalist, Eurocentric, deontological,
essentialist and rationalist nature: the ambivalence of the self and its political
constitution.
In any case, democracy colored by a certain agonism is a democracy that is capable
of transforming itself. And that makes the agonistic model much more relevant to
our present world than the liberal or deliberative alternatives.
It also introduces us the important dimensions of ambivalence, disruption and
constant change of the definition of the political as well as the social which
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underlines much of the turmoil in the world today as exemplified by the inability
of the liberal nation state faced with globalizing tendencies, and at the same time
indicate the way we must understand politics. It implies a politics of dynamism,
reflexivity, openness. It tries to bridge the perennial gap between the normative
and the political by situating them in a participatory democracy which upholds the
value of participation and stresses the primacy of the socially embedded selves
before the rationally conceived representational and bureaucratic mechanisms
which are, at the same time, assumed to be universally valid.
It is a contribution that recognizes difference, the major social and political
element that shapes the late modern polity, and the challenge before liberal
democratic legitimacy, as well as an awareness for the vibrancy and permanence of
the ethical possibility that overcomes any type of proceduralist or deontological
flaw. Therefore it promises to regenerate a vibrant political in a radical sense.
However, it tends to give too much to indeterminacy and uncertainty, so that the
ethical notion may become itself an arena for the political difference and its power
configurations may tend to corrupt. Hence there is the risk that the absence of the
commonness of meaning as opposed to difference in terms of ethical positions may
give rise to a democratic breakdown.
In this chapter my analysis showed that both the Habermasian deliberative theory
and the agonistic democracy present us certain possibilities, theoretical tools and
conceptions which may be productively used to enhance the survival of the
democratic ethos and re-founding the relationship between politics and ethics. Both
approaches provide us with the objective of democratic participation and equality
based on the communicative processes, solidarity, care and social construction of
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the political. They also contribute to the essential quest for placing the moral at the
center of the political theory without subscribing to some transcendental or
metaphysical theory of the good. In this sense, both theories have important
insights about the configuration of the political cum the ethical to offer for
overcoming the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy however they are prone to
some criticism in their conception of the political processes, the universalist
arguments and sometimes formalist and foundationalist implications.
In the next chapter which will present my conclusions from this study, I will
summarize broadly the findings of my thematic reading of the approaches on the
legitimacy crisis of liberalism. This involves a critical analysis of the classical
liberal moral theories, the Rawlsian extension and the communitarian thought, the
Habermasian theory of deliberative ethics and the radical democrats and, in
particular, agonistic democracy. I will also try to suggest the theoretical avenues,
trajectories and strategem which are necessary not only to eradicate the negative
effects of the legitimacy crisis of liberalism that I have reflected upon by taking
globalization as the reference point, but also to devise the inputs, tools and
concepts which may contribute to the regeneration of the political theory by
emphasizing the ethical element as the part and parcel of any political process,
which also stands at the crossroads of the epistemological, ontological and
axiological paths for understanding the political behavior of man.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
In my thesis, I have focused on the effects of globalization on the liberal
democratic perspective, and engaged a dialogic reading between the theories of
classical liberalism, Rawlsian liberalism, communitarianism, Habermasian
deliberative democracy, radical democracy and agonistic democracy in order to
assess their possibilities for a reconstruction of the relationship between ethics and
politics in a way to be able to answer some of the important questions of our
globalizing world. I have argued that there are deficits in the liberal conception of
identity, rationality and universality and that the democratic ideal wedded to the
liberal theoretical perspective seems to be overshadowed by these weaknesses. I
have also critically presented the positions of all these approaches with regards to
these three faces of the legitimacy crisis of liberalism and evaluted their ability to
respond to the challenge of introducing new concepts and modalities that would
effectively respond both to the emerging crises in these three sites of the
normative-political discourse, as well as to change in general.
In this chapter, I will first try to exhibit some of the contours of my critical and
dialogic reading of the approaches, perspectives, theories and explanations
regarding the phenomenon of globalization and its implications for the liberal
democratic legitimacy. Secondly, I will suggest certain ways and conceptions
which are expected to provide the political theory with a better understanding of
the relationship between politics and ethics, in general, and the democratic ideal, in
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particular. Let me start by focusing on the question of globalization and its
implications for the legitimacy of liberal democracy.
6.1  A Thematic Reading of the Legitimacy Crisis of Liberal Democracy
6.1.1 Legitimacy of Liberal Democracy and the Challenge of Globalization
Globalization is not only the processes, tendencies, discourses and debates that we
have come to witness in the recent decade, but also a significant theme for
understanding the immense potential of the political change and to grasp the
profound challenge before the liberal credo as well as political theory. For this
reason in Chapter II, I have offered a tour d'horizon regarding the perspectives on
globalization. I have indicated that globalization as change reveals the uninhibiting
sense of pervasiveness and alarming disruption of liberal democratic understanding
as it is conventionally conceived. Its impact on world politics is often characterized
as the triumph of democracy as the old division of communist vs. free world has
faded away in favor of the latter. The number of "democratic" governments has
flourished, the discourse of democratic representation has gained popularity by the
demise of dictatorships,  the terms "human rights", "pluralism", "multiculturalism",
"toleration" and "cooperation" have become commonplace, all giving the sense of
the humanity's final victory of the dignity of man against the global evils like
totalitarianism and oppression which indeed encouraged some to call it "the end of
history".
Besides, the expansion and proliferation of telecommunications technologies
helped to catalyze this sense of a humanity of common bonds, as the local cultures
and modes of life started to be integrated with a "global" culture by which a single,
all pervasive set of values and references of thinking is assumed to be emerging, as
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well as an aesthetic "rapprochement" between diverse cultures, beliefs, ideologies
and religions. While the local has lost its sense of an immediate cultural and social
marker, more and more identities long ignored and undermined under the politics
of citizenship and the cage of national identities began to emphasize their alterity
as a political demand and a political position by itself. Paradoxically, in this sense,
the local, minority and subaltern movements started to call for a universal standard
of politics which is based on diversity of identities. Thus emerged the discourse of
human rights and the democratic principles. Therefore, globalization, has
revitalized the political theory and its nexus with ethics by enabling the political to
reassert itself.
However, as noted before, such change also carries not all promising outcomes. It
has negative impacts on the constituent elements of national politics in many ways:
weakening the territorial and political sovereignty of nation state, undermining the
role of national legislatures and political mechanisms, bureaucracies and other
expert systems by increasing transnational influence in domestic affairs, emerging
global risks with large-scale social and political implications such as
environmental pollution, mass migration and ethnic-religious clashes, declining
trust in the representative systems and institutions and a general sense of
indifference towards political parties and their programs which seem to resemble
each other more and more. Globalization is also bearing upon the liberal state as
the mechanism which generates unified meaning and action for the political selves;
but also upon such liberal theoretical constructs as the definition of the political
self, the rhetoric of rights and responsibilities, the intrinsic relationship between
liberalism and democracy, the conceptions of power, state, rationality and the
making and articulation of political choices. The legitimacy crisis of liberal
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democracy is attenuated further by the postmodern attacks on the basic
assumptions of liberal democracy about the nature of the political self, mode of
behavior, i.e. rationality, and its axiological framework in the form of
universalism.
What emerges with globalization then is not only a doubt about the working of
liberal democracies, but also a crisis of their relevance and hence theoretical
validity. In most of the cases, the liberal element seems to be overshadowing the
democratic element with its imposing, static and unicentered understanding of
politics as well as the political subjects and processes. In a sense, the democratic
value of participation seems to be jeopardized by the liberal insistence on legal and
political order. The resulting discontent and the lack of solidarity, care and active
involvement in politics on the part of the society signal the profoundness of the
inability of the liberal credo to review and reshape its conceptions and tenets. It is
at the juncture of globalizing relations in social, cultural and political realms that
the governability crisis of liberal nation state meets its legitimacy crisis.
I have suggested that there emerged three very important faces or sites of the
legitimacy crisis of liberalism as revealed by globalization: its conception of the
self, rationality and universality. The emerging new collective identities, and often
antagonistic relations between them characterize the crisis in the liberal conception
of the self which is by and large reflected in the concept of citizenship. In addition
to that, the doubts about the unitary, homogenous and "national" subjecthood
raised especially by postmodernist thought strengthen the emergence of these
collective identities resisting the homogenous parameters of identity. The outcome
is an instability in the citizenship notion of liberal nation states, and a dangerous
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turn towards annihilation of differences which coincides with the late modern
celebration of difference.
This crisis in identity in return is exacerbated by the pressures of globalization
upon the bureaucracies of the national political apparata of the nation state which
have got stronger in manipulating the uncertainty and "expertistic" isolation.
Moreover, powerful lobbies and interest groups gain tremendous resources to
dominate the political discourse and preferences. Therefore the notion of politics as
a rational decision-making starts to attenuate. The faith in a procedural political
realm conceived and organized on the positivistic and foundationalist precepts and
operating by the principle of instrumental reason begins to recede. The postmodern
accent on the hegemonizing and colonialist color of the modern Reason contributes
to this development.  However, the downside of this tendency is that those agendas
questioning instrumental rationality may give rise to irrationalism and anarchism
which may again endanger the coherence, consensus and cohabitation among
various political views and positions.
In addition to the self and rationality, I have also discussed the third site which
contributes to the general crisis in legitimacy of liberalism, that is, the liberal
conception of universality. In a way, the late modern loss of faith in a universal
model as a grand metanarrative may be said to characterize the other sites of the
legitimacy crisis, as the liberal notion of the self as well as rationality are distinct
for their claims of universal validity and normative value. The paralyzing
postmodernist attack on the Orientalist mindset of social sciences and production
of knowledge, and the claims of Eurocentricism imminent in the very universal
formulas of the liberal rights and freedoms galvanize the effects of globalization
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which both encourages supra-national political positions and movements, but also
emphasize the significance of the local further weaken the liberal reliance on
universalist explanations.
The political, normative and philosophical approaches which have been trying to
resolve these three sites of the legitimacy crisis are the center of my thesis. I
consider the context of this crisis as the globalization process, in so far as it is this
process that provides different positions on politics and morality with the
possibilities and problematics in discussing the relationship between political
liberalism and democracy. This relationship necessitates at the same time a
discussion on the relationship between politics and ethics. This occurs at the
juncture of the history where the promise of an assumingly democratizing world
thanks to the euphoric interpretations of globalization encounters the crisis of the
liberal democratic governance revealed by the emerging signs of discontent,
disruptions, indifference and conformism. In this sense, the globalization discourse
and the conflicting perspectives on it are important because they constitute both a
litmus test, and a melting pot for the modernist-postmodernist debate that has had
much to contribute to the debate on ethical underpinnings of politics, and the
debate on the efficiency, flexibility and even validity of the liberal democratic
framework.
And thus I have started to analyze the groundwork of the liberal democratic
thought in order to evaluate if and how its basic premises shape its political
elements which show vulnerability before the encompassing change and its basic
assumptions about the human nature, mode of thinking and action, and a normative
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configuration of the political as manifested in the conceptions of the self,
rationality and universal codes.
6.1.2 The Faultlines in Liberal Thought: A Cause Lost?
Chapter III provides a critical and dialogical reading of two main avenues of the
political-normative construction of the liberal democratic thought: the Lockean and
Kantian theory of contractarianism, and the utilitarian tradition. In my analysis of
these two positions, I conclude that liberalism from the start has difficult and
unsecure positions with regards to the conceptions of agency, the rationality of the
political system and decision-making, and the universal relevance of its premises.
In the light of my discussion in Chapter III, I argue that the current crisis of
liberalism is not a conjunctural event. Many of the faultlines of the existing
legitimacy crisis actually lead back to the origins of the liberal thought which has
been shaped largely by a sense of fear from disorder and clash, and the hope for a
salvation under a strong state. I have several observations in order which support
this view.
The first conclusion from this discussion is that liberalism is colored by a certain
idealism and abstract individualism which makes it difficult for the liberal nation
state to foster participation and preserve the democratic element by relying on
conceptions of concrete selves, and concrete political relationships among them. In
a sense, this abstraction often relying on some sort of the idea of "state of nature"
or an ahistorical "covenant" may be considered as the escapism from the hard
realities of the social world. Therefore, the abstractness of the liberal ideals
eventually leads to impoverishment of the political.
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A second conclusion is that liberalism, based on the fear from disorder as
manifested by both the contractarian and the utilitarian brands, is generally
suspicious towards the disruptions, difference and dissonance which are the
constants of the political formula and the democratic ideal. This negative accent on
the potential of the selves and the political process itself characterizes the liberal
mood which sees politics and all the conflict, dissensus and disruption which are
part and parcel of it, as an "inevitable evil."
Therefore, liberalism, going beyond its quasi-messianic claims may be called a
"therapeutic polity" which in return values the order, institutions, legality and all
those political concepts that promise silence, hence depoliticization, rather than
vocalization of the political role of the selves,. This is yet another conclusion I
draw from my critical reading of the classical liberalism: formalism and legalism
are significant aspects of the liberal thought and, especially the Kantian attempt
which equates politics with law. This equation stems from the fear that once the
political is unharnessed, it could disrupt the moral life of the individuals.
The liberal definition of politics as a "conflict management" technique or a
"bargaining process" has immense implications for the persistence of the political
which the democratic theory aims to achieve. Because of this, and the reliance on
formalistic and institutionalistic expressions of the democratic process under the
rubric of "consensus", the liberal position tends to exclude the Other, because
strong positions in any bargaining do not always rely on normatively superior
justifications, but on power scale in general. Therefore, the institutionalist stress
gives rise to primacy of the state versus an individual who is defined in terms of an
abstract, negative and conformist politics. Politics conceived and applied as a
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procedural activity becomes stagnant, docile and monopolistic as the law emerges
as the only justification of the political claims. The universalist appeals to morality,
such as the Kantian categorical imperative, thus endorse a politics based on
discipline, rather than constant reshaping and repositioning.
A direct consequence of the emphasis on procedural democracy is the conformism
and the resistance to change which leave the nation state as the only effective
political actor sponsored and dominated by a limited circle of powerful political
and economic actors. As a result, participation which is the most important
democratic element and value, gradually fades away. Hence, although liberalism
claims to limit the state power, it actually enhances it at the cost of encouraging
inequality, resulting in the impoverishment of the political and the ethical.
I also find out from my reading of the liberal discourse that there is also a problem
with the understanding that the liberal nation state poses as a neutral referee before
the immensely pluralistic notions of the good and moral positions. Pluralism is a
relatively recent coinage for the liberal democracy. Apart from this, the liberal
nation state preserves a morality of its own by legally sponsoring or discarding
identities, modes of life styles and even intellectual projects.
Beside these general observations about the liberal democratic normative position,
I also have gathered important insights about the liberal conceptions of self,
rationality and universality in my thesis. First, the conception of the other is a
replica of the self. By placing emphasis on similarity and homogeneity, the liberal
position neglects the plural sites of identity formation, the social context in which
the self is shaped, and the various moral trajectories of rational decision making
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and thus its notion of citizenship becomes a limiting element for the political
potential of the self. The lonely liberal self, motivated only by his rationalistic
calculations and interests cannot burden the grand universal claim of an
autonomous maker of his own fate.
The self even faces with losing all his political potential which is seen as the
remnant of the total power which is defined as being embodied in the procedural
and institutional mechanisms, because the configuration of the political necessarily
leaves little room for social basis of dialogue as well as contestation and
repositioning of political claims. Therefore, the "liberating" sense of liberalism
may turn out to be "suffocating" for especially those selves who are not
represented in the definition of a particular citizenship, and those who lack
resources either to participate in or influence the institutional politics.
A transcendental self is thus inevitably surrounded by the systemic will of the most
concrete of all political actors, i.e. the nation state possessing the only justifier of
the political legitimation, i.e. law.  This outcome is indeed not intended either in
Kant, or in Rawls. However, the political theorization with the purpose of
establishing an "orderly society" based on an universal and instrumental rationality
certainly leads them towards that direction. Therefore, legitimacy of liberalism
from the outset has built-in destabilizers in terms of public and private tasks of the
selves which are presented as neatly and separable categories of the individual
action. The sharp division between private and public aspects of the self
contributes to this instability.
248
An asocial self, a strictly private being is an introvert entity who lacks solidarity,
care and dialogue, all qualities of a normatively acceptable democratic framework.
The outcome of such a conception is the same: the supremacy of the nation state as
the single locus of the political activity, and as the ultimate guardian of rights and
freedoms. Moreover, the liberal perspective which considers politics as a negative
activity discourages the self to engage in conflict and contestation with other selves
and therefore leads to exclusion and asocialization.
In terms of the rationalistic claims of liberalism, I argue that the Kantian equation
of Moralität with Rationalität far from delivering its promise, indeed becomes
another obstacle for the democratic moment. Because, by furnishing the universal
reason as the only legitimate arbiter for the individuals' political decision-making,
it tends to limit the infinitely rich and diverse positions of moral reasoning.
Combined with the proceduralist tendency, any universalist definition of rationality
within this framework works for depoliticizing the political subject. Thus an "ethic
of rational submission" emerges against the initial intent of liberating and
empowering the selves. Moreover, the liberal understanding of rationality as
economic rationality too narrows the diversity of normative possibilities for
consensus and construes reason as a servant to self-interest. Therefore, it again
impoverishes the political by ignoring the vast avenues of action and interaction
among selves each of whom may carry a distinct motif for participating in political
deliberation and decision-making.
Discussing whether current crisis in the universalist claim of the liberal thought
may be traced back to classical liberalism, I conclude that the universalist color of
the Kantian framework especially, serves to strengthening legitimacy claim of the
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most powerful, hence contributing to conformism and inequality. Because the
universalizability test is too abstract and needs the legal sponsoring of the nation
state which uses that test to pursue the interests of the most powerdul actors. I have
also observed the prevalence of a Eurocentric construction of such a universalism
as apparent from the Lockean, the Kantian, and the Millean prepositions regarding
the centrality of the interests, analytical models and normative tools of the West for
not only evaluating the East as the Other, but also disseminating these constructs
by the way of colonialist policies which do not conform to the highly humanist
tone of the liberal thought itself. The outcome is the inescapable assimilation of the
other into a procedure to which it does not accord, or ignoring it simply because it
tends to be "unreasonable".
6.1.3 Between Justice and Virtue: Reflections on Rawls and Communitarians
In Chapter IV, I have analyzed the Rawlsian and the communitarian responses to
the legitimacy crisis of liberalism. Both these approaches are important because
they offer a revitalized political and ethical framework and must be commended
for their intent. Especially Rawls's attempt to erect a bridge between equality and
liberty, as well as between realism and idealism, deontology and teleology,
morality and rationality is worth of praise. However, both perspectives suffer from
certain theoretical inconsistencies and misplacements, following a similar line of
conception of the political like all those observations about the political-normative
aspects of the classical liberalism which I have mentioned above.
The most important contribution of Rawls for our discussion is that he
acknowledges the plurality of goods and the need for integrating equality into the
liberal democratic framework, thus partially responding to the liberal weakness on
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rights and entitlements. He designs his distributive justice theory in order to
contain the political positions drawing upon difference and pressurizing the liberal
order and to introduce a conciliatory element of politics that would mitigate the
clash of those positions. Rawls's "justice as fairness" approach reveals us that,
although the framework is, without doubt, a meaningful political theorization and
much more consistent than many classical liberal positions, its conceptions of the
political and the normative tools and procedures are fraught with similar
misconceptions.
First of these relate to the nature of the relationship between the political and the
ethical. He, like Kant, tries to devise universal rules which would guide the
political decision-making in a moral way. Yet, his attempt remains another attempt
in the path of an abstraction of the concrete practice of politics, concrete selves and
concrete situations which involve contestation and thus immediately the political.
Similarly, his definition of politics as bargaining also reduces it to a "politics of
interest"  and hence results in impoverishment of the political. He also subscribes
to the notion that politics is a conflict management technique following the liberal
idea that liberty is freedom from external interference which is the cause for
marginalization and negation of the political element.
Again, Rawls's stress on consensus as the primary objective of political disposition
risks becoming yet another liberal argument for conformism. The abstract nature of
the theory unfortunately enhances this possibility. The self is hence pushed toward
unanimity and convergence rather than difference and dissonance. His sense of
difference as disorder, quite in line with the classical liberal understanding leads to
the limitation of the political potential too. The peculiar liberal instinct to endorse
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stability appears in Rawls as well, giving way to a sense of formalism,
institutionalism and conformism. It is clear that "conciliatory" liberal approaches
let it belong to Rawls, Kant or Habermas trying to establish bridges between the
particular with the universal, almost always turn out to be proceduralist, and tend
to defy their own premises.
The conceptualization of consensus as the primary objective of the political
activity impoverishes the political as difference is left out as the real arena of
power contestations and instead the procedures at the behest of the nation state are
introduced as the only relevant political justification. As individuals who are
conceived much in the same line with classical liberalism move towards
consensus, they also move towards unanimity, and moral convergence while the
state and powerful lobbies are preserved as the "neutral" referees.
With respect to Rawls's conceptualization of the self, I reach similar conclusions as
I did for the classical liberalism. For Rawls too, the self is unitary, lonely, asocial
and ahistorical being. He too endorses rights which are dissociated from the social
ends, and hence supports the asocialization and thus depoliticization. The liberal
self in Rawls too is a generalized other, dispossessed and introvert.
Rawlsian sense of rationality is not much different than that of classical liberalism.
Rationality is seen as a guarantee of consensus which is conceived as the main
objective of the political activity. The argument for rationality is advanced in order
to confront the perils of moral fragmentation. However, what Rawls calls
"reasonableness" is not a single, homogenous and universal mode, but includes a
vast array of choices and moral justifications. The negative repercussion of the
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Enlightenment definition of a universal reason for the political can also be seen in
Rawls who limits it to the process of bargaining and self-interested action which
actually reduce the moral preponderance of his position. Because it is usually the
most powerful, and not necessarily the most just who is the winner in such settings.
Rawls is universalist like all classical liberal thinkers, but this aspect too suffers
from certain Eurocentric tendencies. He claims that liberalism of his sort is the
universal morality. He argues that his main focus is western liberal society so
endorsing the universal values in the name of a particular public culture relevant to
that society becomes an anomaly. This confusion between the means and ends, i.e.
the local and the universal has significant ramifications for our discussion since it
may negate the political as well as the ethical. Because to extrapolate locally
shared norms and traditions on a universal scale is either an idealist endeavor that
seems to have failed not only in Rawls's case, but also in Kant's, or it is a
dominating discourse which would then betray its own claim of equality, respect
and justice.  The universalist accent on particularity, as relevant for the
communitarians in the opposite direction, becomes an anachronism. Because it
both suppresses and at the same time glorifies particularity. Thus Othering and the
exclusion of the Other becomes possible not only across societies, but also among
the selves within the same society as difference lies at home too. Therefore, Rawls
too seems to be unable to respond effectively to the theoretical requirements of a
normative-political framework which would ensure participation, difference and
the constant vibrancy of the political.
In Chapter IV, I have also analyzed the communitarians in order to substantiate my
reading of Rawls because Rawls may be considered as the raison d'être of the
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communitarian line of thinking. While Rawls represents the contractarian,
deontological and the egalitarian traditions, communitarians represent somewhat
hermeneutic, Aristotelian and the teleological approaches. However, there is a
common theme between them: how to reconcile the self with the politics and at
what scale?
Communitarianism is largely a refutation of the liberal universalism and
abstraction, and can be seen as the other side of the liberal coin. It relies on a
critique of Rawls and the liberal individualism. Yet, it is difficult to call this
thought a distinct theory because it lacks a theoretical coherence as many of its
proponents do otherwise sponsor other agendas and thus it remains largely as an
extension of liberalism. However, the communitarian critique is important for my
task since it provides us the alternative locations and destinations of the self.
Communitarians perceive Rawls as the voice of the modern liberalism and are
especially attracted by his emphasis on justice. Because justice requires a
conception of the moral position which must correlate with the conception of
agency.  The communitarian response to the Rawlsian notion of agency is
significant for it balances it with a conception of self which is socially bound, a
depository of the common meanings, and shared values. Therefore they dismiss the
liberal notion of self as an isolated being, a ghost, an unencumbered person, and
instead they stress social construction of the self. This argument makes
communitarianism a perspective which could offer a way out of the problematique
of the liberal self.
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However, the communitarian notion of identity seems to be suffering from similar
misconceptions like the liberal tradition, although in a different plane. Because
communitarians while defending social construction of agency, easily fall into the
trap of reductionism and eradication of difference in the name of common values
and norms. Their emphasis on sociation is a useful and indeed necessary
contribution, yet to associate the social with the self in a way to make the self an
amorphous member of a collectivity is a real risk for this perspective. It is even
more alarming on the part of the democratic idea to observe in some of the
advocates of the communitarian school, a longing for the "good old community"
where the difference and dissonance was nonexistent due to singular and
hegemonic codes of political and moral behavior.
The communitarian self, like that of liberalism, is moved away from his political
potential and the moral consistence in this way. Because the communal attributes
of the self are just one aspect of his political figure. Moreover, the othering may
immediately emerge as difference is undermined for an image of unitarian
community. After all, the term "community" seems to be failing the expectations of
those communitarians who still see it as a valid, relevant and desirable unit of life
and as a self-contained collectivity. That kind of community seems to be outmoded
in the western liberal societies, moreover the implication of homogeneity connoted
by this term is hard to find resonance among the pluralized identities.
Communitarian critique of the universalism of liberalism too is misleading as the
concern of the communitarians is to find solutions based on their model of the
western liberal society, just like Rawls, and other liberal thinkers whom they
criticize. Here as well I observe the same risk as I did in the cases of Kant and
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Rawls: the inconsistency between the promises and the theoretical configuration of
the political and normative elements cannot support each other. And the ensuing
gap is always filled by the already-existing power structures in the society.
Therefore, I have argued that communitarianism too fails to provide a satisfactory
response to the Balkanization of identities, irrelevance of modern rationality and
the universalist arguments utilizing Eurocentric perspectives.
6.1.4 Habermas and Radical Democrats: Avenues for Participatory
       Democracy
My critical reading of the deliberative democratic position and the radical
democratic idea, and within it the agonistic democracy approach in Chapter V
showed that these approaches do better respond the legitimacy crisis of liberal
democracy by not only providing us with novel theoretical tools and concepts, but
also engaging us to rethink the constitution, configuration and the limits of the
political. In this sense, many of the criticisms I have launched against the classical
liberals like Kant, modern liberals like Rawls and the communitarians are the
concerns for these schools as well.
Habermas is another bridge-builder in the path of Kant. He is aware of the
inaptitude of the liberal position to tackle the modern problems relating to identity,
rationality and universality, and therefore he tries to reconcile the idealist
contractarian tradition of Kant with the egalitarian, pluralistic and democratic
elements. The deliberative ethics or deliberative democracy thesis of Habermas is
therefore a very significant contribution to the liberal conception of politics in
particular, and to political theory in general.
256
His introduction of the principles of deliberative democracy and a dialogic
rationality, consensus-based decision-making, and a socially situated self are all
very meaningful steps to revitalize the democratic ideal. He offers us the
relationship between democracy and law, which is based on discursively obtained
consensus through democratic participation. I believe that these are the elements
any consistent political theory of democracy should possess.
The weaknesses of the Habermasian theory, however, come from the same root as
the liberal position: his defense of the modern "achievements" like individual
autonomy, his endorsement of universalism, his unshaken faith in the primacy of
procedures and the equation of morality with legality all remind the Kantian
project of a universally valid normative code which would combine both the
particular and the universal, both the political and the legal, both the rational and
the metaphysical. A major difference is that while Kant relied on instrumental
rationality to bridge the norms with factity, Habermas devises communicative
rationality.
The bridge-building for Habermas stands on the tenets of the Enlightenment ideals
such as rationalism and universalism. As I have discussed before, these tenets are
the very roots of the instability, and the loss of faith in the relevance of the
democratic ideal in face of all the changes that are imposed by globalizing
tendencies. He, however, is keen on preserving them in order not to give away to
the postmodernist "revolt", but this insistence produces significant problems for the
theory.
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One of these problems is that Habermas's effort to enable the self to become an
active participant in politics fails due to, first, the abstract definition of
communication, communicative power and communicative ethics, and secondly,
his singling out of communication as a universally monolithic process which
conversely carries a real risk for othering, exclusion and domination. The self is
not sufficiently situated in the theory, because he is, like the liberal conception, a
"generalized other". In other words, the normative theorization using grand
channels, once again fail in the face of the factity. The other is defined as the other
side of the interlocution and is silenced much in the same way as the liberal theory
does, as I have discussed above. Although Habermas does not intend to create a
transcendental theory, at the end, he arrives at one because he sticks to the
modernist notions reducing politics to law, morality to reason, and the dialogue to
"plain speech."
A parallel weakness, reminding us the Kantian and Rawlsian remedies, is observed
in Habermas's reliance on procedures, law, institutions and his stress on order. As I
have mentioned above, such proceduralist theories often end up diminishing the
political potential which is nourished by difference, dissonance and  disruption. So,
the theory cannot deliver what it originally aims to do. For this reason, I have
focused on radical democracy as another discourse alongside Habermas, which
attempts to delineate the legitimacy of the liberal nation state. There are strong
aspects of radical democracy and the agonistic democracy because they seem to
provide one of the most innovative and thought-provoking responses to the
legitimacy crisis and its repercussions for the political and normative
conceptualization. For example, the emphasis placed upon the political as the
activity which is constantly in making is a significant contribution. The conception
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of democracy as a mode of being and something more than a form of government
is another. Another effective response is the recognition of change, disruption,
difference and, antagonism and not consensus as part and parcel of politics.
The stress on difference and the notion of a democratic moment are aspects of the
radical democracy thesis which claims the possibility of meeting the challenge of
change as globalization poses for the liberal democratic state. It is also important to
recall that the democratic element which has been forged in the liberal democratic
model is now receiving a special attention which it certainly deserves. In this
context, it is meaningful to observe that the agonistic position attempts to open
relational possibilities based on respect, to engender critical responsiveness and
selective collaboration without ignoring antagonism or difference. The ethics of
care is the normative framework for this perspective.
Although radical democracy and agonistic democracy are relatively promising and
reinvigorating responses to the legitimacy crisis, they stand as models too abstract.
Moreover, the underlining of difference must be carefully distinguished from the
glorification of difference since we need to keep the balance between those
perspectives which stress order, like the liberal position, and those which
emphasize change. Both sacralizations do not work in favor of rooting of a politics
in conformity with the factity and sustained by an ethics of responsibility. Again,
the focus which might be blurred in sponsoring change and uncertainty is
important for a theoretical endeavor to achieve a substantial, well-grounded and
living democratic ideal.
259
6.2 Prospects and Reflections: On the Intrinsic Relationship between Politics
    and Ethics
In this part, I would like to state my reflections on the legitimacy crisis of
liberalism and to suggest certain theoretical efforts and signposts which may be
useful for the discussions on liberal political position as well as other variants of
democracy and the debates on the normative modeling of the political concepts
such as identity, rationality and universality. First of all, I would like to emphasize
that the crisis of liberal democratic legitimacy as I have dealt in this thesis cannot
be understood if it is not situated within the framework of the liberal normative
political understanding that isolates, fragments, imprisons the self and strips the
individual off his sociation, responsibility, reflexivity, and constant shaping.
Excluded in the liberal ethics is the component of care, solidarity, and agonistic
respect. What is encouraged instead is the isolation of the self by building walls of
negative freedom,  separating the self from the other.
I also conclude that the legitimacy crisis is not a contingency nor an ephemeral
phenomenon. This shows us that the problem lies in the liberal conception of the
self, and its relation with the other. Therefore, we have to turn our attention to the
problem of ethics in order to understand the legitimacy crisis and not limit our
focus to the minimalist role attributed to the ethical in the domain of modern
politics.
I have argued for three constitutive conceptions of the liberal normative-political
order: identity, rationality and universality, three conceptual sites which may as
well be relevant for any political theorization for they signify the ontological,
epistemological and axiological conceptualizations. On the subject of identity, I
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have showed that the liberal ethics and its extreme individualism which lies under
its negative perception of sociability eventually leaves the political devoid of its
imminent ethical content. It also leads to negation of politics in general, as I have
mentioned before. Then, "the political" is strictly separated from the realm of "the
social" which is then defined as the free-floating area where the solitary beings, i.e.
individuals perform non-essential roles and hence posit no moral significance in
their relationship with others. Thus, "the social" is distinguished from "the ethical"
too. Therefore I think that we need to emphasize the groundedness of the self in the
social in order to sustain and reinvigorate the relationship between ethics and
politics.
The institutionalist and state-centered politics of liberalism, as I have explained in
my thesis, is the very fact behind all the instability and displacement of the self in
his own right. The political expression of the self has no destination but the public
role within which he is constrained by the state which is the "guardian of the
order." Such a bounded self cannot reveal and realize his social, emotional and
political potential and thus remains a passive unit in the exercise of politics. Hence
one has to consider the constitution  and the role of the state in this whole picture
in order to argue for a normatively grounded democracy which will limit the
rationalizing and totalizing force of the state on the political potential of the self.
Ethics is the real content of the subjecthood. And a self which performs its course
of action by unhindered political participation in decision-making is an "ethical"
self. We need to admit that the self is ambivalent and open to change. The self so
constituted is open to social as well as inner change, to dialogue and difference and
is freed from the chains of formalist responsibilities that are imposed by the liberal
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order in return of the extension of rights which, as I have shown, do not directly
contribute to the vibrancy of the political. I believe that in order to ensure the
constant motion of the political, the intrinsic relationship between the ethical and
the political, and to transform the silent self into a political actor, we need to
consider the selves as concrete as the other. This requires a conceptualization
which is exempted from Eurocentric universalism, and is aimed at sustaining the
vitality of the political through constant awareness of difference, disruption,
dissonance and disagreement.
For the second constitutive element of the normative-political order of liberal
democracy, i.e. rationality, I have tried to highlight the "poverty of the Reason" as
defined by the instrumental rationality, and the need for an ethical reconstruction
of the political question if democratic ideal is to survive the ordeal of the challenge
globalization and the ensuing legitimacy crisis of liberalism. In other words, the
ethical question needs to be evaluated as a response to the failure of the modernist
notion of rationality as it characterizes the crisis the nation state is undergoing as
the container of the political power. Then our task should be to salvage the
democratic ideal without running the same risk of foundationalism and by seeking
strategies to sponsor a new type of rationality which would be based on dialogue,
difference, openness and normative responsibility contributing to viability of the
political which is at the core of the democratic ideal at the same time. My work,
therefore, implies the need for further theoretical exploration of the very structures
of the liberal polity and attempt to examine its hierarchical, inegalitarian and
exclusionary character.
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Regarding the element of universality, my conclusion is that the claims for
universality and conformism support each other in the liberal theory. This is a
symbiosis that elevates power as a moral ideal and value over any other conception
of political morality. And it is for this reason that empowerment as well as
disempowerment take place in the same terrain as the tactics and maneuvers are
introduced for moralization and remoralization of the same power structure. In
parallel to this process, the political changes its nature from being a constitutive,
dynamic and resistant feature of the human agency and social life, to a passive,
conformist, and proceduralist game whose only vibrant feature remains
legitimization of the existing political order. Therefore the alternative theoretical
perspectives stressing the viability of the democratic element need to eschew from
universal narratives, not in the sense that their explanatory power would be
confined to certain cultural, social, or political "enclaves", but that they have to
critically evaluate, synthesize and constantly review the conformity of the
theoretical generalizations to the essential change in the social universe,
reconfiguring and reshaping the self and thus the social, and thus the political and
the ethical.
All these conclusions on identity, rationality and universality also constitute the
main conclusion I draw from my discussion on the legitimacy crisis of democracy
and the alternatives that I have elaborated demonstrate that ethics cannot be
reduced to a functional element of politics. Ethics characterizes, determines and
generates the ideas about the political too. So, the legitimacy crisis of liberal
democracy and its surrounding crisis of modern ethics also reveals us that the
notion of "political morality" as exemplified in liberal political morality is
misplaced and underlines all the problematic areas that I have discussed.
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Therefore, we need to find new ways and theoretical strategies to transform the
liberal democratic perspective with a more radical approach that considers
alternative interpretation of identity, universality and rationality as being
constitutive of a more egalitarian and ontologically conceived political order in
which the ethical shapes the political, then the political exists by the virtue of
sociability of the individual, and then the identity is constructed over a positive
view of social relations based upon solidarity, care, other-regarding, sympathy and
cooperation.
In this context, I would like to add that the categorization of ethics beyond the
purposes of classification, into the areas of business, politics, family, culture, etc.,
actually leads to a direct "enclosurement" and "irrelevancy" that creates different
codes of normative behavior for different areas. Once the ethical universe is
categorized, fractured, and fragmented, all the ethical/normative domains of the
human condition which are assumed to be autonomous, begin to possess their own
and often conflicting brand of moral standards. This couples with the
fragmentation of the self which underlies the legitimacy crisis of liberalism as I
have demonstrated in my thesis.
Fragmentation in identity occurs because the self is faced with behaving rather
differently, each time, redefining himself depending on the context in which he is
expected to utilize certain moral code. Therefore, all the genuine faces of the self
are fragmented into concrete and definable faces that do not resemble each other. It
also leads to a de facto fragmentation of the rationality and universality claims
since in each of this actional domain, the self utilizes different reasonableness and
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conception of the world that most of the times prove to incompatible with each
other.
In the face of this categorization, fragmentation, particularization, and isolation of
the multiplicity of the individual goods, the state emerges as the only authority
which creates and sustains its own good of individualism which results in the
primacy of the state and institutionalism discouraging participation, excluding and
silencing the political potential of the selves. Hence political morality is equated
with morality of the power politics which necessarily means a false moralism.
From this dilemma there is no way out unless we seek a different paradigm of
contemplating the self and his social universe in a whole, realizing that ethics and
politics go together as we see in the problems related to the constitutive elements
of the normative-political order, namely, identity, rationality and universality, but
also for a reconstruction of the normative democratic model based on the principle
of participation. Such an endeavor must avoid any theoretical configuration based
on the abstraction of the self from his sociation and dissecting the self's private
aspect from his public aspect. Because the definition of the liberal politics based on
that dissection is the very element that creates the petrification of the democratic
element and thus the eventual non-politics. Thus a need emerges, as a result of
globalization, for a definition of political ethics which, without sponsoring the
same mistake of a politics devoid of normative consistency and isolated from other
pathways of the self by the way of fragmentation of morality into sub-moralities,
would mitigate the centrifugal and fragmenting, often antagonistic and Other-
annihilating tendencies of globalization process.
265
The solution I propose is to locate a conception of ethics as the part and parcel of
human reality, let it be in his political, social, cultural, economic and personal
domains. All these domains are interrelated as they are influenced by the every
sphere the individual is situated. As I have demonstrated in my thesis, emphasizing
a certain aspect as the only center of explanation regarding this whole results in
misconceptions that in turn endanger and hinder the political potential of the self.
Ethics cannot be conceived outside and beyond human existence. It cannot be
presented only as a theory, an abstract ideal that people may prefer to choose or
not. Whether we name it such or not, ethics is in our very being, very existence,
not only through our external actions, but also within our feelings, self-perception,
and love and hatred. This leads to an understanding of politics as a necessarily
ethical practice, and it draws the liberal mistaken view of politics from the
procedural and power-politics dimension, back to the existential level where
seemingly tranquil everyday life is the home of the political, in line with what
Levinas conceives as a hospitality between politics and ethics.
What is needed is an ethics of responsibility based on the notion that we are moral
as we are, and that the other is a moral entity as respectable as I am. It is an ethic
that is essentially free from reductionism that is caused by "interest  equal
morality" understanding of liberalism. Such a conception of radical ethics and
politics, however, requires that all the social, affective and reflexive potential of
the self which has been ignored, altered or hidden under the liberal principles of
order, negativity, and formalism must be recuperated, again in a radical style. By
traveling from the world that promised liberation but imposed us the "chains of the
freedom," such an ethics can prepare for us an itinerary that places man in his
proper place in the universe, and within himself. But not without the recognition of
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the fact that being on the earth means being different, and hence being the other.
Therefore the disagreement is part of this perspective as well as consensus,
vitalizing the concrete politics which is at the same time the center of the
democratic model.
This ethical position requires us to produce modalities, frameworks and ways for
action in order to be able to respond the challenge of change. Therefore the ethics
of responsibility intertwines with the ethics of action, as politics and ethics are
entwined.  This is also an important reference in order to achieve the task of
preventing the annihilation of the Other as a result of modern identity formation
and subsequent othering process. In all these respects, the political theorist or
scientist as the observer too needs to carry the same ethic of responsibility. My
final conclusion, therefore, is to emphasize the need for a synthetic and dialogic
perspective as I have tried to emulate in my thesis in order to better understand and
meet the challenge of globalization, and the legitimacy crisis of liberalism. Indeed
we need to erect bridges, overreaching our basic positions and conceptualizations,
and trying to complement the empty spaces in our thinking with other perspectives
which may have something to offer in order to better understand and situate the
political  and the ethical. I believe that we need to stick to dialogue between
approaches, not to let ourselves be amassed in mutual silence.
In this sense, my thesis may indeed be seen as a critical and dialogic reading of  all
major bridge-building ventures in liberal democracy: Kant, Rawls and Habermas.
These are efforts which are to be both welcomed and, at the same time, put into a
critical scrutiny. However erecting such comprehensive schemes of convergence
requires immense theoretical venture of defining a set of limited number of
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variables that would be used in placing and justifying the whole theory. For Kant,
it is categorical imperative and rationality, for Rawls it is distributive justice and
the original position, for Habermas it is the communicative rationality. We have to
be alert against the fact that "conciliatory" approaches, i.e. those theories that try to
relate the individual initiative and power with that of the social universe such as
Rawls's, Kant's, and, Habermas's turn out to be rather proceduralist and tend to
defy the very premise they are constructed over.
Therefore I believe that any bridge-building or synthesizing effort needs to do this
without destroying the "environment" of the political theorization: in other words,
neither destroying the political for the ethical, nor undermining the ethical for the
political. In other words, we have to avoid formulating strategies that would
perpetuate the gap I have observed in my thesis, in all these approaches with
universal claims and multi-layered ontological ordering. It is the gap between
plurality and order, between formalism and dissonance, between rationality and
metaphysics, between norms and facts.
Hence, I argue that we have to be aware of a critical risk in the "bridge-building"
theories of Kant, Rawls, and Habermas which may also be relevant for other
political theories: the inconsistency between two different levels of ontology, i.e.
the self and the society or community for that matter, each possessing different
levels of normative political requirements, i.e. categorical imperative, or rights and
entitlements, or traditions and shared values, almost always results in
depoliticization, elimination of difference and the assimilation of those normative
statements by the already-existing power structures in the society. So, the
ontological ordering and the relationships between the actors have a direct impact
268
on the normative configuration of values, institutions and processes like
representative democracy, respect, toleration, rights and responsibilities which in
return shape the understanding of the political and the course the political is
permitted to follow.
In other words, any political project necessarily involves an ontological mapping,
an epistemological interface, a modus operandi to substantiate and operationalize
that mapping, and an axiological or normative framework in which the selves are
expected to move, interact, follow and sustain by the virtue of their political
dispositions. These linkages indicate that politics, whether defined as an activity
based on legality and rationality as the liberals do, is radically wedded to the
normative/ethical considerations. Then, the task of the political theory, as I
perceive it, is to ensure that these linkages sustain a content which is
commensurate with the democratic ideal, and that its reflexivity, and readjustment
ability are preserved by reinstating politics to its original locus: change. Thus
change becomes no more an anomaly, an unpleasant disruption, nor a glorified
value per se, but a vital ingredient for the political to prevail itself against the
domesticating, dominating, petrifying and hegemonizing effects of the drive for
order. In other words, the political must be understood as a situation, a moment, a
radically changing one which occurs by the virtue of the social.
The social, in return, necessarily involves a notion of being which is liberated from
the mechanical, systemic and procedural qualities and stand as naked as it is: a
radical existence which draws and reflects upon itself to find its proper meaning.
So, as long as the self is defined in relation to itself, by a certain "responsibility to
being", and as a depository of value, its ensuing relations with the Other are saved
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from the liberal or modern danger of annihilation, and hegemony, thus a sense of
"responsibility to otherness" can be engendered.
This is the ultimate position of my thesis with regards to the theoretical prospects
and strategies which aim at supporting the self's dialogic and agonistic relationship
with the other, and at the same time sustain the persistence of the political in
conjunction with an ethic of responsibility based on openness, dissonance and the
acknowledgment of change, as the democratic ideal insists on. In brief, I have
analyzed in my thesis the question of resurrecting democratic ethics and the
theoretical reminders and observations as how to apply it to the problems of the
contemporary society. This is an investigation which provided a critical reading of
both the liberal position and alternatives to it. However, in my thesis, I did not deal
with how my position applies to concrete cases such as identities, ethnic
nationalisms, fundamentalisms, and other social movements seeking a change in
the political structure of the liberal democratic society. It remains as a task for
further study.
I believe that in order to apply this understanding of the political-normative
perspective to actual questions, one has to have a theoretical framework which
must be based on a certain synthesis of the ideas for participation as well as
representation, normativity as well as factity, consensus as well as dissensus,
abstraction as well as grounding across the positions around the principle of
democracy. This is what I intended to do in my thesis, and also where the
originality of my thesis lies in.
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